

**ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT RESTRUCTURE:
DOES THE CANADIAN MODEL HAVE
VALIDITY FOR U.S. ARMY
RESERVE COMPONENTS?**

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

Jon Paul G. MacIntyre, Major, Canadian Armed Forces
B.A., University of Prince Edward Island
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19971124 084

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 6 June 1997	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 4 August 1996 - 6 June 1997	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ARMY RESERVE Reserve Component Restructure: Does the Canadian Model Have Application For U.S. Reserve Components? ARMY			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major J.P.G. MacIntyre, Canadian Armed Forces				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 66027-1352			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2 A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study examines variables of restructure of U.S. Army Reserve Components (RCs) consisting of Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserves (USAR), as compared to the model adopted in 1995-1997 by the Army Reserve of the Canada. The author is aware of problems this restructure generates, as he drafted the Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) Reserve Restructure Proposal which formed the basis for the Canadian Land Force Command (LFC) (Army) Reserve Restructure Directive. The RC restructure will be an important factor in the reorganization of western armies as Active Components (AC) draw down. The burden in meeting international and domestic commitments of western militaries by their governments makes RC involvement in military operations increasingly necessary. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the US Army is under pressure to reduce heavy forces, yet meet growing numbers of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) missions dominant in current theaters. Since RC restructure principles adopted by Canada may have application for the US Army RCs, the study examines roles, organizations, and missions of both country's RCs. Methods of reorganization adopted by Canada are analyzed against these organizations to determine if they have application for either US Army RC. Basic roles of Reserves of both nations are similar. Therefore it is reasonable to assume many parts of the restructure process are applicable to both. The focus is to determine which Canadian factors could be applied to US RCs. The study concludes that specific and general principles of the Canadian model have merit for application within the US RCs. In order for the Army to meet domestic and international missions, it will be necessary for federal and state governments to reach further consensus on the structure of these Total Force Army elements. The study recommends the Canadian model be considered for application in current and future US Army RC reorganization.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Reserve Component, Army National Guard, Canadian Reserve			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 148	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	

**ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT RESTRUCTURE:
DOES THE CANADIAN MODEL HAVE
VALIDITY FOR U.S. ARMY
RESERVE COMPONENTS?**

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

Jon Paul G. MacIntyre, Major, Canadian Armed Forces
B.A., University of Prince Edward Island
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of Candidate: MAJ Jon Paul G. MacIntyre


Thesis Title: Army Reserve Component Restructure: Does the Canadian Model Have Validity for US Army Reserve Components?

Approved By:

_____, Thesis Committee Chairman
LTC Marvin A. Chandler, B.A., M.S.


_____, Member
John T. Fishel, Ph. D.

_____, Member
LTC Jules M. Wermenlinger, B.A.

_____, Member
LTC Sam L. Schutte, B.A.

_____, Member
MAJ Kevin T. McEnery, B.A., M.M.A.S.

Accepted this 6th day of June 1997 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT RESTRUCTURE: DOES THE CANADIAN MODEL HAVE VALIDITY FOR US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS? by Major Jon Paul G. MacIntyre, Canadian Armed Forces, 140 pages.

This study examines variables of restructure of U.S. Army Reserve Components (RC), consisting of Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserves (USAR), as compared to the model adopted in 1995-1997 by the Army Reserve of Canada. The author is aware of problems this restructure generates, as he drafted the Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) Reserve Restructure Proposal which formed the basis for Canadian Land Force Command (LFC) (Army) Reserve Restructure Plans. The RC restructure will be an important factor in the reorganization of western armies as Active Components (AC) draw down. The burden in meeting international and domestic commitments of Western militaries by their governments, makes RC involvement in military operations increasingly necessary. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the US Army is under pressure to reduce heavy forces, yet meet growing numbers of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) missions dominant in current theaters.

Since Reserve restructure principles adopted by Canada may have application for US Army RCs, the study examines roles, organization, and missions of both organizations. Methods of reorganization adopted by Canada are analyzed against these organizations to determine if they have application for either US Army RC. Basic roles of Reserves of both nations are similar. Therefore it is reasonable to assume many parts of the restructure process are applicable to both. The focus is to determine which Canadian factors could be applied to US RCs.

The study concludes that specific and general principles of the Canadian model have merit for application within the US RCs. In order for the Army to meet domestic and international missions, it will be necessary for federal and state governments to reach further consensus on the structure of these Total Force Army elements. The study recommends that principles used in Canada be considered for application in current and future US Army RC reorganization.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
CHAPTER	
ONE. INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	1
TWO. THE CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE RESTRUCTURE PROCESS PROCESS.....	26
THREE. THE US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS	36
FOUR. SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES OF RESERVE RESTRUCTURE CONTAINED IN THE CANADIAN ARMY DIRECTIVE AS APPLICABLE TO US ARMY RC UNITS.....	43
FIVE. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INTENT OF RESERVE RESTRUCTURE CONTAINED IN THE CANADIAN ARMY DIRECTIVE AS APPLICABLE TO US RC UNITS	98
SIX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	119
BIBLIOGRAPHY	132
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	140

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Active Component
AGR	Active Guard and Reserve
AO	Area of Operations
ARNG	Army Reserve National Guard
Arty	Artillery
Bde	Brigade
Bn	Battalion
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
Co	Company
CO	Commanding Officer
CONUS	Continental United States
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DAMPLE	Department of the Army Master Priority List
DoD	Department of Defense
ENG	Engineer
Ft	Fort
FTS	Full Time Support

ID	Infantry Division
IBTS	Individual Battle task Standards (Canadian Terminology)
IN	Infantry
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
LFAA	Land Force Atlantic Area (Area HQ, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada)
LFC	Land Force Command (Army HQ, Canada)
Mech	Mechanized
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Conflict
MTC	Militia Training Center (Canadian Terminology)
MP	Military Police
MTOE	Military Table of Organization and Equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
RC	Reserve Component
ROE	Rules of Engagement
S-1	Personnel Representative
S-2	Intelligence Representative

S-3	Operations Representative
S-4	Logistics Representative
SCONDVA	Standing Committee On National Defense and Veterans Affairs (Report to the Canadian Government, February 1996)
SCRR	Special Committee on the Restructure of the Reserves (Report to Canadian Government, October 1995)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TAE	Total Army Establishments
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAP	The Army Plan
TASS	Total Army School System
TF	Task Force
Tm	Team
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOW	Tube Launched, Optically Guided, Wire Controlled (anti-tank missile)
UN	United Nations
USAR	United States Army Reserve

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Definition of the Problem

Background

The collapse of the military threat of the Warsaw Pact has created initiatives pressing for a realization of savings in the military spending budgets of Western governments. The focus for reductions in forces is the rationale that associated budget allocations provide a better return if used for social programs or to decrease national deficits.

As domestic, economic, and political demands for cutbacks in the size of Western armies continue, military leaders will be increasingly forced to acknowledge a shift in emphasis from large-scale Active Components (AC) to smaller standing forces, operationally augmented by increasing numbers of Reserve, National Guard and Militia personnel.¹

NATO relies heavily on Reserve forces—nearly seven million strong, of which more than one million are US—to augment its regular forces.²

During the Cold War, the US and its allies established large standing armies with redundant capabilities to counter the Soviet threat. Today, forces built on mass alone are becoming both less necessary and too expensive to field and maintain.³

One challenge facing the US Army today is adapting to the new global situation while maintaining its ability to enforce government policy as directed. As can be appreciated, these interwoven necessities can take divergent courses as the military struggles to be economically thrifty, viable, and efficient and yet remaining capable of achieving tasks political masters lay on

the table. Many times since World War II, shifts in domestic and international policy have forced radical changes to the organization, capabilities, and direction of military forces.

The US Army today has the task of fulfilling the government's national policy by being capable to deploy to two major regional contingencies (MRC) through force projection from the continental US (CONUS). As the draw down brings the US Army to a ten (10) division structure, it becomes increasingly difficult to meet this capability requirement while answering the call for troops to Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and other military operations other than war (MOOTW) tasks. Should the situation arise where the AC has to respond to a two-MRC situation, it will only be possible with significant augmentation from Reserve Component (RC) units.

The Guard and Reserve are no longer considered as forces of last resort; rather they are recognized as indispensable to the nation's defense from the earliest days of conflict. And, as we look to a future in which budgets will likely remain tight and the tempo of day-to-day military operations will remain high, the cost effectiveness of the Total Force takes on increased importance for the next twenty-five years of Total Force planning.⁴

Under the current national strategy directives for the US Army, the AC is responsible for fielding the forces required to react to two nearly simultaneous MRCs.

The forces the administration fields today are sufficient, in concert with regional allies, to defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous MRCs.⁵

In reviewing this mission, the AC of the Army opted to task a large percentage of their current personnel strength as combat arms warfighters, leaving smaller numbers of AC personnel for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) missions. However, the need to react simultaneously to two MRCs such as Korea or DESERT STORM means virtually all AC members, warfighters and support personnel both, would be deployed to conduct these operations.

The Army has further identified that should this situation occur, it would be necessary to mobilize and deploy various RC warfighting, CS and CSS units. Many people in the civilian

community are unaware that for Operation DESERT STORM, a single MRC, the Army National Guard (ARNG) alone activated 398 units and 62,411 personnel to fill Army capability gaps, deploying into that theater 297 units and 37,848 personnel. Additionally, the US Army Reserve (USAR) deployed significant numbers of units and personnel to that mission.⁶

Consistent with the Secretary's testimony, about 147,000 Army Reservists were called to active duty under Operation DESERT STORM. More than 74,000 of these reservists were sent to the Persian Gulf area to perform both combat and support missions, and the remainder served in capacities in the US and Europe.⁷

There is little doubt that a capability gap exists between the National Security Strategy and the two MRC missions assigned to the AC Army and the ability of these MRCs to be conducted for a prolonged period of time.

The RCs of North America, arguably the major force of victory in Europe in 1945, have over time played greater and lesser roles of responsibility in their respective militaries due to policy changes. In some instances, radical revisions in organization, missions, and training were required as government emphasis alternated between national objectives and economics. Yet the threat has not receded, as some would like us to believe. Western military forces are far busier and have seen more deployments since the break up of the Soviet Union than at any other time in the latter half of this century. RC forces play a major role in many of these operations, and will continue to do so well into the future. These roles in their current format are more fully defined in chapter 3.

In Western nations, the ACs, reserves, National Guards, and militias are restructuring and downsizing in an effort to effect directed budget cuts. The Canadian military recently issued an Army-wide directive for the reduction, reorganization, training, and integration of the Army RC into the Total Force Army of Canada. The author has an intimate knowledge of this plan, having drafted the Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) proposal which eventually formed the basis of the

Land Force Command (LFC) Directive on Restructure of Army Reserves. This directive was the end result of over two years of study by various military staffs, high level political committees, local communities, and private interests. It lays the foundation for reduction of the total number of Canadian Army RC units while at the same time provides specific direction for reorganization, training, and increased AC interface.

When fully implemented, it is anticipated this restructure process will see the RC more integrated at the company and platoon level within parent AC formations and specifically tasked to provide sustainment forces, including individual and sub unit organizations.⁸ It is envisioned this restructure will allow expanded RC involvement in existing and future Canadian Army missions, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.

As with any restructure of the Army's RCs, this process endured considerable review and debate regarding perceived advantages and disadvantages of the plan. Issues not common to AC restructure initiatives, such as the parochial interests of geography, economics, heritage, politics, and language, surfaced at regular intervals throughout the planning and preparation stages. These unique concerns required innovative staffing approaches when normal introspective and analytical debate proved to be no match for heart-felt parochial arguments of many serving Reservists, local politicians, and "the old guard" of the various militia and Reserve communities (participant observation). As would be expected, the process was not without inherent disadvantages and resistance. In some cases, entire RC units were decimated by the mass resignation of infantry soldiers not interested in giving up their rifles and kilts to become truck drivers and logisticians.

Barring a recurrence of a long-term global conflict, the hard fact for both the US and Canada is that the call for reductions in standing armies and RC restructuring will continue into the next century. This is exacerbated by domestic and political pressures to reduce deficits in the

governments of North America whose populations who hold little love for strategic and international interests and commitments. When compared to lagging domestic economies and perceived government waste and bureaucracy, pressure will increase to cut military spending.

As early as 1989, the Army began developing plans to reduce its AC and RCs as part of a broader force reduction plan for its total force. Events that unfolded in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union beginning in late 1989 have led to successive force reduction plans and progressively smaller end-strength targets for the Army's AC and RCs. DOD's February 1992 plan called for a total army force of about 1.1 million to be in place by 1995; 567,000 of these personnel would be reserve forces. To achieve these end-strength goals, the Army developed plans to reduce its AC by about 145,000 personnel and its reserve forces by about 215,000 between 1988 and 1995.⁹

Justification for the maintenance of large standing armies will never be an endearing alternative for the peoples of two countries whose national territory has not seriously been threatened in this century. There will be an increasing number of initiatives, originating in both public and government circles, for reduction in the number of units and personnel in standing armies. This in turn will force emphasize on reorganizing, restructuring, and training respective RCs in an effort to pick up the slack as we attempt to meet national and international missions.¹⁰

Research Question

Army Reserve Component Restructure: Does the Canadian Model Have Validity for the US Army RCs?

Scope

In the US Army today, a debate rages over whether to designate the majority of AC units as warfighters while designating the existing ARNG and USAR units for CS and CSS elements. This initiative was the main contention of an article written for the Strategic Studies Institute in February 1992 by Colonel Phillip A. Brehm, now retired, a National Guardsman and expert on the strategic and operational application of ARNG and USAR Components within the AC structure.

Colonel Brehm maintains that if the US Army relied more directly on RCs, the Army as a whole would enjoy stronger levels of support from the general public regarding mandate and funding. It would also validate RC Forces with respect to the civilian community.¹¹ Colonel Brehm feels that the Army would enjoy higher levels of public support if the RCs played greater roles, simply because RC soldiers come from local communities whereas AC soldiers are from all over the nation and are geographically localized at existing Army bases. He also feels that a major restructure of the ARNG and USAR units was necessary.

As 1995/1996 Gallup Polls reveal, the military is the "most trusted government institution" in existence in the USA today.¹² In his view, the limitations of RC organizations need to be realized, acknowledged, and incorporated in operational and strategic planning, while at the same time cashing in on the public support given to RC units. He felt that parochial interests about the salvation of the RCs should not be permitted to block a concept that would benefit all parts of the Total Force Army in the US.

Concepts such as his continue to be voiced as respective militaries strive to attain balance between cost effectiveness, readiness, and practicality in an age of shrinking budgets. To compound the problem, inter-RC rivalries have recently broken out with leaders of the ARNG calling for an end to the very existence of USAR units in response to the USAR claim that they are the true "Federal Reserve," a role that was seen by the ARNG community as traditionally theirs.

A group of Adjutants General, led by Maj. Gen. Greg Barlow of Washington were the first to cry "Enough!", developing an initiative that questions the need for two RCs in the Total Army.¹³

The development and production of technological weaponry designed to provide US forces a clearly definable edge also gives cause to a negative impression regarding the Army. The average civilian develops the impression that the US will win its wars simply by applying cost

effective technological marvels with little or no risk to soldiers. Operation DESERT STORM, with its successes brought about by new technology, whose images were emblazoned on TV screens by CNN, NBC, and others, reinforced this concept among individuals not trained to think in terms of holding ground and close-quarter fighting. The pressures to continue reductions of military forces will therefore continue into the next century. As disquieting as it might sound, the only way to reverse this process appears to be having the US Army thrashed on some future battlefield. Continued pressure for reorganization of both the AC and RCs is inevitable.

Definitions

In order to understand the discussion of the use of Canadian Army Reserve restructure principles in the US model, it is necessary to define terms used in this study.

Activation. This is the process where an RC unit is brought into full time operational status by an order from either the President or by Congress (depending on the level of activation). For the purposes of this document it will be used to indicate when units are brought into full-time operational status for domestic military support or foreign military deployment.

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR). This is a term applied to RC soldiers on active duty for at least 180 days. These soldiers are paid from RC funding. AGR personnel receive the same pay and benefits as soldiers of like grade in the AC, and AGR soldiers must meet the same standards as AC soldiers, making AGR and AC soldiers, on the surface, at least, virtually indistinguishable.¹⁴

Army Active Component (AC). This term defines the full-time army soldiers and units comprising the core of capability for both Canada and the U.S. militaries.

Army National Guard (ARNG). FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, defines the ARNG as "units commanded by the governor of their particular state

or territory and respond to state or territorial missions and emergencies at the governor's discretion. The ARNG units may be federalized and mobilized at the order of the President or Congress in case of national emergency.”¹⁵ This definition will be utilized in this document.

Combat Service Support (CSS). FM 100-5, Operations, defines this as “the focus of logistics at the tactical level of war; the synchronization of essential functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain soldiers and their weapon systems in an area of operations; includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service support troops to arm, fuel, fix, move, man, and sustain soldiers and their equipment.”¹⁶ In the context of this study it will apply to units, systems and missions needed to achieve these tasks.

Combat Support (CS). FM 100-7, Army Operational Support, defines this as all applicable “fire support and tactical assistance provided to combat elements. May include artillery, helicopter, engineer, Military Police, Signal, and electronic warfare units and assistance.”¹⁷ In this document, the term shall apply to any units or functions that provide support, through fires or capabilities, to the primary army warfighters (armor and infantry) but not including logistical support.

Deactivation. For the purpose of this document, a unit that has been activated to full-time status for operational reasons is now returned to its pre activation status as an RC unit shall be deemed to be deactivated.

Effective. “Producing a definite or desired result. Making a striking impression; impressive. Effective is applied to that which produces a definite impact or result.”¹⁸ Effectiveness in this study will be determined by a subjective evaluation of the principles and circumstances involving RC Restructure in the both the Canadian and US Army models. For example, if the application of a particular principle of the restructure process permits a unit to be

better able to meet its missions while incurring no increased costs, then the principle is judged to be effective.

Full-Time Support (FTS). This is defined as the personnel assigned to RC units who work full time throughout the training year and are not restricted by the number of days that they can be employed in a given position.

Heavy Forces. FM 100-5, Operations, defines this as “the mechanized forces of maneuver warfare, primarily armor, cavalry, mechanized infantry, and self propelled artillery, with associated aviation, combat support and combat service support elements.”¹⁹ In this study, it will apply to any unit or formation which employs these systems as the primary weapons.

Inactivation. This term will be used to indicate an RC or AC unit that has been deleted from the current Order of Battle of the applicable nation. In such a situation, the unit name will exist on paper only, with no personnel, resources, budget, or facilities assigned to it. It is incapable of activation unless a specific order of the designated government returns it to the current Order of Battle, allowing it to recruit personnel, receive funding, draw equipment, and establish training facilities. This process, of necessity, will take much longer than the activation of an RC unit to operational status.

Individual Battle Task Standards (IBTS). This term is used in Canada to measure effectiveness of individual soldiers. A series of these standards also exist from the section through to the battalion. They are used to quantify if soldiers or units have achieved requisite training and capability before moving on to higher levels of training. In the context of RC restructure in Canada, it has been recommended this benchmark system form the basis of funding of individuals and units within the RCs. This implies that before budgets are provided to units for higher level

individual, unit and combined arms Battle Task Standard training, the previous or “stepping stone” level must be achieved by all concerned.

Integration. Webster’s Dictionary defines this as “to make or form into one whole; to give the sum or total of.”²⁰ In this document it signifies the melding of personnel, units, formations, or branches into a parent organization, increasing the total capabilities of that organization.

Major Regional Contingency (MRC). As part of the National Security Strategy for the US, the government has tasked the Army to be prepared to react to and conduct operations in support of two significant geographical possibilities. The occurrence of these events would see the Army deploying large numbers of personnel to conduct operations to counter the situation. For example, DESERT STORM was viewed as a single MRC.

Militia. The New Webster’s Dictionary defines this as “a body of soldiers not permanently organized in time of peace.”²¹ In the context of this study, it will be used to signify the more common term for the Canadian Armed Forces Army Reserve.

Missions. FM 100-5, Operations, defines this term as “the commanders expression of what the unit must accomplish and for what purpose. Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. During missions analysis, commanders translate these into orders for their subordinates.”²²

Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). In FM 100-5, Operations, the Army identifies thirteen examples of activities (illustrative, not inclusive) that fall under the MOOTW umbrella. These are: (1) noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), (2) arms control, (3) support to domestic civil authorities, (4) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, (5) security assistance, (6) nation assistance, (7) support to counter drug operations, (8) combating terrorism, (9) peacekeeping operations, (10) peace enforcement, (11) show of force, (12) support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and (13) attacks and raids.²³

Mobilization. In this document, this term will be used in lieu of activation. It will have the same meaning for an RC unit affected by activation.

Paid Ceiling. This term is used in the Canadian Reserve community as a measure of funding, and therefore the limit of the manpower that may be generated for a particular unit. The paid ceiling is misleading in that some associate it with an actual level of manpower. Rather it is a reflection of a formula (\$40.00 per day x forty training days x the authorized manning level of that particular unit) which allows the allocation of budgetary support. With that pool of money the commanding officer can finance his completely manned unit for forty days of training, or if he is at only half strength, for eighty days. This has long been a problem, since in this model funding is not tied to training requirements given to individual units by the next higher commander.

Reductions. The New Webster's Dictionary defines this as "act of reducing; diminution; conversion into another state or form."²⁴ In this study, it will be used to indicate situations where the total number of personnel of a branch, formation, or unit has been diminished. Any necessary reorganization or restructure resulting from the reduction will be implied but will be dealt with under those two terms.

Reorganization. The Little Oxford dictionary defines this as "changing to provide an orderly structure; initiate change once again."²⁵ In the context of this paper it will define taking existing units and changing their configuration to accomplish identical tasks more effectively or to achieve new and different tasks.

Restructure. The Little Oxford Dictionary defines this as "changing the composition of a particular group in order to achieve new requirements or expectations."²⁶ For this document the term will apply to organizational change of formations above the unit level.

Roundup Units. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization,

defines this as:

a program wherein an RC unit is organizationally aligned to a fully structured AC unit to provide the parent formation robustness and increased employment flexibility. Roundup units are assigned a priority for allocation of resources through the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). DAMPL priority will be consistent with the unit's strategic force package as published in The Army Plan (TAP). Roundup units receive DTA sponsorship from the parent RC unit.²⁷

Although no longer an official term in US Army lexicon, it is useful to know the definition of the term for this study.

Roundout Units. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization,

states this term reflects:

a program where a unit from one Army component is organizationally aligned to a unit from another Army component to complete the organic structure of that parent unit. A roundout unit brings under structured units in another component to a designated Military Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) structure. Roundout units are assigned a priority for allocation of resources through the DAMPL. DAMPL priority is consistent with the units strategic force package as published in The Army Plan (TAP).²⁸

Total Army Establishments (TAE). A system used in Canada where a unit must organize and train itself from the bottom up. In order to achieve necessary missions and funding for higher level training, a unit must first demonstrate it is able to recruit, train, and retain soldiers to man (progressively) section, platoon, company, and battalion level organizations. Failure to achieve the identified standard at any particular level entails a detailed review of the unit training methods and application of funding, and direction to repeat the process from funds identified for this purpose. As this is a cyclic process based on yearly recruiting programs for a particular unit, failure to achieve the required levels essentially means the unit will not participate in battalion level training at the end of the training cycle.²⁹

Total Force. This concept, common to both Canadian and US Armies, defines the concept of AC and RCs as a combined force deployed as the need arises to counter threats to the national security of the country. In simple terms, it implies AC units as carrying on day-to-day operations and meeting operational requirements where able, but being augmented by RC individuals or formed units in situations where the requirement outstrips the capability.³⁰

United States Army Reserve (USAR). These are individuals and units within the current structure of the US Army that provide a manpower pool for national mobilization in times of emergency. They consist of CS, CSS, and training units.

Warfighters. For the context of this paper, this term will apply to those personnel and units actively trained and organized to engage enemy forces in direct combat. Specific examples of this are armor, infantry, artillery, and air defense units.³¹

Limitations and Delimitations to the Research

This study will focus on the effectiveness that any RC restructure principles used in the Canadian model may have on the US Army RCs. It would be impossible to examine all facets of the US and Canadian RC structures. This paper will therefore examine them as complete entities, applying the components of the Canadian process against the US Army model. Although the Canadian process dealt with all forms of Canadian Reserves (army, air, navy, and communications reserve elements), the effort herein will focus on Army RC restructure principles and measure their validity if applied to their US model. This will help determine if specific principles of the process adopted by the RC of Canada have application for US Army RCs.

Although the current size of the US Army and its RCs is approximately twenty times that of its Canadian counterpart, the various principles of reserve restructure presented are applicable

regardless of the size. The principles need only be applied on a larger scale in order to measure their validity in the US situation.

To make the reading of the thesis more understandable to US based readers, the author has adjusted some terminology normally used in Canada to fit that of the US. For example, instead of referring to the Canadian full-time Army as "Regular Force" (Canadian term), the more commonly understood term of AC is used. Refer to the definitions page of the introduction should they required clarification of terms.

As the subject is an ongoing debate, it was necessary to impose a cutoff date for additional research input to allow the preparation of the final thesis document. The date selected was 28 February 1996. Documents originating after this date are not included in the research text.

Significance of the Study

It is a virtual certainty that RC restructure will continue in the US Army well into the next century. The Canadian model was not without its trials and tribulations, at various points not appearing to be anything more than a staff driven exercise. But the reality of budget restraints and reductions forced the Army leadership to take a serious and innovative approach to the problem.

In the US, debate concerning RC restructure gives the study significance. While some argue that the ARNG and USAR can accomplish all assigned tasks within prescribed training schedules, others maintain that only in unique circumstances can they complete current combat readiness requirements and tasks. With this in mind, an initiative exists in some circles of the US military to have the AC fill the role of warfighters for the Army and to have ARNG and USAR concentrate on training as CS and CSS units. This is seen to hold merit when analyzed under the auspices of budgets and return for investments. As Colonel Brehm stated in his article:

a serious look should be taken at the cost effectiveness of maintaining and equipping a force which has little likelihood of being committed to combat much before totally new units could be generated.³¹

Above all, the fact remains that the US Army and its RCs have not yet reached the end state with regard to restructure initiatives. Therefore planning must continue on how best to take advantage of the resources allocated by Congress and the States so the Army is able to achieve its missions. In doing so, one must remain cognizant of an overriding principle that tends to be swept aside in the turmoil of restructuring processes:

Completely integrating the AC and RC is, of course, impossible. Any plan to modify current structure, system, and policies must begin with the premise that the AC and RCs are inherently dissimilar and that many of the dissimilarities cannot (and should not) be eliminated. The fact that the RCs are a citizen-soldier forces and the AC is a full-time professional army will always remain. Nonetheless, eliminating as many dissimilarities as possible and reducing the effect of those remaining is the only way to merge the three armies and thereby increase the readiness of the RCs. Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii) understated the problem somewhat when he declared that "the blending of active and reserve forces needs further refining."³²

A look at how Canada prepared and initiated the process while more fully incorporating their RC units into the Total Force Army is warranted, if for no other reason than to provide insight into the problems, procedures, and debate that occurred as a result. Given the common heritage and economic state that the two countries are experiencing, what was endured by one in the process will undoubtedly have to be surmounted by the other should that same process be applied.

Review of the Literature

A number of articles, reports, and documents have been written concerning the abilities and expectations of the Canadian and US RCs. The Canadian RC restructure process produced several directives and reviews regarding the implementation process and the expected results.

Many articles, reports, and books have been written about the need for RC restructure within the US Army, particularly since the last major mobilizations during the Gulf War. While some are presented publicly in an effort to advance a parochial interest, the majority of the written work, in both countries, attempts to subjectively evaluate the problems of RC restructure and the increasing requirement to have RCs fill the gap resulting from downsizing the AC.

Topics of these documents range from the background and variables used in the Canadian initiative and the process that followed, to citing the need for restructure within US RCs, to arguments for maintenance of the status quo. Solutions presented tend to be formulated with a genuine concern for the well being of the respective Armies and the RCs within. The focus of these published works, in both nations, was always the same--the Army must be capable of achieving the political strategic objectives. The US must also answer the call for an expanded place as the world's predominant power. To accomplish this the Army RCs must play a more significant role in future Army operations. How should they be restructured or reorganized to accomplish this in a time of budget restraint and AC draw down?

The data generated to answer the thesis question was collected from published books, articles, and reports from Canada and the US. Once collected and reviewed, personal interviews and surveys with military and civilian authorities in the US were used as a method of determining the accuracy of the data. The principal document defining the restructure process for the Canadian Army RC is the Report of the Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves (Canada) published in October 1995. This report reflects the results of more than two years of study, interviews, presentations, and reviews of the proposed methods of restructuring the RCs of the Canadian Military, defining what is both good and bad about the process. As its mandate reflected, it was a focused effort to rationalize the 1994 Canadian White Paper on Defense and to

resolve the "need to restructure Canada's Reserve Forces, most notably the Militia, with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to the requirements of the new global strategic environment."³³ It recommended a total of forty-one recommendations for the restructure of the RCs of Canada, of which thirty-nine were directly attributable to Army RC restructure. It is from this document that the applicable principles used for Canadian Army RC restructure will be analyzed for their application to the US Army RCs.

Supporting documents to the SCRR report are the Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) Reserve Restructure Proposal (draft), written by the author, which includes an associated presentation package, the Land Forces Command (LFC) Reserve Restructure Directive (Draft), and the Report of the Standing Committee on National Defense and Veterans Affairs (Canada). These directives and reviews provide amplification, broadening, or innovative methods to achieve the goals set out in the SCRR report. For the most part they are supportive of the process, although in some instances differences surfaced as to the exact method of implementation.

From the US RC perspective, the document Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force by Colonel Philip A. Brehm is an introspective look at how US Army RCs are organized. In his book, he clearly supports RC restructure within the Army, stating that without RC preparation and support, the Army will be unable to complete its missions in the future. In his writing, he explains how the RCs could be better utilized as a bridge to the US civilian community while taking on roles to which they are more attuned.¹⁵ Supporting his assertions are three reports, two written by the US General Accounting Office and the latter by Charles E. Heller. These are (1) National Guard--Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for the Gulf War, a report to the Secretary of the Army, (2) Army Training-Replacement Brigades were more proficient than Guard Roundout Brigades, a report to the House of Representatives, and (3) Total

Force: The First Wartime Use of the All-Volunteer Force Raises Questions About the Role of the National Guard and Reserve Units in Combat, The Disproportionate Burden Borne by Minority Enlistees, and Combat for Women, a report to the Government Executive.

Supporting the assertion that the RCs are capable of meeting assigned missions (combat, CS, or CSS) is the US RCs view of the situation resulting from mobilization during the Gulf War.

The documents suggesting that the status quo be maintained for US RCs are (1) Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military by Martin Binken, (2) The Army's Roundout Policy After the Persian Gulf War, by Robert L. Goldrich, a report to the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the US Congress, (3) Reserves and Readiness: Appraising the Total Force Policy: Relying on the Reserves Makes Good Sense, but the Army Has Yet to Bring Practice in Line With Principles by Carol R Shuster and Charles J. Bonanno, a report to the US House Committee on Armed Services; (4) The impact of the Persian Gulf War and the Decline of the Soviet Union on How the United States Does its Defense Business. Hearings for the US Congressional Committee on Armed Services, and (5) Military Forces and Their Personnel Sub Components: Restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve, report to a Congressional Hearing.

Research Methodology

The initial research of the thesis focused on the examination of the roles, organization, and missions of both the Canadian and US RC organizations. Gross differences in current structures and tasks could affect the validity of the application of the Canadian model to the ARNG and USAR. Factors used in the Canadian restructure process were measured against both US RCs to ascertain if the same principles and methods had application in the USAR and ARNG. The study

attempted to objectively determine if the principles used in Canada, whether as they stand or with modification, could be applied to US RCs. The second step in the process was a comprehensive review of the Canadian RC restructure thought process and the resulting directive. This identified key facets incorporated in that model and included the identification of any debate and sensitivities that arose in Canada with regard to the process.

From the public viewpoint, an examination of the national need for RC restructure and the goals, finances, and politics associated with the program was completed. From the military quarter, the reduction methodology, proposed reorganization, necessary tactical regrouping, and present and future training and readiness requirements of RC forces was examined. Integral to this was a general review of how RC funding has been closely tied to performance and attainment of required mission standards for RCs. As a result, a clear definition of the pros and cons resulting from the Canadian experience became evident.

In order to weigh the validity of the Canadian model against that of its US counterpart, it was necessary to evaluate the application of identified factors and experiences of the Canadian model against the ARNG and USAR. Once completed, it was possible to identify those concepts applicable to both the US and Canadian RCs.

Finally, the input of feedback obtained from members of the Army RC community in the US was included as a litmus test for what has transpired and what is likely to happen to US Army RC forces in the future. A combination of survey and interviews was utilized for this aspect of the research. Survey questions were provided to serving members of the Army RCs at the rank of major and captain attending the US Army Command and General Staff College course and to senior serving RC officers throughout the 35th Infantry Division stationed in Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Nebraska, and Colorado.

In an effort to obtain candid responses rather than party-line answers, no names shall be referred to in this document. All data generated from this research method will be referred to as either group survey response or interview response. Wherever possible, direct non attribution quotes were included to demonstrate the deep emotional feeling that the topic of reserve component restructure generates within the US RC family. Comments in the thesis which originated from a survey questionnaire or personal interview had to be verified on at least two other occasions in order to be considered viable and worthy of inclusion in the finished paper.

Technology played its part in the research gathering as the Internet was used extensively in the research work, particularly with regard to the research documents available in the Pentagon Library. A web page was posted on the Internet with the written questions used in the survey made available for public and private response. Considerable information was gathered through this medium, although in many cases it tended to be heartfelt and parochial rather than introspective and in the best interests of the country and its military. However, it did prove the depth of emotions that run throughout the Active and Reserve communities, both serving and retired, about this sensitive issue.

Specific questions addressed were in support of the main thesis question:

Army Reserve Component Restructure: Does the
Canadian Model Have Validity for the US Army RCs?

Supporting questions include:

1. What are the specific concepts used in the Canadian restructure process?
2. Which of these concepts could have application to restructure of the US RCs?
3. Are the US Army RCs currently organized and able to accomplish attainable, cost effective missions?

4. Does the current role of the US Army RCs properly fit into the concept of a Total Force Army for the US? Will application of the Canadian restructure concepts help achieve this?
5. Are the US RCs capable of achieving the readiness levels expected of them under current conditions?
6. In terms of equipment and training requirements, is the current structure of the US Army RCs providing a cost effective return for the Army as a whole?
7. In the US, is the involvement of currently serving ARNG and USAR personnel a critical requirement for developing and incorporating any RC restructure proposal?
8. Will utilization of applicable Canadian restructure concepts assist US Army RCs to provide forces necessary for readiness and support of the AC?
9. Is it likely that the application of facets of the Canadian model for Reserve restructure would allow US RCs to attain their missions more effectively and efficiently?

Most answers to these questions were an interpretive response to the literature review, survey questionnaires, and interviews conducted throughout the research period. In many cases, definitive answers were not possible since the interpretation was subjective rather than as a result of physical application of a particular concept. Once analysis of the Canadian model was completed and assessed for validity against the US RCs, the only true feedback available, short of an applied test case unit, was the questionnaire responses received from the US Army RC community.

In summation, the methodology taken for this research included the following criteria:

- (1) an examination of the applicable factors of Army Reserve Restructure in the Canadian model and how they are applied to that structure, (2) a review of the general organization and missions of the Army RCs of both the US and Canada, (3) a measurement of the validity of application of the

factors used in the Canadian model against the US RCs, (4) an examination, in general terms, of the cost efficiency of the US Army RCs in relation to their missions. Can the application of variables from the Canadian model assist them in becoming more cost efficient?, and (5) personal interviews with serving and retired USAR and ARNG personnel to confirm literature research.

Once the literature research process was underway, the research design continued using the personal interviews and questionnaires conducted with members of the US Army RCs. These were aimed at further defining any existing and potential problems with the application of the Canadian restructure principles to these forces. At the heart of this process was the attempt to identify individual views with regard to the validity of past, present, and future restructure concepts in the US military.

In an effort to avoid those who might feel inclined to recite the party line, the interviews and questionnaires focused on the rank and file of the US RCs. These personal views were particularly important in measuring the validity of the literature review data concerning the use of facets from the Canadian model to restructure the US Army RCs. Military prose and other periodicals were examined regularly in an effort to identify any undercurrent of approval or dissension among AC or RC communities concerning restructure initiatives in both affected countries.

The initial meeting of the thesis research committee in mid-August 1996 marked the official start of the thesis preparation. At that time the prospectus was submitted in its draft form to allow the committee members to provide direction and guidance to refine the definition of the problem and the research approach to be adopted. The final draft of the prospectus submitted 12 November 1996.

In order that the subsequent research could be conducted in a timely and effective manner, the main effort was to complete the research into available written work by the end of February 1997. At that time, a draft thesis was submitted to the thesis research committee for comment and further direction. Identification of problem areas and alternate methods of approaching the question and the available research material was the primary focus of the draft thesis submission. The committee met every month to review the progress and to provide insight, guidance, and direction on the material collected and the future conduct of the research.

From February to April 1997, validation and confirmation of thesis data collected to that point continued to be the focus of the study. An effort to obtain first hand views of some of the key members of the USAR and ARNG in the states of Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska resulted in sufficient data for validation or repudiation of the research to that date.

This process was time consuming and sporadic, therefore continued research and refinement of the draft thesis was conducted to fully respond to the main question. The thesis research committee continued to meet and the direction and comments of this body further guided the research direction and analysis conducted for the project. The final draft form of the thesis was completed 15 April 1997 to allow time for a final review by the research committee and preparation of the document for the final submission. The completed thesis formed the basis of an oral examination held 25 April 1997.

¹Charles Belzille, Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Government Printing Office, 30 October 1995), 6.

²General George A. Joulwan, National Security Report, (Washington DC: Reserve Officers Association, October 1996), 24.

³John A. Hiscock, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration" Joint Forces Quarterly (Fort McNair, Washington DC, Department of the Army, August, 1996), 42.

⁴Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, June 1996), i.

⁵U.S. Government, A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, (Washington, DC, The White House, February 1996), 14.

⁶National Guard Bureau, "The Army National Guard As a Strategic Force" After Action Report-Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM (Washington DC, Department of the Army, 28 June 1991), 1.

⁷US General Accounting Office, "Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War" Report to the House Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 24 September 1991), 8.

⁸*Ibid.*, 8.

⁹US General Accounting Office, "Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved", Report to the House Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 12 May, 1993), 2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹Philip A. Brehm, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to Total Force" Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College (Pennsylvania, US Army War College, February 21, 1992), 8.

¹²Gallup Corporation, Survey of Institutions Most Trusted in the United States of America, 1994 and 1995.

¹³Maj. Gen. Robert F. Ensslin, "Time to Bite the Bullet: Disagreement in the Total Army" Armed Forces Journal (Washington DC, September 1996), 28.

¹⁴Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "The Future of the Citizen-Soldier: Issues and Answers" (University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky), 22.

¹⁵U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), glossary - 2.

¹⁶U.S. Army FM 100-16, Army Operational Support, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 31 May 1995), Glossary - 5

¹⁷David B. Guralnik and Joseph H. Friend, General Editors, Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 462.

¹⁸Ibid., US Army FM 100-5, 2-21 to 2-23.

¹⁹R.F. Patterson, New Webster's Dictionary, (Miami, Florida, PSI and Associates, Inc., 1968), 121.

²⁰Ibid., 143.

²¹Ibid., Operations, 2-21 to 2-23.

²²Ibid., 13-4 to 13-6.

²³Ibid., 186.

²⁴Maurice Waite, The Little Oxford Dictionary, seventh edition, (Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, 1987), 444.

²⁵Ibid., 652.

²⁶Ibid., Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, 3-12.

²⁷Ibid., 3-12.

²⁸Ibid., 3-12.

²⁹Taken from multiple sources by the author.

³⁰Taken from multiple sources by the author.

³¹Taken from multiple sources by the author.

³¹Ibid., Brehm, 9.

³²Ibid., Jacobs, 108.

³³Ibid., Belzille, 8.

CHAPTER 2

THE CANADIAN RESERVE RESTRUCTURE PROCESS

Relevant Principles Of The Canadian RC Restructure Process Which May Have Merit In Application To The US Army RCs

A comprehensive two-year study and review of the Canadian RC system resulted in a process which culminated in the Report of the Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves (SCRR), published 30 October 1995. This document, combined with the subsequent government reviews (1) the Report of the Standing Committee on National Defense and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) and (2) the Reform Party Independent Review of the SCRR Report provided the Minister of National Defense (similar to Secretary of Defense) and the Army leadership with a far reaching base of information with which to issue direction for the restructure of the RC of the Canadian Army.

In its final form, the SCRR report contained a total of forty-one major recommendations for restructure of the Canadian RC. Of these, thirty-nine directly impacted on the operations and organization of the Army RC. Twelve dealt with such items as pay scale in comparison to AC personnel, benefits upon retirement and when returning from active duty, cadet programs, and the Canadian Rangers (far north) program. These items are particularly unique to the Canadian system and would have little or no application in the restructure process itself, although the US RCs will no doubt have to resolve these same types of issues using their own administrative

regulations. For the purposes of this study, only the factors that directly impact on restructuring the organizations of the US Army RC units and soldiers will be examined.

It should be remembered that in the Canadian Total Force Army model, RC units are responsible to the federal government. There is no system similar to the ARNG units in the US where an individual state can activate units of that state for domestic requirements as determined by the state government. Military assistance to provinces and territories in Canada can only be accomplished with the express approval of the Federal government. Therefore, some of the factors discussed in this thesis will appear to only be applicable to the Canadian model, or would only apply to the USAR.

The Canadian Reserve restructure principles will be examined for their merit as applied to both RCs of the US Army. It is beyond the scope of this document to analyze the problems involved in the intricacies of the Canadian restructure principles with regard to their application in the US RC system (for example, benefits, pay, medical coverage). Therefore, no attempt will be made to provide recommendations adapting to the complexities in applying these principles to the US Army RCs. That process will need to be addressed by the US Army should decisions warrant the adoption of Canadian principles for RC restructure.

The remainder of this chapter will endeavor to identify and explain the SCRR recommendations evaluated as having significant potential for application to the US RC system.

Canadian Reserve Restructure Principles

Reserve units selected by Area (Regional) Commanders should be tasked to provide formed companies, platoons, and/or sections for incorporation into Regular Component units proceeding on peacekeeping or other military duties.¹

The implication of this particular principle is to identify and task Canadian Army RC units needed to bridge existing capability gaps in existing AC units. These units are then provided with the funding and resources necessary to recruit, train, and deploy formed bodies up to and including company strength that will be absorbed into designated parent units and formations for deployment as required.

The definition of stages 3 and 4 of the Canadian four-phase mobilization plan set out in the 1994 Defense White Paper should now be amended so as to reflect clearly defined roles for the Reserves, and especially for the Army Reserve, as the basis for recruitment, training and the provision of formed and trained units required in the event of a major operation or conflict.²

This principle identifies the need for all Army RC units to have clear and distinguishable tasks and placement in the structure of the AC should mobilization (activation) of the Army RC be required. Stage 3 sees the best trained and manned companies, batteries and squadrons of the Army RC being mobilized to fill clearly identified shortfalls in parent AC units, formations or capability. Stage 4 on the other hand sees Army RC units completely mobilized, the best trained filling above mentioned gaps, and the remainder filling out and training newly activated war establishment units to be deployed when ready. This last condition would be in response to a major conflict requiring the dedication of a significant percentage of the nation's resources to the war effort.

The relative viability of existing Army Reserve units should be validated using the following factors as a critical but not all inclusive list.³

While the unit must be prepared to meet its operational tasks dictated in Phase 3 of the Canadian Mobilization Plan, it must also be prepared-and have a demonstrated capability-to provide the individual, section, and platoon size augmentation to the Regular Army needed to meet the demands of the present situation.⁴

The unit must demonstrate it has the necessary population base, facilities, historical recruitment data, and soldier retention, and have achieved required training standards to mobilize

as a unit when called upon. It must also demonstrate a clearly defined capability to provide formed and trained sub units of soldiers, up to and including company size organizations, to the AC when called upon.

Over the last five years, the unit must have demonstrated its ability to recruit effectively and to retain its personnel at or near its paid ceiling. In demographic terms, it must also have access to a nearby pool of potential recruits or be willing to relocate.⁵

The unit must have a clear and established history of recruiting, training, and manning to its authorized unit establishment, doing so consistently for a period of at least five years. This figure was a Canadian decision based on Statistics Canada research of average population density, continuity, and movement. Irregularities in this examination should be reviewed closely. This is to determine if current success of a local unit is a trend that will continue for the long term due to renewed interest in the military by the community at large, economic growth, or other societal factors. On the other hand, it may also be caused by some factor that the community is incapable of sustaining over the long term which would adversely effect the units ability to perform its missions. This would result in wasted dollars in infrastructure investment should the unit be forced to cease operations because of its inability to sustain itself.

Care and common sense should be exercised here. In Canada, many small communities are able to consistently produce battalion size organizations, well trained and fully manned, while large cities and populated areas, because of other job opportunities available in an urban setting, have difficulty manning a single rifle company. Many factors play on this ability and time should be taken to ensure a unit demonstrating consistent historical success in production and training be given its just due.

The unit must have demonstrated that it can effectively train and that its personnel are able to qualify in high percentages on the Individual Battle Task Standards and perform with reasonable effectiveness in the collective (section/platoon/company) exercises.⁶

The unit must have demonstrated a consistent ability to effectively achieve individual training standards it is assigned each year. Here again the five year bench mark was used in Canada. At the same time, it must show an ability to quickly adapt and continue its training growth when presented with sub-unit training opportunities either as a single Military Occupation Specification (MOS) or in combined arms operations. Although these standards differ between the two countries, the applied principle is an effective way to determine if the unit can do the job it is tasked to complete on an individual level so that it is trained and ready to conduct higher level training when available and as required.

The unit must have demonstrated the ability to effectively manage its personnel, operating, and maintenance budgets over a five year period.⁷

In conjunction with the above identified training assessment, the unit must have demonstrated an ability to effectively manage assigned budgetary resources. In the austere fiscal reduction environment that western armies are currently subject to, there can be no room for units that expend allocated training funds without producing trained soldiers or without achieving the tasks they were assigned. This covers the complete spectrum of financial allocations that a unit may receive, including pay, fuel, maintenance, ammo, etc.

The unit record in war and peace should be considered, so as to reinforce success.⁸

In cases where units are relatively equal in all other evaluated factors, those that have a history of military deployments for operations should be retained before those that do not. This helps continue the bridge necessary between the civilian community and the local RC units, as the "old guard" continue to support their unit through job opportunities, time off, etc for the soldiers of the unit. It has the additional advantage of providing a rally point for recruitment and retention of

soldiers, and assists in obtaining the necessary community support required by political leaders when committing RC soldiers to operational missions.

The unit must be geographically located so as to serve as a consistent link between the military and the general local population. It must also enjoy the support of the community in which it functions.⁹

A critical requirement for any RC unit is to be located where the civilian community will support both the unit and the soldiers in it. While seemingly an obvious statement, there are many Canadian communities where large concentrations of immigrant families or communities of a particular heritage detract from the units ability to recruit, train, and receive community support. This is a reflection of the reluctance and inherent mistrust certain ethnic backgrounds have for the military, particularly where they or their parents were forced to flee oppressive situations in which the military was used as a weapon against the civilian population. This should not be interpreted as all encompassing, since in many locales, most notably communities of Scottish, German, Irish and French Canadian ethnicity, tremendous support exists for the local RC unit. It is simply another factor to consider in measuring relative viability, albeit rather low on the scale of measurement.

The Total Army Establishment (TAE) program be implemented to structure units from the bottom up, ensuring success at organizational and training levels before providing funding for higher level training and unit capabilities.¹⁰

This principle calls for building RC units from the bottom up. For example, an infantry battalion could be tasked and funded to provide and train three platoons of riflemen and a company HQ. Once it had achieved this goal, it would then be allocated funding to repeat the process, thereby producing two full strength rifle companies. Should this be achieved, and there is a demonstrated pool of more recruits, a third company, or a combat support company of scout, mortar, anti armor and sniper platoons could be authorized and funded. To start this process, a

review would obviously be necessary, unit by unit, to evaluate where the start point should be for each existing RC unit. An additional consideration would be units that have soldiers deployed supporting operational missions, or who have recently seen large transfers of RC soldiers to the AC. They would then be granted leeway with regard to their ability and time required to replace and retain the required numbers of troops.

Conversely, if a unit was not achieving required production targets and training levels, it would receive no additional funding for expanded or higher level training. In fact, it could loose funds previously allocated should it be unable to meet the requirements and see those moneys shifted to locations that are exceeding their tasked requirements. This provides a critical and necessary incentive for units to recruit actively, train properly and provide troops for RC deployment when required.

A critical requirement is the demonstrated ability for an RC unit to make effective use of the allocated AC support in their training.¹¹

Key to the success of the Canadian Reserve restructure program is the percentage of full time (AC or full time RC staff) manning and the units ability to employ these personnel effectively. Initially a major stumbling block in the restructure process, the mixing of a high percentage of full time staff into RC units has paid great dividends in preparing and training RC personnel.

Full time staff in these units man key positions such as S/G-3, S/G-1, Deputy/XO, Asst S/G-3, unit Chief Clerk, pay clerks, supply personnel, maintenance personnel, senior NCOs, and required enlisted soldiers. Their sole purpose is to handle the daily administrative staff burden that rob RC soldiers of the opportunity to physically train during the allocated time.

An example is an infantry company deploying for weekend training. When the main body of soldiers arrives at the unit location, they would simply draw equipment, weapons, ammo, etc.,

receive previously prepared orders, mount fully kitted and waiting vehicles, and deploy to their training area to maximize training value obtained by the time allocated and funded. On completion of the training, after action reports, vehicle maintenance, equipment turn in (less personal items), and other duties would be completed by the full time staff.

This system has an additional benefit of providing a cadre of full time personnel who are current on possible deployments, doctrine, missions, etc., and who have established AC contacts with the parent formations to facilitate mobilization training and administrative functions when required.

Units will be structured to conform to the Total Army Establishment models and constitute an effective training vehicle. As a result, the number of armories (unit training buildings) must be reduced to the minimum required to support effective training.¹²

The number of infrastructure buildings needed to support RC units must be reduced to that required to allow effective training. The resulting budgetary savings in operations and maintenance budgets resulting from these closures, or at least a large percentage of them, should be plowed back into unit training or other requirements to compensate for infrastructure closures. For example, in one region of Canada, a very successful and well manned Reserve infantry battalion had three armories supporting it, all within a fifty mile radius of each other. Two of these are now closed and the resulting cost savings from the closure paid the cost of renting buses that carry the soldiers from the affected communities to the central unit armory still functioning. This has proven to be very successful and well accepted in this region of the country.

Delegation of additional tasks not allocated during the annual training plan must be accompanied by the associated funding. This includes parades, courses and other tasks that are passed down from higher HQs to the units.¹³

Again, this may be an obvious statement, but many short notice tasks in the past have not included associated funding, which has then had to be taken from the unit training budget. The

unit CO now has the right to refuse additional tasks if funding is not forthcoming, or as a minimum he may have the next higher in the chain of command acknowledge the level of training the unit will not be able to achieve because of the loss of training funds. Whichever method is applied, the objective is to reduce the impromptu and in some cases unnecessary tasks that whittle away the training budgets of many units.

These identified Canadian Reserve restructure principles are the heart of the Reserve restructure process in Canada. They have been or are currently being applied in all units and formations in an effort to improve training efficiency and readiness. Although there are many other concepts being applied to the process, only those identified herein are evaluated as having significant potential for application to the US Army RCs. These principles will be discussed in further detail in chapters 4 and 5.

¹Dr. Brian Dickson, and The Honorable Jack L. Granatstein, and MGen (Retd) Charles Belzile, Report from the Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves (Canada) (Ottawa, Government Printing Office, 30 October 1995), 19.

²Ibid., 20.

³Ibid., 33.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., 36.

¹²Ibid., 38.

¹³Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS, AND CAPABILITIES OF THE US ARMY RESERVE AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Introduction

To continue the process of analyzing the Canadian RC restructure model against that of the US Army RCs, it is necessary to identify and define the roles, missions, and capabilities of the USAR and the ARNG. This will lay the groundwork for the analysis of the principles of restructure and have the additional benefit of clearly delineating where the capability gap is for the AC component when faced with at least one, and in the worst case, two simultaneous MRCs.

Tasks of the US Army Reserve and National Guard

The RCs have been an integral part of the US Army for many years. However, in the last twenty-six years, there has been a strong move to more fully integrate them into the Total Force Army structure. Under this process, the Army has become increasingly reliant upon the RCs in order to be capable and ready to deploy on many of the current missions assigned to Army forces.

At the outset the policy was hailed by the US defense community and especially the Army. The draft had ended and the smaller, all volunteer Army was struggling to fill its ranks in an antimilitary post-war climate. The policy appeared to solve the problem of remedying what former Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer later called a "hollow army" composed of under strength units. Now the Army could flesh out its combat divisions with less expensive reserve units, and have funds to develop and build new weapons systems to fight a major war in central Europe.¹

Much of this integration is a direct result of the lessons of the Vietnam Conflict, where the RCs were not fully integrated into the Army effort and therefore contributed comparatively small (ARNG 12,000, USAR 15,000) numbers of personnel to the war effort.² This resulted in a severing of the bridge to the community for public support and placed extreme pressure on the Army and the government to successfully conduct the conflict, undermining the Army effort being put forth. As a result, the Army realized that in future conflicts, public support for the operation was critical and embarked on a program to secure that support by a program of full RC integration into the Army structure under the total force banner.

Mr. Arnold Punaro, Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee put it another way in discussing DESERT STORM. He said, "The active services had already gone to war, but the nation didn't go to war until the Guard and Reserve were mobilized". Involving the RC early in any operation, including a contingency, is absolutely essential for the well being of the Army and its fragile relationship with "the people."³

This terminology was to reflect the rational that the RCs needed to be brought into the mainstream of defense plans and operations.

The objective of the Total Force Policy is to integrate the services' RCs with their AC, obviating the necessity to resort to the draft. Under the policy, the Department of Defense has deliberately placed significant responsibility for the nation's defense on the shoulders of the citizen-soldier; the reserves, rather than the draftees, are now the nations primary source of available military manpower when expansion of the military beyond the size of the AC is required. The RCs are therefore no longer "forces in reserve" but a key cog in the United States military apparatus. Deployment of the RCs to the Persian Gulf was absolutely essential, because the active forces could not have done the job alone.⁴

RCs could no longer be considered as forces of last resort but were now recognized as indispensable to the nation's defense from the earliest days of any conflict.⁵ The Chief of Staff of the Army at the time therefore undertook a deliberate strategy of making the RCs indispensable to the successful conduct of any future large scale operations by ensuring they were tasked with key combat, CS and CSS, missions and tasks.

General Abrams set out to intertwine the three components so completely that to fight any war a President would have to obtain congressional support and in turn, as Clausewitz states, "the will of the people." In a recent article on Abrams by Lewis Sorley, Abrams is quoted as

saying to General Walter Kerwin, "If we're ever going to war again, we're going to take the reserves with us."⁶

When former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin took office, one of the first projects he initiated was a bottom-up review of the national security policy in relation to the new world order and the military changes that they necessitated. It was from this study that the RC force baseline was established to mobilize and support the nearly two simultaneous MRC situation that is embedded in the current US national security policy.⁷ Of significant interest is the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) report tabled in 1995 which spells out the need for increased integration of RCs into AC training and missions. Although this document is not yet accepted as official guidance, the physical draw down of AC forces has significantly affected their ability to complete the two nearly simultaneous MRC scenario assigned to it. Therefore, the RCs will more and more be called upon to bridge the gap between requirement and capability.

Reliance on the RCs is not coincidental. They are a cost effective resource to the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders. The experience and skills gained while on active service are not lost when the member affiliates with an RC. Consequently, processes must exist to ensure well-trained, highly-skilled personnel stay in the military, whether it is in the AC or RC.⁸

The US Military, then, is now in a position where it is no longer large enough nor has all the capabilities needed to get the day-to-day missions accomplished. It now takes each component, Active and Reserve, to get the work done.⁹

The current strength of the ARNG, including technicians and Active Guard and Reserve (GAR) personnel, is pegged at 423,818.¹⁰ Of the 1995 pegged US Army total manpower strength, fully 16% is formed from the USAR and 25% from the ARNG. Another 25% is identified as Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard. The Individual Ready Reserve is a manpower pool of previously trained individuals who have already served in the AC or in the Selected Reserve and have some part of their Military Service Obligation left to complete. They form an integral part of many mission areas of the Army and provide essential

combat, CS, CSS, and special operations to the Total Army capabilities. They are liable to fulfill involuntary active duty roles and fulfillment of mobilization requirements when necessary.

The Inactive National Guard consists of former National Guardsmen who no longer train actively with their units and are therefore on inactive status, even though assigned to particular units in a mobilization role. Upon activation under the applicable authority, they are required to report to their units.

The enhanced readiness brigades, found entirely within the ARNG, are the principle ground combat maneuver forces of the US Army RCs. The Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review identified a specific need for highly trained and equipped combat ready reserve forces which would ensure the nation's ability to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.¹¹ Fully 15 Enhanced Brigades have been earmarked for resource allocation and training by 1998 that will allow them to mobilize, train, and deploy within ninety days after call-up. They are tasked to sustain a level of readiness that will permit the nation to pursue the two MRC strategy and may be called upon to reinforce, backfill, or augment AC forces when activated for particular operations.

The ARNG provides a large percentage of the Army Total Force capability. It is currently tasked to provide 186 early deploying force support package units, 2 Special Forces Groups, 8 combat divisions, 2 separate brigades, a scout group in strategic reserve, and other support forces plus a mobilization and training base.¹² ARNG units account for large percentages (over 50 percent) of total Army capability in infantry scout troops, separate brigades, field artillery battalions, combat units, infantry battalions, armored battalions, maintenance units, and medium helicopter companies. They also provide sizable percentages (25--50 percent) of the total Army capability for air defense battalions, combat divisions, corps attack helicopter battalions, combat engineer units, mechanized infantry battalions, combat service support units, armored cavalry

regiments, special forces groups, and medical units. In summation, they provide a significant percentage of the Army's capability to conduct land warfare.

USAR units account for an equally large segment of the total Army capability. Although they have recently been restructured to no longer provide formed combat units or formations, they do contribute significant forces to the Army's ability to wage modern warfare. For example, they provide large percentages (over 75 percent) of US Army capability at division, corps, and echelons above corps levels in key areas such as chemical defense companies, public and civil affairs units, transportation units, rail battalions, psychological operations units, training divisions, judge advocate general units, and legal units. They also provide 25--75 percent of medical brigades, petroleum support units, terminal battalions, corps support groups, water supply battalions, hospital units, engineer battalions, and finance units. In short, without these CS and CSS units the army would be unable to deploy, sustain, and support the combat units in the Total Force Army.

The Army National Guard provides significant combat capability, while the Army Reserve contains much of the Army's combat support and combat service support capability. These two reserve entities provide about half of the combat and two-thirds of the Army's support capabilities.¹³

Army RCs have been involved in all areas of Army operations, including combat, peacekeeping, international humanitarian and disaster/famine relief, domestic missions, and counter drug operations. They are capable of assuming additional missions as directed, provided funding is available. A benefit to AC draw down is the enhanced availability of equipment from deactivated AC units that is cascaded down to RCs. During Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM against Iraq in 1990 and 1991, the RCs activated over 890 units and over 250,000 personnel in order to provide the various capabilities the AC needed for overwhelming force which produced a swift, violent, and successful conclusion to the operations.

The RCs have shown that they are capable of contributing substantial, well trained forces to the AC missions. In many situations, they are fully capable of completely assuming responsibility for operations, particularly those in domestic situations. The scope of the capability may be limited by response time, equipment quantity and quality, or the number of skilled specialists available to fill the positions in the RC units, but they do not prevent the RCs from being assigned functions that require high skill levels and quick response. The RCs have been able to repeatedly demonstrate their capacity and willingness to respond, and the AC component has on many occasions shown the need for RC skills and manpower.

With the continued drawdown of Army AC forces and the increased instability caused by changes to the international situation in the last ten years, the RCs have been called upon to shoulder more and more of the operational burden. Although the Army AC is able to handle many of the day to day missions unassisted, the current tempo of operations coupled with the two MRC strategy has made it impossible for the AC to carry out protracted operations without substantial support.

Critical areas of the CS and CSS capability for the AC are currently embedded in RC units and formations, making the AC increasingly reliant on the RCs for even the simplest of operational tasks. Barring a major global conflict, these trends are likely to continue into the next century as the US struggles to support democracy throughout the world and to thwart oppressive regime's efforts to adversely effect the national security interests of the US. The RCs of the US Army will find themselves increasingly involved with the operations of the AC. It is therefore prudent to analyze how future reorganization, budgetary cuts, and changing strategy can be implemented effectively and efficiently into the US Army RC system.

prudent to analyze how future reorganization, budgetary cuts, and changing strategy can be implemented effectively and efficiently into the US Army RC system.

¹Charles E. Heller, "The New Military Strategy and its Impact on the Reserve Components," Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, US Army War College, December 7, 1991), 6.

²Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "The Future of the Citizen Soldier Force: Issues and Answers" (Lexington, Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 2.

³*Ibid.*, Heller, 26.

⁴Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1995: The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Spring 1996), 26 and 34.

⁵Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: US Government), i.

⁶*Ibid.*, Heller, 12.

⁷*Ibid.*, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1995: The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, xxiii.

⁸*Ibid.*, xxiii.

⁹LGen Edward D. Baca, Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1995, v.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, 1.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Baca, 37.

¹²General Accounting Office, National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War, (Washington, DC: US Government, 1991), 8.

¹³*Ibid.*, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, i.

CHAPTER 4

SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES OF RESERVE RESTRUCTURE CONTAINED IN THE CANADIAN ARMY DIRECTIVE AS APPLICABLE TO US ARMY RC UNITS

Introduction

The process of restructuring the AC and RCs of the US Army is not a revolutionary concept arising as a result of the end of the Cold War. Armies are living entities that continue to evolve as society and technology advance. The cessation of major conflicts most easily recognizable by American citizens, such as World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, resulted in changes to US Army structure as new technology, cultural and societal interests, and lessons learned were applied to existing structures and doctrine. The end of the Cold War was just another evolutionary step in the process.

However, it is not simply the military or government that exerts the pressure for structural change. The civilian community in the US plays a significant role in determining the strategy and organization of their country's military.

On one hand, Americans have always grudgingly paid for peacetime readiness, yet expected flawless performance once a conflict has begun. The other part of this multiple personality is a distrust of standing armies and an idealization of the citizen-soldier be he (or she) a draftee, volunteer, Reservist, or National Guardsman. Thus, when presented with a world perceived to be at peace, the pressures exerted by the people and their representatives to downsize become tremendous.¹

Government and domestic pressures continually force the US military to rethink how it will structure for and fight the country's wars. The end of the Cold War, budget restraint, and the emerging threat of smaller regional conflicts and disputes forces leaders and analysts to work

toward a new military strategy to counter these problems. Dominating the entire process is a genuine wish on the part of the US Administration not to commit the same error of isolationism that contributed to both World Wars, conflicts into which the US government and military was irrevocably drawn. Having assumed the role as the leader of the free world, the US government now must acknowledge that to defend the process of freedom and change throughout the world, the US must be proactive in assisting countries attempting to achieve and maintain democracy. To do so means a military able to flex its muscle and yet show budgetary restraint.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President indicated he had no wish to repeat the mistakes of the past in merely downsizing or making across-the-board cuts in the armed forces; rather, he called for restructuring. The consequences of continuing down the traditional path of seeking more AC strength than Congress and the public are willing to support are disconcerting. Potentially, they could mean the Army's energy and political goodwill will be wasted trying to justify AC end strength while the RC is neglected.²

We must conclude therefore that initiatives to restructure both the AC and RCs of the US Army will continue, necessitating critical changes in force structure. For the RCs it will mean continuing and dynamic realignment with regard to training and active participation in AC missions. As these processes are deemed to be inevitable, a look at how another nation approached the issue may lend insight or new approaches that could be applied to the US Army RCs. To accomplish this, we will first examine the process of the Canadian Army RC restructuring process to assist us in determining its validity to the US Army model.

The initial step in analyzing applicability of the process used for the Canadian RC restructure model is to review each of the principles against their application value to the US Army RCs. There will be scope here for subjective interpretation by the writer with regard to this evaluation. It is necessary to present each of the relevant principles and analyze them not so much in the context of Canadian or American applicability, but in an effort to identify some of the resistance that accompanies proposals for restructure of the RCs.

The information presented in this chapter attempts to delineate principles of restructure that appear to have merit in the US Army RCs, particularly with regard to the general organization and infrastructure support they utilize.

Specific Principles of Canadian Army Reserve Restructure

Is the involvement of currently serving and retired reserve personnel (ARNG and USAR) a critical requirement for developing and incorporating any RC restructure proposal?

This may either be an obvious proposal, or one that will open the proverbial Pandora's box when trying to get different groups with varying parochial and political interests to agree on how to best approach the problem. It was determined early in the restructure process in Canada that without the involvement of the senior RC leadership (political and military, serving and retired) that the entire process would be doomed to failure. These groups were simply too powerful and vocal to be disregarded, and their input was essential to having any hope of implementing effective restructure.

This is not to say that involvement of these influential personnel was not without some very difficult bargaining sessions as the AC and RC struggled to find the best solution to the problem. There were many heart felt, and occasionally heated, arguments such as "my unit has to live on forever because we fought at Dieppe." However, many were quick to realize that downsizing and budget constraint are problems here to stay, and that *they* had better arrive at a workable solution or the government would simply impose one on them.

In the US Army, this situation would most certainly be exacerbated by the difficulty in trying to work out what is best for a *three* component Army. The individual state governments will no doubt be very concerned regarding to any restructure proposals that sees any or all of them lose ARNG units or personnel. The USAR will also be resistant to any restructure proposals that will

impact on their ability to function. The reality is, however, that all three components will have to face the restructure problem and come up with workable solutions.

The key distinction of the two RC forces is that the ARNG, as the state militia, has the only permanent status for land forces granted by the Constitution. Since Articles I and II of the Constitution have never been amended, States will argue ARNG troops are the principle military asset the country has. Many States claim they are prepared to finance any proposed cutbacks from their own budgets. It is doubtful, however, if ARNG forces can be solely sustained by the budgets of most of the States for any period of time, particularly with regard to equipment purchases.

There has always existed tension between States and the Army with respect to controlling the National Guard. The system is wedded to the geography of the country. As local organizations, the external political power of the RCs, that which the RCs exercise collectively in the national arena, is formidable. As local organizations the RCs are also shaped by internal political factors, that is within the RC units themselves. The RCs have tunnel vision - each is intensely parochial and protective of its own turf, so much so that they often lose sight of the forest for the trees and are quick to discard (or make up, as the case may be) "threats" from the Regular Army and the other RC to their roles within the defense establishment.³

There is little doubt this will be the most difficult problem for the Army and Federal and State governments to resolve. It is particularly so given the political influence generated from many quarters, particularly the "old guard" of the ARNG. But the truth of the matter is that current downsizing of US Army forces, whether AC or RC, will continue into the future. Unless they come up with a workable solution to allow smart cuts and realignment, they will simply end up as in the 1960s and 1970s with a hollow shell army. That army would have a difficult time supporting and promoting the NCA's strategic objectives and the country's national interests.

Reserve units selected by Area (Regional) Commanders should be tasked to provide formed companies, platoons, and/or sections for incorporation into Regular Component units proceeding on peacekeeping or other military duties.

There exists significant debate originating from many quarters of the US military and political communities with regard to the size of units that the RCs should be tasked to provide.

Currently, individual ARNG and USAR locations generally provide formed bodies of troops ranging from company to battalion size, with many regional locations combining to form brigades and divisions of RC troops. There are also smaller organizations of platoons, and in some cases squads, of specialty troops who may or may not be collocated with a larger formed body in the same RC location.

There are over 6,000 ARNG and USAR units (at the company level or separately organized detachments) located throughout the United States, although many are grouped into larger units such as battalions or brigades. Each unit has a particular function (such as infantry, combat support, administration, etc.) and a particular mobilization mission. Each unit is assigned an authorized manpower strength that is its peacetime goal; the ability to attain and maintain this strength level forms part of the readiness evaluation. RC units have been differentially successful in meeting these manning goals. The manning rates vary widely: from under-manning by more than 50 percent to over-manning by more than 25 percent.⁴

The structure of the Canadian RC is very similar, with individual locations or armories tasked to provide formed bodies of troops ranging from section (squad) to company size units. Again, several locations are combined to form battalion and brigade size units of RC personnel for higher level training when required, but the main vehicles for training throughout the year are section, platoon, and company.

This process has proven quite successful, particularly when applied through the auspices of the Total Army Establishment (TAE) program (discussed previously in chapter 2). It directs commanders of individual units to concentrate on attaining the level of personnel and training tasked to them by supplying funding and resources necessary to accomplish that task. It allows for expanded capability should the unit be more successful in recruiting, training, and retaining their personnel throughout the training year. As the TAE program emphasizes, Area Commanders have the ability and authority to reward success in cases such as this and shift allocated resources and funding from a less successful unit to a one more successful.

Having the company as the prime organization at individual locations provides more reasonable expectations of successful recruiting, particularly where the population base may restrict the ability of the unit to recruit and retain soldiers. In these cases, success must be closely monitored and weighed against the costs of infrastructure and support for the unit. There are many cases in Canada where large population base areas prove incapable of supporting even company size units, while other areas with relatively small populations are consistently able to produce company plus units trained to the standards as directed by the Area Commander.

The definition of stages 3 and 4 of the Canadian four-phase mobilization plan set out in the 1994 Defense White Paper should now be amended so as to reflect clearly defines roles for the Reserves, and especially for the Army Reserve, as the basis for recruitment, training, and the provision of formed and trained units required in the event of a major operation or conflict.

While there cannot be exact comparisons of Canadian and US Army mobilization criteria, it is clear that like Canada, the US must specifically identify missions the RCs are expected to achieve and what units are to be assigned to those missions. While it is acknowledged that general purpose combat capability is necessary in all units as a base line for further training in specialized operations, the current national security policy of the US makes it difficult if not impossible for RC units to be prepared to meet all missions that could be thrust upon them.

The Canadian Army has placed from one to three RC brigades in every one of the four Land Force Areas (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and Western) in Canada. These brigades are under the command and control of the AC Major General commanding the Area Command. Like the AC units in his area, he is at his purview to assign specific tasks, whether short term or longer duration, to RC units and individuals in his Area. The only limiting factor is the funding necessary for assigned RC unit missions, a condition which is normally handled at Army Command level when Area Commanders are assigned missions.

In Canada, any one of the four Area Commands is normally tasked to provide required troops for a given UN mission occurring at any point in time. Normally, each of the Area Commands is assigned this responsibility for anywhere from two-to-four consecutive six-month rotations, depending on the type of mission and the other demands that have been placed on the Army at the same time. The Area Commander then makes his assessment of how to best handle the assigned task, allocating all or parts of the given mission to both the AC and RC units in his Area.

Once the mission tasking is complete, additional funding is normally supplied to the Area Commander to ensure his Area is able to activate RC forces when needed. While this Area Commands is then busy training to meet the assigned mission, whether it be peacekeeping or disaster relief, the AC and RC units in the remaining three Areas continue general purpose combat training. This allows Area Commanders and the units to plan and prepare for non-warfighting type missions with a clear view to the projected time involved, at the same time maintaining a combat capability with the other three brigades.

In an article written for the magazine Parameters, John R. Brinkerhoff clearly identifies this as a problem for US RCs and suggests some solutions based on assigning specific roles to various elements of the RC community. For example, he suggests that differences in tactics and strategies between an MRC in South West Asia, versus one in Europe, versus one in South East Asia dictate a need for RC units to have clearly identified MRC missions to give them focus for their training. Like the AC force packages put together for the various MRCs, Brinkerhoff suggests the same principle be applied to the RCs.

The case for conservation of Army combat power is made by retaining the eight ARNG divisions and giving them and the 17 NG Separate Combat Brigades meaningful assignments in the national security strategy. One premise is that it is less expensive in the long run to retain low-cost combat power than to reconstitute it if the conventional wisdom is wrong.⁵

The relative viability of existing Army Reserve units should be validated using the following factors as a critical but not all inclusive list:

Before attempting to analyze the concepts for application to the US model, it is prudent to examine what the US Army has already determined to be necessary principles for RC restructure. The Army has recognized that continued budget constraint and restructuring of the Army AC and RCs are relative certainties well into the next century. Necessary to that process will be the inactivation of various units and formations and the closure of various supporting infrastructure determined to be no longer affordable for the total structure of the Army. Developing a list of criteria for this process is essential in determining the priorities in which the various units and formations can and will be identified as suitable for retention or designated for inactivation. This established list of criterion will be essential in establishing the validity of any future restructure processes.

In identifying units and formations for inactivation to meet targeted 1995 end-strength goals, the ARNG and USAR used eight basic criteria to select units for inactivation and for keeping others. In relative priority, these criteria were: (1) Historical readiness, especially personnel readiness, (2) Access and proximity to training areas, (3) Projected ability of area to support recruitment, (4) Geographic balance, (5) Owned versus leased facilities, (6) Historical significance, (7) State missions, and (8) Participation in Operation DESERT STORM.⁶

These selected criteria form a solid basis for restructure of US Army RCs, and indicate that serious thought has already been conducted in preparing for future restructure of the Total Force Army model. However, the ARNG and USAR openly admit that one RC did not weight the importance of these criteria in the same method as the other RC. For example, state missions were far more important to the ARNG than the USAR, who are not assigned state missions. Conversely, owned versus leased facilities was more important to the USAR than the Guard.

Although Department of the Army staff provided general guidance on criteria to be used when making unit selections, NGB and OCAR separately identified the specific criteria to guide their decisions. Their criteria were similar in that candidates for inactivation were often units that had experienced chronic readiness problems (especially those unable to attract sufficient recruits), were located long distances from their training sites, or were associated with other inactivating units. Some criteria were more important to one RC than the other. For example, NGB sought to balance its cuts geographically so that force reductions did not inordinately affect NG state missions. OCAR placed a greater emphasis on retaining the expertise of units that had served in Operation DESERT STORM. Also, OCAR considered whether the government owned or leased the facilities that the unit occupied.⁷

In order to expand on US Army rationale for these criteria, an outline review of their intent and application is necessary. This establishes current US Army thought in the approach to restructure of the RCs. The individual restructure principles adopted by the Canadian Army for the reorganization of their RC can then be measured against the US model to determine similarities, contradictions, or complimentary facets.

Historical Readiness

One of the striking similarities between the two models is the concept of rewarding the success of an individual unit which has shown good performance in recruiting, training, and retaining personnel over a period of time. This is the primary purpose for the existence of RC units, that being their ability to recruit and train part-time personnel for the Army structure. Being able to retain them on a consistent basis contributes to the overall efficiency of the unit and provides cost savings to the Army as a whole. By not having to repeat this yearly cycle on a large scale (necessary when large numbers of previously trained soldiers left the unit) permits the leadership of the Army and the RC involved to focus those valuable and limited resources elsewhere. As a result, the unit is able to more regularly conduct advanced training of soldiers who are already proficient in the basic necessary skills. This requirement is the key element to the overall unit readiness, a factor which was used in both models to determine which units should be

restructured, eliminated, or assigned new roles. The US Army justifiably places particular emphasis on this capability.

Although current US Army leadership is very much aware of the critical importance of RC personnel and training readiness to permit the Total Force Army to achieve its missions, there continues to be problems universally achieving necessary required standards. There will always be units that for societal, economic, or political situations at a given time will be unable to achieve their assigned readiness levels. What is desired is an overall capability among the RC units that allows them to achieve the assigned readiness and training levels prior to their deployment into an operational theater. Within the US Army, this does not generally appear to be the case.

The two Army RCs, the ARNG and the USAR, account for over 70 percent of all Selected Reserve manpower, and an even greater percentage of all junior enlisted reservists. In addition, these two components tend to have the most severe problems with personnel and training readiness.⁸

Access and Proximity to Training Areas

Access and proximity to training areas were not seen as essential requirements in the Canadian model, principally because each Area Command has their own Militia Training Center (MTC) in addition to AC training schools. For the most part, units are not geographically isolated in Canada, since population centers tend to be within a 100 mile strip of the Canada/US border. As a result, all units were deemed to have the same relative access to training areas and resources.

This consideration makes perfectly good sense in countries as large as the US and Canada. It is precisely for this reason that the MTCs were established in Canada in order to limit the costs incurred by RC units as they deploy to maneuver areas to conduct field operations and training. Canada has attempted to closely tie-in Army RC training schedules to flight schedules of the Canadian Air Force, and in some cases even the US Air Force when available, to limit costs incurred for deployments to maneuver areas.

Currently, the US Army operates some Local Training Areas that are utilized for the most part by the RCs. However, they are spread rather far apart and representation in every state or group of states is not always achieved. There needs to be more emphasis placed on this training requirement and a fuller, more comprehensive system of training areas established that can be utilized by Army RCs. With the airlift assets of the US military, it is feasible to envision a system where the Air Force, particularly the Air National Guard and Air Reserve, could be employed in such a role. Not only does the Army RCs receive the benefit of rapid deployment to maneuver areas, but the Air Force structure as well receives residual spin-off benefits. Air Force units, formations, flight crews, and installation staff receive concurrent training benefits as a result of participating in an air movement exercise similar to that required under force projection operations.

Another solution, albeit an expensive one, is to construct more maneuver areas in the US, shortening the distance most RC maneuver units would have to travel to reach a training area. This would have to be carefully balanced against existing costs of transportation for units to measure the marginal value of one system over the other. The Canadian experience has been that the expenditure up front seems excessive and is the hardest portion to sell to those who control the budget allocations. The savings and benefits of this process are not normally realized for at least five years after the new infrastructure has been built, a sort of delayed gratification that sometimes is lost on financial controllers.

Projected Ability of the area to Support Recruitment

Of more importance to the Canadian model was the ability of the population base of a given area to support an RC unit. This was conducted through historical reviews of the support a unit in a particular region has received from the local community, combined with a ten year Statistics Canada analysis of population density, growth, stability, and migration within the nation.

This criteria had to be tempered in some cases where anomalies were discovered. For example, in a heavily populated, urbanized area, support to RC units was weak, while in an isolated community of only about 50,000 people, an infantry battalion was fielding over 1,000 soldiers, a medical company was at full strength, an engineer squadron was fully manned, and a service battalion was nearly full up. The contributing factors to this situation was community trust in the military, a proud history of regional participation in all of Canada's wars, and a relatively high unemployment rate, prompting many soldiers to seek employment opportunities, both part time and full time, with the military.

Geographical Balance

Another similarity to the Canadian model, albeit for a different reason, is the ARNG attempt to ensure that geographic balance was achieved after reductions in RC forces were completed. In the US model, this was an effort to ensure every state had at its disposal sufficient ARNG units and personnel necessary for domestic emergencies or operations.

In Canada it would have been unrealistic to think that all the units of a particular province or territory would be completely removed from the RC structure. It was however, kept as a secondary consideration after unit performance and capabilities. If a unit was determined not to have the population base necessary to support an RC unit, or satisfactory past performance in the region where it was located, it was usually targeted for inactivation. However, if it was willing to relocate to an area that could support it, then associated costs necessary to effect the move were examined to determine if this option was viable.

In some cases, this proved to be what transpired. In one example, a medical unit located in a community with a relatively small population base and limited medical facilities (thereby limiting the number of trained personnel in the area), was relocated. Now situated in a major population

center with 5 major hospitals, three universities which had medical programs in their curriculum, and many colleges, ambulance and paramedic facilities, plus other infrastructure necessary to a successful medical unit, it thrived. Within one year, this unit had grown from being nearly inactivated to one of the best manned and trained RC medical units in the country. Although such success stories are few and far between, there is scope for this process in any RC restructure plan.

In their efforts to ensure that all states had equitable distribution of existing ARNG forces, the NGB developed a plan to redistribute units left after required inactivations necessary to reach personnel strength goals. Although the reasons differed from the Canadian model, they are important in the context for restructuring US Army RCs.

NGB was developing a plan to relocate certain units from states that have been relatively unaffected by the force reductions to states that have been heavily impacted. NGB's goals in developing the plan were to achieve a more equitable distribution of the effects of force reductions and ensure that some minimum capabilities are available to all states. We did not assess the merits of this proposal as it had not yet been finalized. DOD officials advised us in January 1993 that the re-stationing of units would entail additional costs that will need to be considered before a decision is made on adopting or rejecting this proposal.⁹

Owned Versus Leased Facilities

Although not an essential criterion per se for the process in Canada, infrastructure Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs were analyzed in each and every Army Area Command in Canada. This was completed in an effort to provide further input for ways to decrease expenditures for O&M and plow that money back into unit training. Costs of armories were examined in detail, with expenditures for the last five years being analyzed to provide historical reference. Although not used as a selection criteria, it was the basis for eliminating unit redundancies in the same geographic area, served as a tie breaker when necessary, and allowed units and staff planners to examine ways to decrease these costs. This concept will be discussed further in this text.

Historical Significance such as Participation in DESERT STORM

A further similarity between the two countries' concepts of Army RC restructure is retaining units that have previously demonstrated historical participation in peace and wartime operations over similar units that have no such history. This criteria provides incentive for units to aggressively recruit and train so as to be ready for deployment at any time, continuing the contribution to the unit's history. Once again the main criteria is readiness and the ability to deploy, the fundamental *raison d'être* for RC units.

Although Canada has not had a major combat deployment (such as the Persian Gulf or Panama) since the Korean conflict, virtually every UN peacekeeping mission has had participation from Canada. In order to conduct these operations, Canada has continually relied on substantial support from RC units, both on an individual and group basis. These operational deployments were used in the same context for unit evaluations as USAR and ARNG used DESERT STORM.

State Missions

The criterion of state missions was not utilized in Canada simply because no provincial government has jurisdiction over RC forces without the express written consent of the Federal government.

The Canadian Restructure Principles in Detail

The overarching consideration in identifying RC units for restructure or inactivation was the need for a set of identifiable, accessible, and quantitative criterion. These could then be viewed by the RC community at large as a fair and equitable way of continuing the process. As with any process of this nature, it was impossible to please all parties concerned with the selected criterion. This was especially so when parochial interests transcended considerations of what was best for the RCs and the Army as a whole.

In one locale for example, a group of retired servicemen presented a restructure proposal to simply rename an existing infantry battalion located in a major population center. This would have brought back onto the current Order of Battle a unit that had not been there since the end of the Korean conflict. Their passionate, parochial and lengthy pleas to both the SCRR and Minister of National Defense to this end did little to overcome the hard facts. Regardless of what name the unit used, this geographic region had too many units, not enough support for all of them, and this particular infantry battalion was perhaps the worst of the lot in recruiting and retaining personnel.

It was obvious from the start that the Canadian process required a set of criterion that could be proven to be the basis for selection of RC units for inactivation or restructure. The Army leadership, both AC and RC, could then stand by their decisions with statistical analysis backing their choices instead of being under suspicion of playing political "hot potato" with a very sensitive issue.¹⁰

The US Army's attempt to designate unit inactivations in order to match personnel end-strength appears to have been somewhat inconsistent. Although there existed a set of criteria for both ARNG and USAR senior leadership to follow, it appears that in more than one instance, interior and exterior forces influenced the final outcome of what units would be actually inactivated. While this is expected in a process as complicated as downsizing a super power, it does open the way for those intent on derailing the process to cry foul.

This is even more prevalent where there exists political or parochial interests who are on the losing end of the deactivation process and who resort to whatever methods are required to overturn the decision. Although the individuals concerned believe they have the best interests of their community and unit at heart, they feel little or no obligation to do what is in the best interests of the military as a whole.

Officials in both RCs were largely unable to document the factors that entered into their decisions to reduce or inactivate specific units. Although they could discuss in general terms why certain selections were made, they did not know the reasons for other selections. These officials said that documenting their decisions might not have accurately revealed the basis for the decisions since higher-ranking reserve or Army Headquarters officials had the authority to revise their selections on the basis of other information.¹¹

Handling this sensitive political issue in the manner described establishes a dangerous precedent and provides a weak point in the arguments for restructure when influential and powerful people question the selection process. It was quickly evident in Canada that political, community, and business interests held far more sway with the government in power over this issue than anyone in uniform. The Canadian military quickly deduced this would be the key item of the restructure process that could derail the whole effort. Selection of RC units for inactivation was certain to raise public outcry in all levels of government, the media, and the military community as a whole, especially from the associations of various retired military personnel. Therefore, from the outset, it was directed by the Army Commander and the Chief of the Defense Staff that units selected for inactivation had to be chosen on the basis of concrete historical and current data. Only in rare occasions, and only with the approval of the Army commander, could deviations from the quantitative assessment be applied.

Gross anomalies in the selection of US Army RC units for deactivation are another instance that creates more problems than solutions.

In those cases in which low readiness ratings did not appear to be the primary reason for inactivation decisions, we asked (US Army) reserve officials to provide information on why the more ready unit was selected. These officials were able to provide explanations for many of the selections, but in some instances, were either unable to recall or unsure of the selections, or unsure of the reasons for the selections.¹²

It is essential for the validity of the process that staff and senior leaders be fully conversant with the quantitative and qualitative reasons various that RC units have been chosen for inactivation. This is not to suggest that the list has to be memorized, but when the pointed

questions are asked, documented proof is critical in allaying fears the process may have been tampered with. North Americans are traditionally suspicious of pork barreling and parochialism, and obvious deviations such as previously mentioned will do nothing but threaten the validity of the entire restructure process.

To better document unit inactivation decisions and improve objectivity of the selection process, USAR officials are developing an objective methodology which they plan to use to identify Army Reserve units for reduction in the future. USAR officials said that this effort has been driven by their recognition that the lack of documentation on inactivation decisions makes it difficult for them to justify why specific units were selected for inactivation. Moreover, they were unable to demonstrate that the criteria used in the selections was consistently applied.¹³

We will now review the applicable list of factors used in the Canadian restructure process and provide a brief analysis of their applicability to the US Army RC model. All of these concepts were identified in both the Canadian SCRR report and the Canadian Army Reserve implementation directive, both of which are being exercised in the Canadian RC system.

While the unit must be prepared to meet its operational tasks dictated in Phase 3 of the Canadian Mobilization Plan, it must also be prepared and have a demonstrated capability - to provide the individual, section, and platoon size augmentation to the Regular Army needed to meet the demands of the present situation.

Although the mobilization levels and sequence for the RCs in Canada and the US differ significantly, the activation process, intent, and end result are clearly similar and should therefore be more fully defined. The Canadian mobilization process is based upon 4 stages:

Phase I. Force generation. This is augmentation for ongoing daily missions to the AC. This see mainly individual, crew and section (squad) size augmentation.

Phase II. Force enhancement. Increase of resources allocated by the federal government in order to allow the RCs the opportunity to provide more organizations designated in Phase I for support to the AC.

Phase III. Force Expansion. RCs are expected to provide formed companies, squadrons and batteries of units as selected by the Government Order in Council.

Phase IV. National Mobilization. All RC units are activated and expanded to war strength.

The mobilization system for the US military is essentially different from the Canadian system with regard to the levels, authority, and numbers concerned, but strives to achieve the same end result of a progressively stronger reaction to a given situation. It consists of the following steps and criteria ranked from lowest to highest in significance:

Domestic Emergency. Selective Mobilization. Necessary individuals for a given task which may be authorized by either the President or Congress.

Operational Augmentation. Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up. Up to 200,000 personnel for up to ninety days (changed to 270 days since DESERT STORM). The President may authorize this but must inform Congress within twenty-four hours of the decision.

Contingency Operation, War Plan, National Emergency. Partial Mobilization. Either the President or Congress may authorize up to one million personnel for up to twenty-four months.

War or National Emergency. Full Mobilization. All RC units and personnel are activated by Congress for the duration of the conflict plus an additional six months.

War or National Emergency. Total Mobilization. The AC and RC are expanding past existing force structure. There is also a need to mobilize the industrial and production facilities needed for the war effort in order to sustain forces. Congress must approve this action.

Although there are parallels between the two mobilization systems, there will be no attempt to justify one over the other as recommendations for change. However, during mobilization the principle of ensuring each and every RC unit and individual knows where they fit in the overall Army structure when mobilized should be applied to both armies.

One particular weakness identified during deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1991 was the cumbersome and restrictive time limits that were imposed by law on the National Command Authorities in its efforts to provide the necessary RC troops to respond to emergency situations.

The federalization authority needs to be refined to meet the needs of the military situation, to include length of time federalized and access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The President invoked USC 673b to federalize Selected Reserve units for a period of 90 days. One extension of 90 days is authorized by law and was later approved by the President. Accordingly, those units which shipped equipment by sea were limited to 140-150 days in theater because of the time to transport the equipment. States were required to fill position vacancies by cross leveling soldiers from other units. The levied units' readiness decreased. The Presidential call-up did not allow the Army to federalize individuals for initial entry training for subsequent reassignment to their units. This included newly commissioned lieutenants scheduled for the Officers Basic Course. Partial mobilization is a more flexible authority and allows for the federalization of 1,000,000 personnel in units and the Individual Ready Reserve for 2 years. The President may invoke Partial Mobilization after declaring a National Emergency.¹⁴

Time constraints that are a result of congressional laws governing call-up of RC forces affected the ability of the US Army to deploy RC forces were deemed necessary to decisively win the Persian Gulf conflict. But although the RCs were calling for the situation to be resolved at the time so they could deploy to the conflict as required, the Army appeared not to actively pursue the issue.

Obviously, this legislation tied the hands of the AC. However, the AC did little, apparently, to force the issue. This issue directly relates to the failure initially to call-up combat units, especially the roundout brigades of the ARNG and, after prodding by Congress with the extension of the 673b time to a total of 360 days, the sending of the brigades to the National Training Center rather than deploying them.¹⁵

A simple expedient solution during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was for the President to declare a state of emergency, which changes the parameters of the RC activation guidelines, allowing them to stay mobilized for longer periods of time. This was to be necessary anyway to allow the military to activate Individual Ready Reserve personnel who were badly needed for their specialist skills.

For a short time, however, time limits imposed by law forced the RCs and AC to consciously juggle dates and units in order to obtain maximum operational benefit from their availability. It was one of the principle reasons cited by the US Government General Accounting Office (GAO) as to why the ARNG 48th brigade from Georgia had not deployed to join its parent division in the Persian Gulf, even though it had achieved readiness standards required of it in the ninety day mobilization time period (authorized time limit.) This included changing circumstances that caused the unit tremendous difficulties, some imposed by the AC, some as a result of internal problems within. Planners were faced with situations where if they called up RC units too early, by the time they were completed with mobilization and deployment training, deployed into theater and received sea transported equipment, they might only be available for 25-30 days before having to be rotated back out to allow them to demobilize and avoid conflicts with Congress over budget and duration of activation.

The reserve call-up authority invoked by the President on August 22, 1990, and in effect until January 19, 1991, allowed reservists to be kept on active duty for a maximum of 180 days (an initial 90-day period, followed by a 90-day extension at the discretion of the President.) The 180-day maximum, it was felt, precluded the effective use of the roundout brigades. By the time they finished necessary post-mobilization training and deployed to Saudi Arabia, they would have very little time remaining before they would have to either be demobilized or have their active duty extended under other statutory authority.¹⁶

This situation was avoided by the President calling a state of emergency, which lengthened the time limitations somewhat for the RC mobilization. This problem clearly demonstrates a need for a review of the mobilization requirements and expected duration for RCs deploying in support of AC forces. More and more, RCs will be called upon to help the AC complete their missions. Since DESERT STORM they have been amended to permit more flexibility in application, especially the 200,000 call up for 270 days. With limited resources available to both in terms of manpower, budgets, and equipment, allowing this situation to affect the RCs ability to mobilize and deploy not only seriously hampered the Army's ability to complete its mission, but increased

tremendously the expenditures associated with unnecessarily redundant activation, training, and deployment and redeployment costs. As the US commits its RCs to more missions abroad, they need to modify the process even further to ensure the availability of the necessary RC personnel and capabilities.

In Canada, although alternate contracts of varying lengths of time are available, Reservists are normally called into full-time service (Class B) for a period of 180 days (six months) and are eligible for extensions of 180 days as required for the mission. Others can be called into full-time employment for periods normally ranging from one to five years (Class C), with additional time available if the job requires. The rules for extensions are quite flexible, allowing for ease in continuing employment of reservists to accomplish the mission at hand.

There are compensation benefits and terms of employment that have to be worked out in order to implement this system for US RCs. But it is an easily applied, flexible method of ensuring that reserve component personnel are ready and available to support AC missions. For example, when the Royal Canadian Dragoons Battle Group deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina for United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) duty in the fall of 1994, over 150 RC personnel deployed with them. These individuals were given a ninety day contract to cover the period of pre-deployment training, at which point those selected to deploy were given an additional 180-day contract to cover the deployment time in Bosnia. While deployed in theater, the unit was informed that there would be an extension of the unit's mission for an additional two months.

To facilitate this new requirement, reservists deployed with the Battle Group were given another two month contract to cover the effected time. Compensation benefits originating as a result of the extended deployment were worked out when the unit returned to home station. There was never a problem of reservists not being available due to limited mobilization duration and the system was generally viewed as being administratively easy to execute.¹⁷

This system has been effectively used by Canada on virtually every mission requiring RC support, which are in fact most. Should the US military and Congress elect to examine the feasibility of adopting such a system, the intricacies of the administrative processes, arrangements and benefits for US RC personnel will have to be resolved. However, it has proven to be an effective, flexible, and valuable tool for the current Canadian Army in ensuring that the required RC support is available when necessary, a critical aspect for an army with a relatively small AC and a government willing to deploy troops on every UN peace-keeping mission since the UN was founded.

Over the last five years, the unit must have demonstrated its ability to recruit effectively and to retain its personnel at or near its paid ceiling. In demographic terms, it must also have access to a reasonable pool of potential recruits, or be willing to relocate to regions supporting these requirements.

This principle is the basic reason for having any RC in any army. The period selected to evaluate the historical results for US Army RC units will be totally dependent on specifics of the Army system over a given number of years. A comparison running back to the Vietnam War would be significantly different than that of the period immediately prior to the Persian Gulf War.

A suggested point of departure for the US Army review would be the introduction of the Total Force Army, or the period immediately following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent reductions of the US military. Both of these situations significantly affected the structure of the Army and provide some consistency of the set conditions and functions of particular units and commands. The requirement is that historical data, much like cost estimates the US Army uses for training budgets, provides a good baseline to review the success of individual units.

The ability of RC units to recruit and train soldiers and to then retain their skills has a two-fold benefit to the AC and the Total Force Army structure. First, there is the basic need to have the RC soldiers trained to the required standards who can then step forward in time of crisis and, if

not able to assume identical roles and missions as the AC, at least contribute significantly to the overall success of the operation. Second, retention of these trained soldiers limits waste incurred where the Army spends inordinate amounts of money repeating the same training cycle for brand new recruits each and every year.

RC units have been differentially successful in meeting these manning goals. The manning rates vary widely: from under-manning by more than fifty percent to over-manning by more than twenty-five percent.¹⁸

This is not to infer the AC does not experience the same problem. Although it tends to impact AC units to a lesser degree since personnel who join the AC have this as their sole means of employment, they are no less affected. Especially hard hit are basic training centers where the rules for allowing recruits to leave the service are especially lenient. This results in approximately thirty-seven percent of recruits leaving the system before they complete basic training, a huge waste in time and resources. The rules governing release during basic training should be tightened up, or the US Army must resign itself to continued waste of resources available from a limited budget well into the foreseeable future.

Armies throughout history, both AC and RC, have always had to spend great sums of money to train new soldiers each year to keep the strength of the units up. For example, the 1997 recruiting target for the US AC Army is 90,000 soldiers, a significant expenditure in resources when budgets are tight.¹⁹ This is a necessary cycle to infuse new blood into the AC Army and to support the rank structure that is necessary to make the Army function. The same holds true for RCs, but high turnover rates in these units contribute to the difficulties they have attaining readiness standards that are assigned to them.

FY 95 enlisted losses of 76,492 represented a 22.4% attrition rate. While the attrition rate is higher than programmed, it continues to be lower than in previous years.²⁰

The senior leadership of the US Army RCs has recognized this problem and are currently attempting to limit the high yearly turnover rates of RC soldiers through a number of innovative programs which are designed to keep the soldiers interested. This is the basic requirement to retaining large numbers of trained soldiers.

The unit must have demonstrated that it can effectively train and that its personnel are able to qualify in high percentages on the Individual Battle Task Standards (MOS qualification training) and perform with reasonable effectiveness in the collective (section/platoon/company) exercises.

The ability of RC units to effectively train personnel to the level required in preparation for war is essential to the Army. In Canada, individual training skills are the basis of all RC training and form the core of training requirements for units during yearly training cycles. Individual Battle Task Standards are the required measure for the RC and direct that a basic level of MOS skills and general purpose proficiency be acquired and maintained throughout the unit. This cycle is repeated every year with each new batch of recruits entering the RC training cycle.

In the past, Canadian RC training has experienced far too many instances of units attempting to train at too high a level for the funded time available in a given year. There have been instances of company sized units attempting to train personnel at the brigade and divisional level in preparation for fighting enemy divisions and armies. Clearly this is a difficult, if not impossible, task for RC units to accomplish. AC units and formations train year round in order to prepare for these operations, and even then the majority of training is focused on individual, crew, company, and battalion level. This allows them to then participate in periodic higher level training events held throughout the year where the more advanced tactical skills are exercised and practiced. Without mastering individual and crew skills prior to these events, it is not possible for even AC units to become proficient in brigade and division operational warfare.

There is ample evidence that the same problem exists within US RCs. Many units tend to focus on higher level operations before mastering and maintaining individual and crew level skills necessary for advanced training focus. In the US system, basic individual soldier skills form the essential basis for further unit training, providing the basis for readiness levels required for higher level training after activation. Without these individual and crew level skills, the unit will be unable to continue into the more elevated training required for operational deployment. However, there is considerable disagreement in the US military concerning the question of whether RCs are capable of attaining and maintaining required skills, especially in positions requiring mastery of technologically advanced equipment.

Many military leaders feel that the RCs tend to focus on too high a level of training during their limited training time.

Many RC units often use the time they do have inefficiently. Many spend part of their annual training periods conducting brigade and division level exercises, the type of training that even the AC does not conduct routinely. Higher level exercise in the RCs are conducted at the expense of essential individual and small unit training. Smaller units and individual soldiers get little value out of such exercises; for them, it is training time wasted.²¹

In July 1990, the replacement brigades reported an MOS trained rate 22 percentage points higher than the roundout brigade it replaced. Combat arms specialties of armor, infantry and artillery in the roundout brigades reported shortages 25 and 14 percent higher than the replacement brigades.²²

In essence, these RC units are trying to run before they can walk, a problem more grave to their ability to function than the AC. As previously mentioned, RC training is a cycle where new recruits must acquire skills at the basic level before being able to contribute to the overall capabilities of the unit. Although the same is true of the AC, they have more available training time, facilities, and instructors, and the recruits arriving at AC units have at least mastered the basic skills taught to them at various recruit depots.

It is absolutely essential that RC units focus the limited training time they do have on individual and crew level skills. Attempts to train them to higher levels are simply wasted efforts. There is simply not enough time for officers and soldiers to master the intricacies of higher level operations. The results of RC activation for Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM indicated there were many difficulties in activated units who had not mastered basic and crew skills required by their MOS standards.

These units, some of whom had attempted higher level training without ensuring the basics had been mastered, took much longer to achieve readiness levels required for an operational deployment. This was simply a function of having to retrace training steps and qualify personnel on skills that should have been mastered at the unit armory during the normal training cycle.

The ultimate result of the three-army system is that RC resources are wasted in peacetime by inefficiently preparing units that are not as combat ready as they should be, and AC resources are wasted after mobilization by correcting RC deficiencies that should not be there in the first place. These wasted resources-principally time and money-are precious and irreplaceable commodities that, in the foreseeable future, will remain in short supply. We cannot afford to waste them. Some day the cost may be more than money.²³

This does not appear to have been an isolated incident. Prior to the deployment to the Persian Gulf, problems with RC readiness and training levels had been identified by senior Army leadership and the GAO. Specific action was deemed necessary to correct these shortfalls in order to allow the RCs to attain readiness levels required in accordance with the Total Force Army structure. The focus was to permit the RCs to reach and maintain required unit training levels in preparation for higher operational capabilities.

The Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan-adopted in 1989-seeks to improve RC training in thirty-nine areas. It focuses on individual training, leader development, collective training, and training management. While both active and roundout brigades conducted each of these levels of training, the replacement brigades had a much greater opportunity to conduct collective training. Accordingly the proficiency in replacement brigades far exceeded that of roundout brigades. In the ARNG, NCOs are generally one rank behind the AC in completing required courses, and completion of an NCO course is not always a prerequisite for promotion.²⁴

The US Army has dedicated a great deal of time and energy in ensuring standards of RC units reach required levels. It is also essential that they fit correctly into the scheme for mobilization of these units. Of particular importance are 1980 identified RC deficiencies in both technical and tactical competence, and the intangibles such as leadership and discipline. However, it has yet to completely produce the results needed in RC units to allow them to attain required standards on a cyclical basis. Although improvements have occurred, particularly in technical and tactical capability, there remain significant problems with the more subtle and refined skills.

These adjustments have rectified some of the problems identified for RC units in their training preparation.

While the restructuring of the Army had many positive impacts, few were as impressive as the performance turned in at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La, by the 53rd Infantry Brigade during the summer of 1995. The preparatory leader development training, as well as the exercise itself, demonstrated the viability of the Enhanced Brigade concept and the capability of the ARNG to fully meet its assigned readiness goals in a crisis or wartime scenario. As the units continue to convert to Enhanced Brigades over the next several years, we anticipate further success stories along these same lines as the Army National Guard graphically demonstrates its ability to train to the most demanding standards while maintaining its immediate accessibility for missions, both state and federal.²⁵

Through the application of advanced technologies and simulation devices, as well as innovative training strategies, we hope to achieve a 200-300 percent increase in unit training readiness when compared to that reported in the 1991 DESERT SHIELD mobilization. During the annual gunnery training of 116th Armored Brigade, 71% of the crews of a tank company qualified on Tank Table VIII, a considerable feat of crew level preparedness and marksmanship. The AC master gunners on site attribute this success directly to revised training procedures.²⁶

A factor that may have exacerbated the readiness problems of the RCs was the AC misconception that RC units should and would arrive at mobilization training centers as combat ready as the AC. As discussed earlier, this is simply not possible. It is more imperative that RC units ensure their soldiers have acquired and maintained the basic skills which allow them to participate effectively in higher level training.

No matter how well we do in peacetime training, the average RC unit will never be as combat ready as its AC counterpart. Those who imply that they will be as combat ready are making a mistake.²⁷

The ultimate result of the three-army system is that RC resources are wasted in peacetime by inefficiently preparing units that are not as combat ready as they should be, and AC resources are wasted after mobilization by correcting RC deficiencies that should not be there in the first place. These wasted resources-principally time and money-are precious and irreplaceable commodities that, in the foreseeable future, will remain in short supply. We cannot afford to waste them. Some day the cost may be more than money.²⁸

It is essential that commanders at all levels, both in the AC and the RCs, more fully appreciate the skill requirements necessary for RC units. This knowledge must be simultaneously tempered with an awareness of the time constraints placed on the RC units and the impact that this has on their ability to acquire and retain those skills. Without this basic understanding of the very serious limitations and training time availability, and without a much more concerted effort on the part of the RC leaders to achieve and maintain the basic necessary readiness levels, the Total Force Army system is due for some very difficult experiences.

The RC leadership must take the lead in these efforts, and the AC must better assimilate RCs into the Total Force Army training structure. We have previously discussed the importance of more AC support to RC units. The RC and AC leaders must ensure RCs are attaining the standards they are directed and capable of achieving.

The unit must have demonstrated the ability to effectively manage its personnel, operating, and maintenance budgets over a five year period.

In the Canadian Army Reserve system, budgets and resources necessary to conduct assigned training are allocated yearly. They are decentralized down to brigade and unit level for specific application, with management control exercised by Area Commanders through Area Headquarters comptrollers. These resource allocations are reviewed twice yearly which permits adjustments to compensate for unexpected training costs. This method of control allows the Area Commanders to exercise necessary flexibility in re-allocating resources from unsuccessful units to

successful ones. If a unit is not aggressive and focused in recruiting, training, and retaining personnel, it runs the risk of not only being allocated less money in the following cycle, but in losing some that it already has to units that have experienced success in these areas.

Budget allocations are based on the paid ceiling of each unit multiplied by the number of days training that is tasked to the unit by the Area Commander. For example, an MP platoon or a logistics battalion may not be allocated as many training days as an infantry battalion in a given year. Any number of reasons may cause this, but the bottom line is the Area Commander can allocate resources to his units and brigades by task rather than by lump sums. This helps ensure that allocated funds are directed toward training requirements and not being wasted on unnecessary administrative functions.

The litmus test for units is whether the soldiers who were paid during the year achieved required readiness levels in various battlefield skills (first aid, map using, weapon handling, etc). Should the majority of those attending the regular training sessions not achieve required standards, then Area Commanders will be asking some very pointed questions of his brigade and unit commanders. This system forces correct and directed training and focuses units and formations to exercise strict budgetary control or risk censure.

The control and application of resources was one of the identified areas in determining which units were the most cost effective in producing soldiers. Although farther down the priority list than actual readiness levels, manpower, and personnel retention, it contributed to the overall review of effective versus non effective units. A unit that expended \$100,000 to produce 100 soldiers was obviously viewed more favorably than one that only produced 50 soldiers with the same amount of money.

The variables of this system are many, and have to be tailored to fit individual situations. However, economic effectiveness was a point that political and community masters readily

understood when analysis was being conducted to determine which units were viable and which were not.

The unit record in war and peace should be considered, so as to reinforce success.

This is a simple process where a unit that has previously proven its ability to perform necessary functions in domestic operations, peacetime activation, or wartime deployments should be retained over a similar unit with no such history. This process goes a long way in providing incentive for units to participate in activation missions, thereby forcing them to be trained and ready to deploy at any time.

The US Army has already demonstrated a willingness to accommodate those units with a history of support to operations and deployments.

In addition, the Army Reserve decided to retain some units that it had earlier planned for inactivation on the basis of their successful participation in the Gulf War.²⁹

The Total Army Establishment (TAE) program be implemented to structure units from the bottom up, ensuring success at organizational and training levels before providing funding for higher level training and unit capabilities.

Canada has found that the most effective way to effect restructure was from the bottom up, to look at the platoons and companies located in various regions throughout the country as building blocks for higher level formations. A region that for the last five years was able to produce an infantry company and retain the majority of its personnel was seen as more effective as one that could produce a battalion one year but only a platoon the next. It was found on many occasions that success in one region over another was not necessarily a function of an available recruiting pool, but more a function of economics, locale, and heritage.

Although many RC personnel were at first concerned that they may be reduced from a battalion designation to that of a company, for the most part it proved to be a relatively painless experience. The concept of producing one formed platoon, then being allocated resources to

produce another, and more still if the unit experienced continued success, provided a much needed shot in the arm for the RC recruiting programs. They were also instrumental in providing the necessary incentives for keeping the soldiers in the units after they had been trained. Infantry companies and service battalions tended to be the units who best responded to this situation, especially where the incentive was provided to recruit and train additional specialist platoons such as recon, anti-armor, and mortars or, in the service battalions, transport, service, and maintenance companies.

The basic premise with this system is that brigades and divisions are made up of a number of building blocks, namely companies and battalions. Each unit was allocated a set manpower strength and funding to train it, with additional funds being allocated to those units who could produce and train more. In this way, the basic building blocks for formations were produced, and regions that could support the manpower requirements consistently received funding to take advantage of that situation.

As with any RC organization, there is a propensity to train the unit to a level that is simply not achievable or cost effective. Area Commanders surveyed these inclinations very critically and ensured units had achieved the basic readiness standards directed to them. Instead of allowing a company to conduct training designed to fight an enemy division or conduct battalion task force operations, the Area Commanders would re-focus unit training plans. This was accomplished by incentives of specialty training (recon, mortars) rather than allowing unit commanders to lose focus of the basic aim of the program. Although still in its early stages, it is expected that the recruiting and retention figures for RC units will improve significantly over the course of the next five years as the program methodology begins to take effect.

The US system has recognized the same potential problems with its RC training system and the natural tendency to take on more than is reasonably attainable.

The Company is the maximum size RC combat arms unit that should be expected to train for and achieve a C-1 readiness rating. Battalions might be expected to train and maintain C-2, but only if they are staffed more heavily with full time support soldiers, and the balance of the unit manned with carefully selected personnel, who are chosen not necessarily because they are the best qualified but because they possess compatible civilian occupations allowing them more time to participate in additional RC training periods or planning sessions. Brigade and large combat organizations, generally speaking, cannot honestly attain and maintain C-3, based on the scattered nature of their stationing, availability of time, and access to suitable training areas.³⁰

These same basic problems exist for both Canadian and US RCs. Units tend to wander away from basic requirements and training standards, while ignoring realities of limited training time trying to achieve mastery of some very difficult abilities.

Proficiency in leadership, individual, and crew skills is at the heart of the Army's building block approach to training. Soldiers must be proficient in these skills before they can be expected to achieve proficiency in the more complex skills associated with higher echelons, such as platoons and companies. The replacement brigades were able to concentrate on honing individual and collective skills that soldiers and leaders already possessed, whereas the roundout brigades in many cases sought to achieve proficiency for the first time.³¹

If the roundout brigade policy is to be successful filling capability gaps in the US AC structure, then the RC formation and unit commanders have to be realistic. They normally have only thirty-nine days in the normal cycle to train the majority of their personnel. In the summer, many (but not all) will receive additional training to provide new skills or sharpen existing ones. The key to their success at battalion or higher levels, and therefore their ability to successfully deploy on operations, will be their proficiency at platoon and company level in all basic skills. This will allow the ninety days intensive, full unit training they will receive after activation to sharpen existing skills, introduce the more complex and demanding battalion, brigade, and division training, and attain the demanding readiness levels that any unit deploying on operations requires. Failure to achieve those basic building blocks will see the entire RC structure crumble at some point after activation.

A critical requirement is the demonstrated ability for an RC unit to make effective use of the allocated AC support in their training. Would the minimum 10% full-time support model used in Canada be effective in preparing and training units for operations?

Someone needs to redesign, take control of, and support Active, Guard and Reserve Military Technician programs and make those programs deliver the same professional product expected of Army advisors and instructors.³²

In the Canadian model, this principle more than any other is seen as the key to successful integration of RCs into the Total Force Army. If the AC wishes to be able to count on RCs when and where they need them, more than lip service must be paid to the training of RC soldiers. Although friction exists between AC and RC personnel in some instances, for the most part the system has been beneficial for both.

AC personnel have been able to effectively pass on their abilities and experience to many of their RC counterparts and have helped ensure the commonality of standards between the AC and the RCs in all areas of training. Conversely, some of the stigma and barriers that affected the relationship of the AC to the RCs have been eliminated as more and more AC personnel become familiar with the limitations and constraints under which RCs function. In several cases the improvement in the abilities of RC units and personnel after an increase in AC support was remarkable. As this system continues to function, these types of residual benefits are expected to multiply.

The same situation holds true for the US Army. Perhaps now more than at any other time in its history, the Army will have to rely on RC units and personnel to bridge the gaps in AC capability, do it well, and react on short notice. As was shown earlier, force projection and military draw down have a price, that being the ability to have enough forces to deploy in time to protect the nation's interests.

This is not just a problem at the soldier level. The Canadian experience has been that RC soldiers are capable of fulfilling their tasks when called upon, albeit with a little extra training to

sharpen their skills. What the RC community truly lacks is effective leadership, an art form that can only be mastered with concentrated practice. This is not a slight on the RC system, but a simple result of not having the funded training time to improve these critical skills.

Perhaps more important, RC soldiers do not receive the professional coaching and guidance they need from their superiors. This is a direct reflection of the quality of the senior RC leaders. Senior leaders are the products as much of the RC political system as they are products of the military system. They may be dedicated and loyal, but they may not be necessarily competent. They do not have the luxury of practicing their profession every day like their AC counterparts. The barriers between the components prevent RC leaders from regularly observing the leadership, command, and staff practices of senior AC leaders who practice their craft daily.³³

This problem affects more than just man management skills which require a great deal of time and practice to master. Other skills required by officers and NCOs are just not able to develop in an environment of only a few training days a year.

For example, officers had difficulty in the areas of (1) tactical and technical competence, (2) understanding, and applying training standards, and (3) enforcing discipline. Poor leadership in the NCO ranks of one brigade appeared to be the most serious of several brigade weaknesses, and in another brigade rendered the brigade dysfunctional.³⁴

The problem directly affects the unit's ability to come together as a team and to conduct effective operations. Skills developed as a squad leader and platoon leader do not adequately prepare the average soldier, and particularly the officers, for the demands of battalion, brigade, and division operations. It is at this level that RC units tend to be overwhelmed by the enormity of their responsibilities, primarily because of lack of practice. They prove unable in many cases to effectively complete the tasks set out for them. This is particularly evident in the formation staffs who, by the very nature of the work, have to function as a team for long periods to establish operating procedures needed to effectively support their commander.

With these weaknesses, it is no wonder that AC personnel and the GAO view the capabilities of RCs with something akin to disfavor.

Deep feelings...have traditionally marked relations between the Army's active and reserve factions, a natural cleavage between professional and citizen soldiers that widens in the face of shrinking availability of defense resources or a growing perception that reserve forces are substitutes for-rather than compliments to-the active forces.³⁵

This is only a natural occurrence when the professional full-time Army is kept separated from the part-timers, seeing them only during major training exercises. If for no other reason, allocating additional AC and full-time support to the RCs allows each to see the other more frequently, a necessary step in bridging the gap between the two. This will be critical when the time comes, as force projection requirements of the current US army will not allow time for petty squabbling and disagreement over who is capable of achieving what tasks. This element of trust will have to already exist between the two organizations if the Total Force Army is to be able to carry out its missions.

The RCs and the AC are distinctly separate cultures. AC soldiers who have not served in a readiness group or in some other assignment that brings them into daily contact with RC soldiers (in other words the majority of AC soldiers), tend, at least among themselves, to disparage the RCs as unprofessional. AC personnel typically do not understand the constraints under which the RCs operate. The AC officer seems to possess an arrogance toward, and ignorance of, the RCs.³⁶

Compounding the appearance of "ineptitude" is the assumption on the part of the AC that RCs will arrive 100 percent ready to go. This is not their mandate, and in very few cases can RC units and formations be anywhere close to the capabilities of the AC, who have practiced their craft daily. AC personnel tend to forget that few if any AC units and formations deploy to a major exercise without conducting numerous preparatory activities to sharpen the skills of every soldier participating. This cannot be accomplished as effectively by the RCs who are limited by funding, equipment, and training areas plus the amount of time allocated to them to complete the same process. Yet the AC expects the RCs to be fully ready.

The overall proficiency of the roundout (NG) brigades did not reach a proficiency level comparable to that of the replacement (AC) brigades. Roundout brigades were unable to meet the level of proficiency demonstrated by the replacement brigades with regard to complex synchronization skills-the most difficult doctrinal and leadership task in the Army. Roundout

brigades did not have sufficient opportunity to develop proficiency in the key building blocks of Army training: leadership, individual, and crew skills.³⁷

Whereas active Army units can walk out of their barracks to their motor pool to reach their tanks, howitzers, or combat engineer vehicles, RC units major systems are stored at mobilization and training equipment sites or equipment concentration sites. In addition, combat units need ranges and impact areas to fire their units weapons systems. Although the Army is implementing a concept of regional training centers, those centers are oriented primarily toward individual combat service support training that cannot be conducted effectively at home station.³⁸

If one were to review activation requirements and tasked readiness levels for RC units, it would quickly be apparent that they are not expected to deploy the minute they are activated. They can hardly be expected to do so when the majority of the RC soldiers involved spend less than 20 percent of the time of his AC counterpart on the job and training. This is markedly so in combat units of the RCs, whose soldiers have no chance to practice their skills other than with their unit. For this reason they are not expected to be 100 percent upon activation.

No one claims that the 48th Bde, Georgia ARNG, was C-1 in August 1990. It was not supposed to be. Had it received the requisite resources, which the rest of the Army had "hosed" on the 24th Division, it could have achieved C-1 quickly. The post-mobilization training imposed on the 48th, including Gulf area special training, required less than ninety days, even with the revalidation of past training.³⁹

Many RC units, especially combat units, can accomplish very little significant collective training during a weekend drill, simply because thirty-six hours (Saturday morning through Sunday evening) is not enough time to organize a unit that has not been together for a month, issue equipment, travel to a training area, train, return to home station, maintain the vehicles and equipment, and turn it back in.⁴⁰

In overcoming these varied and difficult problems, Canada has found the key to successful RC preparedness is increased AC and full time support allocated to RC units and formations. Although parochial reluctance and suspicion initially had to be overcome, it is now increasingly apparent that this system dramatically improved the overall capabilities of many RC units. It is becoming increasingly critical that the US Army must devote more full time assets to RCs. It is only with the required guidance, time, and assistance of these key individuals that the RCs will be

able to increase their readiness, decrease activation times, be more fully conversant with AC administrative and operational routines, and generally improve their ability to react as required.

This is not to say that the AC or full-time personnel should be assigned to the entire slate of command positions in the unit or formation. It is more important that they take up the burden of daily functioning of the unit, so that part-time Reservists or Guardsmen can maximize limited training time made available each year.

Such action, it is argued, would inject active Army personnel with recent unit experience on modern equipment and current professional military education and school training, into key positions in roundout units. Large numbers of comparatively less capable (if only because of training time limitations) Guard officers and NCOs would be replaced by, in theory, more dynamic individuals. Finally, there is no doubt that the active duty "advisors" are useful, and indeed invaluable, to the RCs of all the services. However, there is a limit to what advisors can do if the advisees reject the advice.⁴¹

Although the idea of AC personnel serving in RC units is not a new concept to the US Army, the application of it has left something to be desired. In some cases, it has been readily accepted and applied, while in others this concept has only been paid lip service. Specific regulations governing the use of full-time support personnel have been laid down for the US military. The ineffective application of these regulations has not fulfilled the requirements of the RCs to effectively organize and train themselves. It does not help the situation when the majority of AC personnel view an assignment to an RC unit as a less than "career enhancing" initiative.

The ARNG full time support program is chartered by Congress to organize, administer, recruit and retain, instruct, and train the ARNG. The four categories of full-time personnel within the ARNG are Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel, Military Technicians, Active Component (AC) personnel, and Department of the Army civilians. This increased reliance on the ARNG, coupled with equipment modernization programs, has led to an increase in full-time support requirements even though full time support authorization levels and budgets are being reduced. The net effect is a reduced full-time support level in units, which has negatively impacted on personnel and equipment readiness levels. The ARNG allocates full-time support resources on a full "first to fight, first to resource" methodology to ensure the maximum readiness within early deploying units. This results in high priority units receiving a larger proportional share of full time support resources than do later deploying units. This has reduced the number of full-time personnel in many units to 50% of required.⁴²

The effect of this less than acceptable employment of FTS personnel, and in particular the assignment of sufficient AC personnel to positions with RC units, impacts on much more than the staff preparation, tactical competence, and leadership capabilities of RC personnel. Other areas are significantly affected as well.

Difficulty in maintaining tracked vehicles (tanks and Bradleys) plagued the performance of the two roundout brigades that trained at the NTC. For example, in one of the brigades that we observed, the average operational readiness rate for these vehicles was about 50 percent, in contrast to 85-90 percent rates for the AC units who train there. This lower rate is a systemic problem in the ARNG, caused by a maintenance system that relies primarily on civilians to maintain vehicles during peacetime.⁴³

The (lack of) full-time support force also impairs readiness. The most obvious effect is the shortage of full-time support personnel. As of the end of fiscal year 1992, only 70% of required ARNG full-time support billets were filled, and only 71% of equivalent USAR slots were filled. This shortage is a result of an age-old Army dilemma: more requirements than funds. Except for assigning AC personnel to RC units (and the number of active soldiers so assigned is minuscule), the current full-time support system exacerbates the distinctions between the components. Although AGR soldiers cost every bit as much as AC soldiers of the same grade and are fully expected to meet and maintain the same professional standards, beneath the surface, AGR soldiers are not comparable to their AC counterparts.⁴⁴

The most effective contribution that AC personnel will have on their RC counterparts is the example, knowledge, and leadership they will be able to impart. It is critical that the bulk of this additional full-time support, especially the AC portion, be of the appropriate rank level to allow the day-to-day work and preparations of RC units to be completed. It will be of absolutely no benefit if several AC majors and colonels are assigned to an RC unit unless they are willing to do the hands on work required of junior officers and NCOs.

The bulk of the force will be garrisoned in CONUS. What will they be doing? Training for certain, but the Congress and the public will want more. Peacetime domestic missions naturally enter the picture and the number one priority should be support and training of the RC. Here we're not discussing senior Army advisors; rather the RC needs AC sergeants and captains with the most up to date doctrinal and technical knowledge to operate at a "gut" level. These AC soldiers must not be considered full-time manning assets; that mission must and should be accomplished by the RC personnel, the AGR, because the Army has the tendency to pull AC soldiers from RC TOE slots as soon as the shooting starts to be used as fillers or to man units created after mobilization.⁴⁵

The inclusion of additional AC personnel to RC units also enhances administrative and operational crossover when required during activation. Operation DESERT STORM amplified specific problems imposed on RCs by the AC, problems that significantly affected the RCs ability to activate and achieve timely readiness levels.

In peacetime, the ARNG uses administrative systems that are not compatible with AC systems to manage personnel and supply operations. Upon mobilization, the brigades had to make a transition to the AC systems, which the ARNG soldiers were not trained to use. This seriously hampered their ability to mobilize and prepare for deployment.⁴⁶

There are also budgetary and resource savings to be had by ensuring that the Total Force Army is in administrative and operational synchronization across the board.

By supporting Guard units directly from the Army's wholesale supply system, the Army could reduce its inventory investment by the amount of inventory at the 54 Guard locations. Using the Army's wholesale supply system would also be another step toward achieving the Army's goal of a single supply system for all Army forces. Additionally, this step would be consistent with the GAO's prior report recommendation that the ARNG use the Army's supply system rather than its own system for the issuance of clothing to its members. The ARNG requisitions would not be assigned lower priorities than they are now, and supply responsiveness would be based on the Army-wide priorities. The GAO found that some units, when mobilized for Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD, encountered requisitioning problems in part because the units lacked training on and experience with the Unit Level Logistics System. About \$680,000 of the \$22.1 million of on hand inventory, excluding major end items of equipment, at the five Guard Locations reviewed was excess to the Guard's needs. By using the wholesale system to supply Guard units, the Army could, on a one-time basis, reduce its inventory by at least \$35.7 million at the five Guard locations included in the GAO's review and by at least \$215 million at all Guard locations.⁴⁷

This relatively simple investment in manpower and system synchronization could be effected to the tune of substantial dollar savings. This is a small example of residual benefits that additional full-time support personnel, especially AC soldiers, can provide to RC units by sheer abilities alone. Parochial interests aside, many in the US Army acknowledge the vital need for this change in the Army structure. However, many are hesitant to strip additional AC soldiers out of already depleted AC divisions and brigades in order to provide the necessary personnel that can help make the RCs much more effective.

Few people involved in the roundout concept question the desirability of assigning more FTS personnel to Guard roundout units. FTS, it is universally acknowledged, can remove peacetime administrative and logistical burdens from part-time reservists so the latter can concentrate on mission-essential training. It can also bring a familiarity with current active force procedures and techniques to reserve units.

The Army Inspector General report on the roundout mobilization also contains the injunction to not only increase the number of FTS personnel in roundout units but "increase *quality* as well." This would apply, it can be posited, to both placing the right types of FTS personnel in Guard units (those who can contribute as much to improving mobilization readiness in mission-essential tasks, as well as handling mundane and administrative responsibilities), and to ensure that FTS personnel are capable individuals.⁴⁸

The selection process to identify AC personnel to go to RC units has to be a directed process. Not all AC personnel will be effective in this role, and sending someone not capable of handling the complex job not only damages his or her career, but does nothing to diminish the friction that occurs between AC and RC units. An AC officer or Sr NCO arriving for the first time in his new RC unit may consider himself lucky if he barges in to change the world and is successful. The more likely scenario is he will be blown out of the water the first time and therefore loses his effectiveness and impact on the unit very quickly.

Conceivably, an active duty officer or NCO, serving a standard tour length of two to four years, might have great difficulty in meshing effectively with Guard members who are permanent residents of their local communities, depending entirely on the personality of the individual. While it may well make sense for RC units to be held to active duty standards when mobilized, it could be counterproductive or impossible for active duty personnel to hold them to such standards in peacetime. Guard unit members would simply "wait them out" if the active duty people applied pressure for "reforms." Or, if the active duty members applied too much pressure-perhaps based on their having been used to AC standards throughout their careers-then the Guard unit members might vote with their feet and leave the unit.⁴⁹

This is a very delicate situation and requires personnel who not only know their jobs in detail but who are articulate and tactful. It is probably one of the most difficult situations a young officer or seasoned NCO can be placed in, and the potential for disaster is very real. The Canadian experience has been that given the correct approach, and they are situation dependent, AC personnel can quickly establish themselves with credibility, honesty, and a genuine wish to assist

and improve the unit and the personnel in it. If this groundwork is not laid early, then the benefits may not come to fruition.

In Canada, some Area Commanders view this process critical enough to warrant a course designed for AC personnel who are assigned to RC units. It is hoped that in this manner, they will be able to quickly and effectively establish themselves within the RC unit and begin to contribute to its improvement and performance at the earliest possible time. The same problem holds true for full-time RC personnel employed within the RC units. A careful selection process should be conducted to provide the best available personnel for the tasks at hand. It must be remembered that the main burden of preparation and administration for the entire unit will fall on the shoulders of these personnel. If they are not well versed in their job requirements, then the entire unit will suffer proportionately.

The professional competence of AGR officers is further hindered by the fact that they are often denied the opportunity to command units because command in the RCs, as a rule, is reserved for part-timers. Soldiers who remain in the AGR program may continuously find themselves filling positions for which, in the AC, command is normally a prerequisite. These soldiers, however, simply because of their full-time status, are denied the benefit of command experience. AGR personnel, therefore, tend to be less competent technically and tactically than their AC counterparts. They may be no more capable in those areas than the part-time RC personnel whom they see only weekly or less, even though AGR soldiers are theoretically the equivalent of AC soldiers.⁵⁰

The Canadian model designated 10 percent full-time support as the level required to be of benefit to the RC. This level could be used as a start point for the US Army provided they were employed in the proper positions and the personnel assigned had the required expertise and qualifications to be of technical and tactical assistance to the units. A review of the full-time support personnel strengths in the RCs indicated that for a force of over 642,000 personnel (all Army RCs) there exists a requirement for 114,505 full-time personnel (17 percent). However, only 73,400 are authorized or funded (11 percent) of which only 70,096 (10.9 percent) are actually filled.⁵¹ These totals indicate a strong desire on the part of the US Army to provide the RCs with

the full-time manpower which they need to assist them in effectively preparing for their operational missions.

Where this system appears to become derailed is with the actual number of AC personnel physically assigned to the RC units. From the figures presented above, only 1,361 (.002 percent) of the total RC personnel allocations are designated as AC positions.⁵² This figure actually represents only a small fraction (.01 percent) of the number of full-time slots to be filled in RC units.

While it is acknowledged that many full-time RC personnel are capable of fully mastering the vast majority of technical and tactical skills required in units, there is no substitute for experience. Problems previously identified in activated units such as poor staff work, cumbersome or different RC versus AC administrative processes, poor leadership, lack of individual training skills, incomplete or weak decision-making processes and operational planning, battle synchronization skills, discipline, and poor or non-existent collective training skills, could be greatly alleviated by each unit having a cadre of trained AC staff officers and Senior NCOs.

In the age of information access and processing and the importance of information dominance to get inside the enemy's decision cycle, staffs will have to be fully conversant with the techniques, sequencing, and coordination efforts required to fully exploit friendly capabilities and enemy weaknesses.

To keep from being overwhelmed, the brigade (staff) must be able to rapidly filter, prioritize, and correlate the intelligence flood. It will dynamically update intelligence preparation of the battlefield products; automate Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition management.⁵³

The inherent problem with this and any other type of technology is that it is generally only as good as the operator or the staff planner who inputs the data requirements into the system. The expertise required to fully and correctly analyze the battlefield and apply the vast array of

resources to gain and protect information, and to ensure that this information is the correct type required for the mission, requires a comprehensive knowledge of the entire spectrum of operational and tactical preparations and execution. This implies that much intensive training is required for those tasked to utilize these systems to their best advantage. It is arguable whether it can be successfully accomplished and maintained by RC personnel who are restricted by the number of days that they may train.

The root problem associated with all of the difficulties or perceived shortcomings within RC units remains one of available experienced personnel. There is no question that RC soldiers can normally attain knowledge levels required to operate various technological systems available to the US Army. An example is the Air National Guard personnel who fly the B-1 bomber and who form the backbone of this strategic strike capability. Many of them are pilots by profession who fly various types of airframes for civilian businesses, therefore keeping their basic flying skills sharp. But can a tank gunner, intelligence analyst, MLRS operator, or any other soldier or officer required to operate high technological army equipment keep those skills up throughout the year when given only limited time and resources for training and where his civilian job offers no comparable skills to allow him to remain current? Even more critical are the intangibles skills required for staff duties, leadership, enforcement of discipline, and battle planning. They are easy to teach but difficult to master, even in the best of situations. Are RC personnel capable of mastering them in the limited time available to train?

Canada has taken the "worst case" approach and responded with a flat no. For this reason more and more AC personnel are being assigned to RC units in an effort to have the skills learned by Sr NCOs and officers of the AC assist the learning process of their RC counterparts. The Canadian experience in our 10 percent (AC)-90 percent (RC) battalions and 50/50 (percent) regiments has been that not only do the RC soldiers learn the required skills through formal

teaching, the sheer example and "rubbing shoulders" with trained AC personnel begins to circulate throughout the entire unit. This is especially prevalent in critical areas such as staff work, leadership and discipline.⁵⁴

There is ample disagreement concerning the readiness of the RCs for Operation DESERT STORM in the US Army community today. One claim is that the Roundout Brigades were simply not ready or able to deploy to the Persian Gulf due to lack of training and leadership. A second view is that the Army used these Roundout Brigades rotating through the NTC to experiment with newly developed tactics for attacking and defeating the classic Iraqi triangular defensive setup that would have to be defeated by Coalition Forces in the Gulf.⁵⁵

This was in stark contrast to the statements made by Roundout Brigade Commanders in interviews and by the three Roundout Battalion commanders who attended the debriefing. They stated that a FORSCOM prescriptive training program was imposed on their commands without input from them or their active brigade commanders. The Roundout commanders were emphatic that they were not provided mission guidance, were not allowed to develop a Mission Essential Task List, and their commands were effectively taken away from them by the observer-controllers. The prescriptive training program lengthened the time they needed to prepare for deployment. During the debriefing the Roundout Battalion Commanders stated they could have conducted collective training and then shipped equipment within thirty days, if they had been allowed to use the Army's Mobilization and Training Management System.⁵⁶

A third, more sinister theory is that the AC was perhaps reluctant to let those who control the purse strings for military budgets perceive that RC forces were able to handle this type of training readiness preparation and operational deployment. In the long term, although it proved that the Total Force Army concept was working, it could result in a future threat to AC budgets. Congress would be sure to question why large, expensive AC forces were necessary when comparatively inexpensive RCs could be brought on line to deal with major threats to National Security.⁵⁷ This theory was presented in Jeffery Jacob's book The Future of the Citizen Soldier.

The political volatility of the issue was further exemplified by the ARNG assertions that the Army's failure to initially mobilize and then deploy the roundout brigades was the Department of Defense's attempt to play politics: by not utilizing the Guard combat brigades, so the Guard argued, the Army could make its case for retaining AC force structure at the expense of the RC in the coming drawdown.⁵⁸

The increase of full-time support, especially in AC personnel, would also help to eliminate a problem of "territory" that occurred on several occasions during training for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Roundout Brigade and Battalion commanders stated that this information (Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR) and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)) was not used to validate their units. They reported having little opportunity to provide input into the validation training plans which were assigned to them. Previously developed Missions Essential Task Lists (METL) were basically ignored and principles of FM 25-100/101 were not consistently followed as validation processes were virtually force fed to them at mobilization stations.

The overwhelming support provided the Roundout Brigades and Battalions by the AC personnel had a counter-productive effect on unit training. Although well intentioned, the large number of AC observer-controllers tended to take over the leadership of the units and short circuit the Roundout Brigades' chain of command... This observation was also made by officers visiting Ft Hood and Ft Irwin.⁵⁹

Placing AC and FTS personnel in key positions in RC units would help correct these difficulties. Not only would they be able to bring their expertise to the table in the form of training programs, METL preparation, and other necessary staff work, their expertise would lend credibility to the RC unit of which they were a part. In the long run, this would probably decrease the incidence of AC personnel from outside the unit viewing RC preparation of staff work as being below required standards.

This process also provides a nucleus of trained AC personnel who have a genuine interest in the abilities and performance of a given RC unit and, at the least, helps prevent outside AC interference with the normal operation of the unit. It provides the RC unit commander with the ability to have unit AC personnel negotiate with or confront other AC individuals when situations of this nature occur. This should help to avoid the "we-they" syndrome that tends to pervade the relationships between AC and RC personnel and units.

This concept will probably be strongly resisted for two reasons. First, the allocation of additional AC personnel slots to RC units continues to drain available manpower resources from

an AC force already tasked with more than it can accomplish on its own. Second, there would probably be resistance from the RCs who would view the allocation of full-time personnel into key unit slots as a threat to their ability, as individuals, to advance their RC careers by assuming the tasks these jobs require. Both of these problems were systemic in the Canadian model, but it was evaluated that the advantages of such a concept far outweighed drawbacks, assuming even that the disadvantages were valid.

There also was a third, more subtle reason for resistance on the part of the AC community in Canada. Many AC personnel felt their assignment to an RC unit was not only taking them away from the busy training schedules of AC units, but that in essence it sounded the death-knell for their own personal careers. This is a far more difficult stigma to overcome, and required some innovative ways in ensuring the careers of AC personnel assigned to RC units did not take an undeserved down turn.

One of the methods used to overcome this predisposition was to have the AC Colonel (assigned to each of the Area Command Headquarters as the Chief of Staff) write the yearly evaluations of the senior AC officer in each RC unit in that Area. Significant input would be required from the unit's Commanding Officer (CO) for this to take place, but extremely negative or positive comments by the COs in these assessments would be strongly contested if substantiation throughout the year was not provided. The remainder of the yearly evaluations for AC personnel in the RC unit would then be done by the senior AC officer in that unit, with the Area Chief of Staff again reviewing the narrative in the same manner.

A second attempt to counter this perception was to have AC personnel joining RC units completely "rebadge", that is take down his AC unit insignia and put up the RC one. This was an attempt to dispel the "we-they" within the RC units and may be perceived as simply window dressing. However, in many cases it did start the process of changing the mind set of the AC

soldier into believing that he was part of the RC unit, and as such was expected to contribute his skills as if he were still with his AC unit. How successful this concept will be remains to be seen, as it was only introduced in 1995. It does attempt, however marginally, to bridge the "societal" gap that exists between AC and RC personnel.⁶⁰

The structure and organization of AC support to RC units will be determined by the requirements of the RCs themselves. In Canada, prior to the restructure process, the minimum allocation of AC manpower to reserve units was generally organized as follows: (1) one x Captain of the appropriate MOS; (2) one x Chief Clerk; (3) two to four senior NCOs of the appropriate MOS; (4) two to four junior NCOs of the appropriate MOS; and (5) maintenance, pay and administrative personnel as required.

Once the principles of the restructure process are thoroughly applied to the Canadian RC system, the support to each unit will increase significantly. Using an infantry battalion as an example, the following would be the suggested layout of the AC support to that RC unit: (1) one x Major of the appropriate MOS (XO or deputy commander of the unit); (2) two to three x captains of the appropriate MOS (personnel officer, training officer, operations officer); (3) one x captain (Pay); (4) ten to twelve senior NCOs of the appropriate MOS (operations NCO, 1 x Sr NCO per rifle platoon); (5) one x senior NCO Chief Clerk (Administrative); (6) one x senior NCO Quartermaster (Stores); (7) one x senior NCO (Maintenance); (8) ten to twelve junior NCOs of the appropriate MOS (1 per rifle platoon); and (9) soldiers as required to fill out the 10 percent rule of AC support. In an infantry battalion of 600 all ranks, there would be 60 AC personnel total, meaning there would probably be 20-30 full-time soldiers as workers. These would be divided up between maintenance, stores, pay, administration, and rifle company positions.

Flexibility is built directly into this system by allowing each unit to tailor the type of support they need, both by MOS alignment and physical requirements of the unit. For example, if

there is an RC unit that is experiencing difficulty keeping its vehicles operational, it can tailor the full-time support to the unit by bringing on more maintenance personnel as required. This can be adjusted by a simple call to the personnel officer of the MOS involved, provided the Area Command Headquarters approves the request.

A second way flexibility is built into the system is where two or more units share the same infrastructure support. Here, if it is possible, redundancies in pay, maintenance, administrative, and other personnel are kept to a minimum and the personnel savings shared by the effected units. They are usually then free to apply these positions where they feel there is a need within their unit. It also allows the units to double-up on some civilian support such as custodians, secretaries, etc.

As indicated earlier, application of this principle is viewed as the lynch pin of the Canadian RC restructure system. It has many residual benefits, but the cost is that more AC and full-time positions have to be funded and provided out of the hide of an already limited budget. It is assessed, however that the pros outweigh the cons with regard to the application of the concept.

Units will be structured to conform to the Total Army Establishment models and constitute an effective training vehicle.

Here again, the focus is on units that can consistently recruit, train, and retain personnel. The bottom-up process must be applied throughout and those units able to achieve results are rewarded by bigger training challenges and resource allocations. Those who cannot may find themselves without a unit in the future.

As much as possible, these RC units must be trained to the same standards as the AC. In Canada, the WARRIOR program is designed to accomplish just that. The yearly training and evaluation process for the RC is exactly the same as the basic refresher training conducted by AC units each year and with the same standards. In this way, the AC can be assured that RC soldiers

program and will have the exact same basic proficiency level as their AC counterparts. This allows for smoother and more rapid assimilation into the unit structure.

In addition to preparing active duty personnel, a growing DoD dependence on the RCs demands that the training and readiness of Reserve Forces and National Guard units parallel that of the AC.⁶¹

The number of armories (unit training buildings) must be reduced to the minimum required to support effective training.

As mentioned in chapter 2, the costs associated for the normal acquisition, maintenance, and operation of infrastructure facilities to support the RCs easily outstrips those inherent costs required to actually train the RC units and their personnel. Infrastructure costs have been and likely will always be a limiting factor in determining budget availability for training of the RC in Canada. Military budgets tend to be allocated in a single pool from which the military itself divides up the resource pie. In other words, the more you allocate to maintenance and infrastructure support, the less available to train and buy new equipment. The same situation exists for the US Army.

It would be impossible to analyze all the infrastructure support currently in operation for the US Army RCs. This in itself would yield enough information for a separate thesis. It is sufficient to say that with drawdown of both AC and RC personnel, and the reduction in yearly budgets, military planners will have to be more innovative in the way they allocate and utilize their infrastructure support. For example, is it cheaper to shut down one or more support buildings for a given unit when another unit is utilizing another structure in the same area or within 30 minutes drive than to continue paying the costs to operate both?

The ARNG operates over 3,300 owned and 141 leased armories in 2,700 communities in all fifty States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia. In addition, the ARNG federally supports the operation and maintenance of over 15,000 Federal training, aviation, and logistical facilities throughout the fifty States and Puerto Rico.⁶²

The total number of ARNG installations mentioned above is intended to support 387,000 personnel, or 112 personnel per installation.⁶³ While no attempt is being made to say this is required or not, it must be fully recognized that there would exist variances above and below that line, some of which would have to be called into question for cost effectiveness versus output of trained soldier and units. It also would seem that in areas with extremely high concentrations of available or serving personnel resources, that cost savings in the form of doubling up of units in a single armory could be effected.

A review of existing infrastructure locations of the ARNG alone shows that the vast majority of them are located from central USA east to the Atlantic coast, with extremely high concentrations in the north-eastern seaboard area.⁶⁴ Of course this is where the heaviest densities in populations exist, and there are more units located in this region than in most other regions in CONUS. However, RCs units do not train every day and a rotating schedule of training nights and weekends would allow the installation to be used more efficiently than having it sit relatively dormant for many days in a given month or year. Therefore it is logical to assume that infrastructure savings could be realized by doubling up on existing installations for units in the same geographical area and eliminating those that are not essential to unit function and training.

Additionally, efforts must be made to provide incentives for the RCs to streamline their installation support. This can be accomplished in the form of a percentage return on infrastructure savings being rolled back into equipment purchases, training, or other functions. In a high population area, it may be more cost effective to build a large installation to support several units rather than trying to operate several less efficient installations to support them.

The concept of doubling up and the construction of large single installations also saves vital person year positions that could be better employed elsewhere in the force structure. For example, savings could be realized in any centralized military function such as logistics,

quartermaster stores, pay, maintenance, or administrative functions where pooling of resources of available FTS personnel generally allows for more efficient application of manpower to tasks. The same holds true for civilian support such as caretakers, installation maintenance personnel, secretaries, and other common user positions.

Parochial and community interests will attempt to resist these initiatives toward installation savings, but the importance of support to the units and freeing up infrastructure funds that can be used elsewhere for the effected units far outweigh these arguments. The principle concern is that RCs are faced with continuing budgetary and manpower reductions and must approach the problem with a critical, innovative approach, endeavoring to squeeze every ounce of available benefit out of each military dollar allocated.

Delegation of additional tasks not allocated during the annual training plan must be accompanied by the associated funding. This includes parades, courses and other tasks that are passed down from higher Headquarters to the units.

This has been a continual problem for RC units in Canada. Too many times, units are forced to dip into training, equipment, or salary budgets in order to meet the requirements of a "show case" parade or some other function not directly related to training the unit. It has proven to be so serious in some Area Commands that unit commanders requested orders in writing from higher commanders or organizations (ie provincial parliament) when "display" or "parade" missions cut into the training budgets of units.

This situation has been recognized in Canada and steps have been taken to ensure that RC unit tasks, whether a parade or an operation, are accompanied by associated funding. In lieu of that, Area Commanders are now obligated to acknowledge a unit commander's assessment of training deficiencies because of lost budgetary resources resulting from these tasks. This has proven an effective measure to combat the frivolous nature in the way some RC units were tasked

for "extra-training" functions when the Army Commander could then ask why a particular unit did not achieve its training requirements for a given cycle after the budget was fully expended.

¹Charles E. Heller, "The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components," Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, US Army War College December 7, 1991), iii.

²Ibid.

³Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "The Future of the Citizen-Soldier," (Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 1994) 48.

⁴David W. Grissmer, Richard Buddin, Sheila Nataraj Kirby, "Improving Reserve Compensation: A Review of Current Compensations and Related Personnel and Training Readiness Issues," (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, September 1989, 65.

⁵Colonel John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power," Parameters, (Autumn 1996).

⁶US General Accounting Office, "Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved," (Washington, D.C: US Government, May 12, 1993), 19.

⁷Ibid., 5.

⁸Ibid., Grissmer, Buddin, Kirby, Nataraj, vii.

⁹Ibid., "Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved," 7.

¹⁰Participant observation.

¹¹Ibid., "Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved," 19.

¹²Ibid., 27.

¹³Ibid., 20.

¹⁴Army National Guard Bureau, After Action Report Operation DESERT STORM/Operation DESERT SHIELD, (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 28 June 1991), 10.

¹⁵Ibid., Heller, 16.

¹⁶Robert L. Goldich, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," CRS Report for Congress, (Washington, D.C: US Government, October 22, 1991), 28.

¹⁷Participant Observation.

¹⁸Ibid., Grissmer, Buddin, Kirby, Nataraj, 65.

¹⁹Participant Observation.

²⁰LGen Edward D. Baca, Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, FY 1995, (Washington D.C: Department of the Army, Spring 1996), 42.

²¹Ibid., Jacobs, 70.

²²US General Accounting Office, "Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard RoundOut Brigades," (Washington, D.C: US Government, November 4, 1992), 4-5

²³Ibid., Jacobs, 87.

²⁴Ibid., "Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard RoundOut Brigades," 6-7, 16.

²⁵Ibid., Baca, 32.

²⁶Ibid., Baca, 32.

²⁷Ibid., Jacobs, 50.

²⁸Ibid., Jacobs, 87.

²⁹Ibid., "Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved," 13.

³⁰Phillip A. Brehm, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force," US Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Department of the Army, 21 February 1992), 4.

³¹Ibid., "Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard RoundOut Brigades," 5.

³²MG Herbert R. Temple, "A Double Standard," Armed Forces Journal, (Washington, D.C: Department of Defense, September 1996), 38.

³³Ibid., Jacobs, 83.

³⁴Ibid., "Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard RoundOut Brigades," 4-5.

³⁵Martin Binken, and William W. Kaufmann, US ARMY Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1989), 62.

³⁶Ibid., Jacobs, 88.

2-3. ³⁷Ibid., "Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard RoundOut Brigades,"

³⁸Ibid., Jacobs, 69.

³⁹Ibid., Temple, 38.

⁴⁰Ibid., Jacobs, 69.

⁴¹Ibid., Goldich, 47.

⁴²Ibid., Baca, 45.

⁴³US General Accounting Office, "National Guard: Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," Report to Congress, (Washington, D.C: September 24, 1991), 13.

⁴⁴Ibid., Jacobs, 80.

⁴⁵Ibid., Heller, 31.

⁴⁶Ibid., "National Guard: Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," 4.

⁴⁷US General Accounting Office, "National Guard: Using the Army's Supply System Will Reduce the Guard's Inventory Investment," Report to Armed Services Committee, (Washington, D.C: US Government, December 9, 1991), 3.

⁴⁸Ibid., Goldich, 33.

⁴⁹Ibid., Goldich, 47.

⁵⁰Ibid., Jacobs, 81.

⁵¹Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Reserve Component Programs FY 1995 Report," Annual Report, (Washington D.C: US Government, March 1996, 39.

⁵²Ibid., "Reserve Component Programs FY 1995 Report," 39.

⁵³"The Key to Information Dominance," Military Review, (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, Department of Defense, May--June 1996), 63.

⁵⁴Participant observation.

⁵⁵Interviews with Army National Guard Officers attending CGSOC 1996--1997 and who participated in the training.

⁵⁶Ibid., "After Action Report Operation DESERT STORM/Operation DESERT SHIELD," 8-9.

⁵⁷Participant observation and interviews.

⁵⁸Ibid., Jacobs, 96.

⁵⁹Ibid., 12.

⁶⁰Participant observation.

⁶¹General John J. Sheehan, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," Joint Force Quarterly, (Fort McNair, Washington D.C: Autumn 1996), 46.

⁶²Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, (Washington D.C: Department of Defense, June 1996), 32.

⁶³Office of the Director, Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 1997 Posture Statement, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 1996), 3.

⁶⁴Ibid., Fiscal Year 1997 Posture Statement, 13.

CHAPTER 5

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INTENT OF THE RESERVE
RESTRUCTURE IN THE CANADIAN ARMY DIRECTIVE
AS APPLICABLE TO US RC UNITS

Introduction

Included with the specific principles laid out in the restructure process of the Canadian Army RC were general guidelines designed to allow further definition of the intentions of the Army Command with regard to the desired end state for the RC. These broad principles were deemed necessary in order to simplify the understanding, application, and integration of the army reserve restructure program. In general terms, they provided the strategic guidance and rationale that was used to reorganize the Canadian Reserves, allowing the Army staff and Commands to apply the specifics of the restructure process with a detailed understanding of the overall objective.

These guidelines are derived directly from within the text of the Canadian Army RC Restructure directive. Since they were initially designed for application in the Canadian process, it was deemed necessary to adjust the specific wording of the general criterion in order to apply them to the US Army RCs. The intended spirit and meaning of each of the guidelines has been kept intact however, in order that accurate assessment of their validity with regard to application in US Army RCs.

General Guidelines of the Canadian Army Reserve Restructure

Are the US Army RCs organized and able to accomplish attainable, cost effective missions?

This is a complex, difficult question to resolve. At the present time, the majority of evidence, particularly results of Operations DESSERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, seems to indicate the current RC system works well within the overall Army plan.

As DESERT STORM proved, the benefits of the Total Force Army policy have been many. From the Total Army perspective, trained RCs have provided the unit continuity so lacking during Vietnam. The policy has also put a strong military presence back into many civilian communities and has helped ensure that the employment of sizable military forces will receive widespread political support.¹

The problem confronting the US military today is whether it can do so in the future when the Total Force Army structure is faced with continued down sizing and budget cuts. Will the Administration again be faced with an enemy willing to sit back and allow US or coalition forces time to mass overwhelming combat power against them? Not if he wants to survive, a lesson the Iraqi Army taught to everyone.

The success of Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM has given a false sense of security to the US military community. This security comes from the belief that since US forces were successful there, they will succeed in future operations against any relatively large, mechanized foe. The difficulty is that the entire world watched the sequence of battle that occurred from the initial Iraqi invasion through to the campaign's conclusion. The most naive of enemies must now surely realize that to defeat the US military, one has to act quickly and with decisive force. Enemies must be prepared to inflict heavy casualties on US forces through whatever means necessary before the US can build up combat power. It is doubtful if the next enemy that US or coalition forces have to face will allow the time (months?) to build up this combat power. Unfortunately, current force projection planning in support of US government policy needs that time to be effective.

After the completion of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, much controversy arose in the US Army concerning the perceived inability of the roundout brigades of the ARNG to deploy with their parent AC divisions in accordance with the accepted mobilization criteria.

The experience of the three roundout brigades during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM generated much criticism and controversy about the viability of the roundout concept and the AC's relationship with the ARNG.²

The interesting aspect here is the continuing belief that the Army is better served in training RCs as CS and CSS units because it is simpler and more cost effective to do. Statistics gathered on the RCs for the US Army indicate that on average it is between 45-65 percent less expensive to train and operate an RC unit rather than an AC unit of the same type.³ This clinical financial analysis, however, does not include inherent disadvantages in having the majority of the US Army's deployable CS and CSS power assigned to RC units. These "hidden" costs generally include delays in deployment time and ability to rapidly counter major threats when significant combat and critical CS and CSS functions of the Army are assigned to RC units, who may require up to ninety days training after activation before deemed ready for deployment. As always, there were exceptions to this rule, and some RC units were ready and able to deploy to the Persian Gulf with little or no extra training, the large percentage of them being CS and CSS units.

The argument that RCs simply are not allocated enough time in the normal training year to adequately prepare as combat units and formations appears to have merit. This is particularly so if the RC units do not contain a nucleus of AC soldiers trained to perform the difficult tasks of battle synchronization, staff preparation and leadership. The decision during DESERT STORM to deploy AC brigades vice the RC brigades to fill up parent divisions was regarded as correct. The US GAO went to great lengths to demonstrate that even with massive AC support and training assistance, roundout units were unable to meet their timelines for deployment to the Persian Gulf. Although the GAO process appears to have been seriously flawed in its research, or possibly its

objectivity, it has had a significant impact on Capital Hill regarding the perception of the RC state of affairs.

The ARNG strongly contests this issue and evidence supports their cause for concern. The current organizational and mobilization concepts for ARNG roundout brigades indicates they have up to ninety days concentrated training after mobilization in which they are to sharpen their crew and unit skills in preparation for higher level training. There were problems identified in all three of the effected units in their initial ability to attain individual and crew training standards, but for the most part they were prepared to begin their ninety day preparatory training.

Army officials have testified that, although roundout brigades were intended to participate in contingency conflicts, the envisioned conflicts were not necessarily of the no notice type as was DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.⁴

Roundout brigades were never intended to deploy without at least several weeks of post-mobilization training. ARNG brigades (under the current training system) should not have been deployed immediately. ARNG combat maneuver brigades can deploy and fight immediately, but with enormously high risk and at the cost of many casualties. It was never envisioned, prior to the Persian Gulf War, that a roundout brigade would be able to deploy as part of an immediate response to a no-notice/short-notice, rapid response contingency. There were readiness problems in the roundout brigades when mobilized.⁵

What is actually expected of these units, under current training and mobilization criteria, is that they be skilled to the level where ninety days training allocated after mobilization allows them to conduct higher level unit and formation training. A further problem for the roundout brigades, reported by some sources, was that these troops ran into problems of changes to their METL, exercise training formats, and schedules (AC imposed) and the end state training objectives.

Left alone, and with the required swift, ruthless action to correct lower level deficiencies identified by the GAO report, it is probable that these units would have been ready within the ninety day time period to deploy into the theater of operations. It is therefore logical to assume that the training program at the unit level was working and that major changes in the organization and expectations of RC units is not warranted. The question is will that same system of ninety days

preparation training allow the US Army to execute its missions when faced with a shrinking AC structure that is the only immediately deployable forces and an enemy that learned from the mistakes of Saddam Hussein?

As events unfolded, however, Operation DESERT SHIELD did not follow this path. There was little warning, there was no specific plan for such a contingency, and there was no call-up or mobilization authority at the time the deployment was initiated. Combat and certain support units were needed in theater very early. Given the speed with which the theater needed combat power, RC combat units were not used; sufficient combat units were available from the AC. Support units-some of which could only be found in the RC-and individual reservists with specialized skills were also needed, however. These requirements led to a presidential order calling up a limited number of RC troops under the 200K authority, but the nation did not immediately proceed to any other stage of mobilization.⁶

It is apparent that this is not the case. More and more, as situations similar to the Persian Gulf arise, RCs are going to be called upon to do things better and most certainly faster. An example of RC forces that can do this is the Israeli Defense Forces who are able to train their RC personnel in the same time (forty days per year), mobilize them in seventy-two hours, and deploy them immediately to a battlefield or operation. An examination of their system may provide clues as to how the process can be better achieved, but it is outside the capability of this paper to provide an in depth analysis.

Any restructure steps utilized to speed up the activation process will enhance the Army's ability to counter national threats and carry out its missions. It has already been theorized that a smart enemy will not allow US or coalition forces time to build up as was afforded them in the Persian Gulf. Had Iraqi forces attacked the early deploying AC forces of DESERT SHIELD, destroyed them before reinforcements could have been deployed into theater, and captured or dumped chemical agents on sea ports and air ports needed by deploying AC and RC forces, it would have been extremely difficult for coalition forces to get into the theater, let alone fight in it.

Many argue that this situation is beyond the realm of possibility, that no enemy would use massive chemical strikes to isolate a region. But if one ponders what is the prize (oil, status, or territory) versus political risk for a country that continually shows disdain for western values (Iran, Iraq,

or North Korea) than US military could be faced with a serious problem trying to get their deploying forces into theater. This problem is continually exacerbated by the length of time it will take to prepare and deploy RC forces to the applicable theater.

The question is one of deployment time and speed in RC preparations. It has become more and more critical for the US Army and US strategic interests that RC units have to maintain higher readiness levels and better trained troops if they are to respond to force projection criteria imposed on the Army by the NCA. There is a real danger of complacency here. Many in the US Army senior leadership level believe the accomplishments of the AC and the RCs during the Persian Gulf War validate the training system and preparations of the RCs.

Perhaps the most salient fact above all of these readiness problems is that, although the roundout brigade mobilization process had never been tested before, the brigades proved capable of being validated for deployment within 3-4 months after being activated. *This is an unprecedented achievement, when compared to the previous historical experience of mobilizing ARNG combat units of brigade or division size.*⁷

The future requirements of RCs in the US Army now rests on their ability to maintain higher standards of personnel and training readiness in order to deploy faster than previous planning anticipated. This will be critical, especially if we assume that foes worldwide learned a valuable lesson in fighting against the US military during the Gulf War.

It has also been suggested within the military community that the country can no longer afford three armies, namely the AC, the ARNG and the USAR. These arguments have tended to be parochial in nature, with one side protecting its "turf" from incursions of the other. But the logic of the overall discussion appears to be very sound, and can hardly escape the critical review of the budgetary masters in Congress as an effective way of reducing Command and Control overhead and infrastructure costs while plowing resources back into manpower, training, and equipment.

With a Command and Control structure in every state, absorbing the Army Reserve's force structure into the Guard would require only a fraction of the USAR headquarters structure currently in place. These additional units and their equipment would be immediately available to

the governors through their own state military departments, with a clear chain of command to the individual who must answer to the people for his or her performance-the governor.⁸

At some point, Washington will be forced by the taxpayers to admit that this nation cannot afford two separate reserve components for both the Army and the Air Force. One of them has to go. In the last 100 years, this nation has fought five major wars. In the four that the ARNG participated in, we won. In the one where the ARNG sat on the sidelines, we lost.⁹

There have already been several restructure initiatives within the US Army that identify the duality of the RC system as costing the Army more time and resources trying to overcome current problems. An example of this was the inactivation of RC units as the Army struggled to meet personnel caps imposed on them by a Congress intent on reducing military budgets. Subsequently, poor or little coordination confirmed to the GAO and the Administration that there was a disconnect in the Army's three components that caused unnecessary problems in Army function, and probably a large waste of available resources.

Better coordination between the RCs in the selection process might have provided more assurances that readiness of the Army's total force was maximized and that individual states were not disproportionately affected by the ARNG and USAR inactivations. In developing the March 1992 list, the RCs largely identified units for inactivation separately. This approach may not result in decisions leading to the most effective forces being retained. For example, both NGB and OCAR might separately inactivate two similar units from the same geographical area on the basis of their inability to recruit the skilled personnel. However, a coordinated review might reveal that the two units were competing for the same personnel and the inactivating one unit might resolve the recruiting problem of the other.¹⁰

This redundancy and disconnected information flow makes the RCs of the Army noticeable targets in Congress. While Congress has historically been stronger supporters of the RC community than of the AC, this was due both to the number of former ARNG and USAR personnel who were included in the Congressional membership, and the constituent effects of RC restructure proposals. The percentage of Congressmen with previous military experience has decreasing significantly as the years pass. This makes it harder for the RCs to maintain their influential political ties, except through the constituencies of the individual Congressmen. There are savings to be had in combining both RCs

into one, and a non-parochial Congress will probably demand an in depth examination with a view to effecting savings in this area.

There is also the question of readiness capability. During earlier restructure processes, the end result of having two RCs downsizing and reorganizing simultaneously resulted in more units receiving sub-standard evaluations in their readiness categories. This is shown in the simple example where the two RCs were allowed to exchange positions by MOS. The purpose was to reorganize the USAR so that it contained strictly CS and CSS units, while the ARNG continued to have a force mix including sizable portions of combat units.

The swap involves about 10,000 authorized positions in each RC. The Guard agreed to inactivate 128 CS and CSS units such as medical, MP and Transportation and transfer about 10,000 authorized positions associated with these units to the USAR. The USAR agreed to inactivate 28 units including most of its remaining combat units and its last remaining Special Forces units, and transfer about 10,000 positions associated with these units to the Guard. According to the Army, the swap will more clearly concentrate CS and CSS functions in the USAR and combat functions in the Guard.¹¹

The resulting effect of the swaps, reorganization and downsizing was that at least thirteen more units experienced degradation of their readiness standards, while an additional 152 units "were not able calculate the affect."¹² There are sure to have been additional affected units in this number, and a review would probably show the "swap" system to be more damaging than publicly admitted. Had there been a single RC, logic indicates a single command and control element would have been able to minimize the effect of the restructure process to the readiness levels of more units.

Another concern is the requirement to have some structure of AC or RC troops available to the states should the Guard be called away on active duty and a requirement arise for forces to assist a particular state or states. Many of the RC units activated during the Gulf War assumed critical roles for AC units in CONUS, Europe and other theaters, freeing up AC formations to deploy into that theater to fight the battle. Many states have recognized the problem and have formed state alliances in order to alleviate such a problem should it arise in the future.

Several states have authorized interstate mutual aid agreements for response to civil disturbances or natural disasters. This should be done by all states in view of the fact that the number of Guard troops may be reduced and certain types of equipment may become inadequate or be eliminated from Guard inventories. Congress should approve the compacts, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency should assist in these efforts.¹³

The issue is sure to attract attention and review as the AC and RCs struggle to rationalize shrinking budgets and requirements. It is an aspect of restructure that can generate potentially enormous savings, but will require significant realignment and innovative ways of doing business, not to mention neutralization of the parochial infighting sure to happen as both military and political leaders jump into the fray to protect their own.

Decisions regarding the reduction and restructuring of defense forces will have an impact on the states. Plans call for more than 30 percent reduction in Guard forces in each state, which could affect their capability to respond to natural disasters, civil disorders, and other emergencies. States have a strong stake in maintaining the Guard capability, which should receive special attention when policies are made that affect the Guard.¹⁴

There is little doubt that any attempts to reorganize the RCs will meet with strong resistance from many quarters, the most notable being the political arena. The process is as inevitable in the US as it was in Canada. It remains to be seen how much pain will be involved in its completion and will the end product structure be able to complete the missions assigned to it by the US NCA.

Does the current role of the US Army RCs properly fit into the concept of a Total Force Army for the US? Will application of the Canadian restructure concepts help achieve this?

The capabilities of the US Army are today being stretched so thin as to cause great difficulty executing the two nearly simultaneous MRCs as outlined by the national security policy. The increasing emphasis of US RCs in the Army's plans significantly increases the need for higher personnel and training readiness standards.

Current Total Force Army structure aligns RC units with parent AC organizations in specific geographic regions to respond to the two MRC strategy. However, there is still a

tremendous need to further define the scope of the missions for RC units involved. Given their limited available training time, it is impossible for them to train to prepare for all contingencies.

CINCEUR's intent is to fully involve the ARNG and Reserve in the implementation of this strategy and its strategic concepts. Accordingly, the RCs must be fully integrated into USEUCOM mission accomplishment. To successfully integrate the RCs, USEUCOM must clearly identify opportunities for RC engagement early in the deliberate planning process (at least 18-24 months out).¹⁵

The General Accounting Office says the National Guard divisions are not needed. The Army says that ARNG divisions would take up to a year to prepare for combat after mobilization and might not be able to fight well in modern combat even then.¹⁶

It is critical that each RC unit knows what it has to train for and that they be given the tools to complete that training. Without the specific mission guidance assigned to them, it will be impossible to achieve readiness levels required to meet all contingencies of the National Security Policy. There is simply not enough training time. Although a general purpose combat capability provides a framework with which to reorient and focus on an evolving role such as peace keeper or peace maker, it will be difficult enough for RC units to achieve these basic levels of training.

As the United States moves into an era with changing defense requirements and constrained resources, the Army needs to systematically consider the range of such scenarios and demands they may impose on both the RC and AC forces.¹⁷

The application of at least some facets of the Canadian Army RC restructure process can only enhance the capabilities and reorganization of US Army RCs. Basic concepts such as the bottom-up building blocks, closure of redundant infrastructure support, and streamlining of headquarters elements can all contribute significantly to the capabilities of US Army RCs. The crucial aspect of the Canadian process, and perhaps the most controversial and yet productive to the US Army, will be the increase of AC personnel assigned directly to RC units. While resistance to this initiative will be significant, it has proven to be the most effective method for Canada to ensure that the RC units are at the readiness levels required of them when the need arises. It is logical to suggest that the US Army will experience the same advantages.

Are the U.S. RCs capable of achieving the readiness levels expected of them under current conditions?

The ability of US Army RCs to fulfill their mobilization requirements when given the appropriate and necessary time is not in question for this document. They have decisively proven in operation DESSERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM that if given the necessary time and resources that they are able to fulfill the activation and deployment standards required of them. However, will they be able to do so when presented with an enemy that will not allow US or coalition forces time to build up their manpower and resources in the applicable theater? Are RCs capable of going to war on short notice and demonstrating the necessary proficiency in tactics and operational art needed to defeat a modern enemy?

Given both the continued reliance on the RC in wartime and the drawdown in active and reserve units, the personnel readiness shortfalls of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM give rise to concerns for the future. Will the Army be able to deploy critical RC units at the required strength and timetables in future contingencies?¹⁸

Opposing view points highlight the breadth of perception that exists within the US Army and the military community as a whole concerning the ability of RCs to accomplish this difficult task. While many feel that RC combat formations and units could have deployed to the Persian Gulf if the training objectives had remained constant, many others are just as convinced that much more training was necessary to expect these units to have reasonable success against Iraqi forces.

The overall proficiency of the roundout (NG) brigades did not reach a proficiency level comparable to that of the replacement (AC) brigades. Roundout brigades were unable to meet the level of proficiency demonstrated by the replacement brigades with regard to complex synchronization skills-the most difficult doctrinal and leadership tasks in the Army. Replacement brigades focused on honing essential skills and elevating their level of operational capability, whereas roundout brigades had to concentrate on developing skills for the first time. Roundout brigades did not have sufficient opportunity to develop proficiency in the key building blocks of Army training: leadership, individual, and crew skills. There will still be some period of post mobilization training required before reserve combat brigades will be ready to go to war in the future.¹⁹

The Army has not adequately prepared its ARNG roundout brigades to be fully ready to deploy quickly. Many soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs.²⁰

There is a perception on the part of many in the Defense community and within the media that the three Roundout Brigades were incapable of deploying. The facts are that they met the Army's deployability criteria but were never given the missions to deploy and no sea lift was ever scheduled for them.²¹

Again, there is the question of realistic expectations versus wishful thinking of both AC and RC personnel who feel that the RCs are ready to go at any time. This will never realistically happen for many RC units and is virtually impossible for RC combat units and formations. There simply is not enough training time allocated in a normal cycle to master all the concepts of modern mechanized battle. Assuming that there will not be a significant increase in the training days allocated to the majority of the RC units in the US Army, the expectation of being able to do so is simply a pipe dream.

Substantial improvements will have to be made to the facilities and resources available to RC units for training in order to allow them to attain, maintain, and improve readiness levels.

However, RC units often do not train under realistic conditions. We reported that training at the units we visited had four major deficiencies. This training:

- lacked challenging , realistic missions, including night missions and missions involving an opposing force, use of smoke and the loss of key leaders.
- failed to integrate combat arms, CS and CSS elements.
- was sometimes canceled because of inadequate support by host installation.
- was often conducted with shortages of authorized equipment.²²

There is no longer the time, resources or flexibility to allow these types of infrastructure, resource, and coordination problems to detract from the limited available training time allocated to RC units. Much progress has been made trying to get the most value out of the few days in a year that the majority of RC personnel can train. More still needs to be accomplished if the RCs are to continue to provide a major portion of the nation's capability and manpower.

In terms of equipment and training requirements, is the current structure of the US Army RCs providing a cost effective return for the Army as a whole?

For the US military, it is an unfortunate fact that, similar to other western nations, the current emphasis in defense is not what roles and tasks the armed forces are capable of accomplishing, but what is actually affordable. Costs associated with AC and RC training have been the subject of detailed review within the US Army. In concert with other budget savings initiatives, leaders and programmers are constantly searching for better ways to reduce expenditures while increasing the production of trained individuals for the components of the Army system.

There is a tendency for many AC personnel to believe that the training standards of many RC units and personnel are not up to the level they should be. When examined in light of the problem of training costs, the US Army should examine the feasibility of centralizing all trades training in both the AC and RCs at the applicable trades school, both to reduce costs and standardize levels of proficiency.

Why waste spaces in the Training and Doctrine Command's Training Centers performing the mission of training fewer and fewer recruits when, with some centralized coordination, the twelve USAR Training Divisions can conduct Initial Entry Training (IET), Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and the US Army Reserve Forces Schools may possibly teach MOS courses.²³

Costs associated with RC training have been examined closely by the US Army and there appears to be several methods to streamline the effort.

To many in the Army, the three school systems managed by the AC, ARNG, and USAR appeared duplicative in many instances, providing courses in multiple locations. In addition, the seeming complexity of the system suggested that consolidation and streamlining would save resources and the costs associated with training. These views were driven by a number of observations, some backed by reports from the DAIG. The RC School system contains a large number of schools (perhaps more than is needed), with underutilized capacity and apparent duplication of course offerings. RC schools make extensive use of borrowed resources, including manpower and equipment, requiring extensive staff time to coordinate.²⁴

Many observers of the roundout brigades' post-mobilization training feel that had their officers and NCOs had more opportunity for, and/or requirements to, attend active Army

schools to obtain necessary technical, tactical, and leadership training, then fewer deficiencies would have been needed to be remedied after mobilization. Attendance at either resident or non resident (i.e., correspondence, sometimes supplemented by short residence attendance) courses is required for promotion to various officer and enlisted grades or for service in various assignments (such as unit commander).²⁵

The Canadian model for RC training sees many RC trade (MOS) courses conducted at the various AC specialty schools. For example, the majority of training for RC armor personnel is conducted at the Armor School, which is tasked with the overall responsibility of training AC and RC personnel in that specialty and maintaining common standards for all armor forces.

Most RC training is conducted during the summer period when many RC personnel are available for extended periods of time corresponding with course training days required. There are also many RC MOS courses running throughout the year that available RC personnel can attend.

Within Atlantic Canada, 85% of all of our new recruits are high school students, in a non-semester educational system. This severely limits our ability to concentrate training outside of the summer time frame when students are not in school. To cater to this we have had to carefully craft a four part training cycle which is primarily centered around the armory and the local training sites, or in one of the two Area training centers in Aldershot and Gagetown. During the summer, many reserve soldiers are involved with either Area or National training, attending courses, or serving in support of training activities.²⁶

This process has three advantages in the Canadian system. First, it allows RC personnel to get precisely the same training as the AC counterpart, using the same training areas, equipment, and instructors, thereby developing consistent standards throughout the Army. Second, it allows the employment of RC instructors on various courses, who then return to their RC units with added expertise gained during the course to pass on to their unit personnel. Third, and probably most important, it serves as a medium to help break down and eliminate the "we-they" attitude that permeates in many Armies between the AC and RCs. It has proven to be a very workable, cost effective solution.

Although still in its infancy, the US Army has instituted a program titled the Total Army School System (TASS) which is intended to remedy the problems identified above. While it is still

settling in to the US Army training system, it has already effected savings in manpower, travel and resources while improving the quality of the student. Full implementation of this program across the US Army should produce even more savings in the future.

In Canada, there are also Militia (Reserve) Training Centers (MTCs) set up in each of the four Area Commands that cater to training RC personnel throughout the year and during the summer "concentration" period. These are staffed by AC and full-time RC personnel on a yearly basis and are utilized to conduct courses not normally run at various specialty schools and provide required facilities for units conducting yearly training schedules.

This system of AC schools and MTCs has reduced infrastructure support to provide RC personnel with the appropriate, standardized training they need in order to maintain required proficiency levels. Costs in transportation of units and individuals to the required training facilities are more than recouped by the elimination of infrastructure duplication and savings in resources and manpower that would be needed to run separate AC and RC training facilities.

Should the US RCs be relegated to strictly combat support and combat service support roles, leaving the warfighter capabilities to the AC?

The driving force behind this initiative in the US is the realization that recent downsizing of the AC has severely limited the Army's ability to meet the two nearly simultaneous MRC strategy laid out by the US Administration. Every soldier assigned to a CS and CSS position in AC divisions is one less soldier manning a combat unit. This "eating away" of limited available AC manpower from combat units continually weakens the combat power of those affected divisions. The continual question is whether the Army can afford to have the limited numbers of AC funded positions going to CS and CSS units rather than the warfighters required in combat units?

Does the AC in peacetime need port and terminal units, graves registration, enemy prisoner of war guard units, and a host of other CS and CSS units? Adding AC CS and CSS units will cost a significant amount of defense dollars to train and maintain a high level of proficiency.²⁷

This is a very sensitive issue sometimes hard to isolate and deal with. There are a number of elements that effect this proposal, not the least of which is the effort required to keep RC personnel manning technologically reliant positions fully trained and current in required skills. This is a critical problem when the RCs are faced with limited funded training time in a given year.

In the RCs for example, it is more difficult to keep the gunner of an AH-64 or M-1 tank fully conversant with their required skills than it would be for a truck driver, cook, medic, or other MOS that has an identical job in civilian employment. Many people have argued that the truck driver of an 18 wheeler hauling various commodities across the nation has the same basic skills that are required to be a driver of an 18 wheeler fuel vehicle, supply vehicle, or ammo truck. Unfortunately for those concerned, there is not much civilian calling for tank and Apache gunners outside the doors of the military. Therefore their only opportunity to keep these required skills sharp is when the unit conducts training in the limited time that it has available.

Only RC personnel whose wartime missions would parallel their civilian jobs can easily maintain the level of combat readiness expected of them.²⁸

On the other hand, a great many USAR soldiers transfer their individual and, at times, collective civilian skills to their military occupation specialty. Thus, the skills are easier to maintain and their initial training need not be as costly. Also, exactly what will be the needs of the next contingency operation? Which units on the USAR CSS list will be deployed? These units are tailored for very specific tasks. To structure the AC to sustain those deployed units for about 30 to 60 days without substantial RC augmentation is unnecessary, a financial burden, and may do little to enhance Total Army readiness. What is needed are innovative ways to reduce RC mobilization to deployment time.²⁹

It was apparent during the Persian Gulf War that the time required to deploy CS and CSS units was significantly shorter than those of units expected to be in actual combat with the enemy. Deployment times appeared to be much less for units where there was comparable job experience available in the civilian work force. Some of this was due to the assessment of the threat and the

realization that a great number of the Army CS and CSS units would never see any action.

Therefore, they were relatively safer than those in the front lines, and if a chance needed to be taken to get more personnel deployed faster, here was the opportunity.

The Army ignored many readiness deficiencies among RC CS and CSS units and deployed them (to the Persian Gulf) anyway. There were several reasons for this. CS and CSS units were needed to fill capability gaps in AC structure. The units were essential to the accomplishment of the mission. CS and CSS units were to operate in the Corps rear area, away from the "front line." The battlefield survival skills of these units was therefore not as critical. Most support units tended to be stationary. The remainder relied on combat vehicles to get around in the desert, placing less of a premium on physical fitness and mobility capability than in combat units. They were not as prepared for war as AC units, but in DESERT STORM this fact proved to be less than critical.³⁰

The larger underlying reason is that, for the most part, soldiers in RC CS and CSS units were able to attain readiness levels faster than in the combat units. For whatever reason and regardless of the rationale used to deploy them into theater, the main reason was that they were ready sooner.

Many CS and CSS units could have deployed much sooner to the Gulf had lift assets been available.³¹

The Army and JCS continue placing emphasis on the ARNG as a source for combat, CS and CSS units to deploy early in any conflict as demonstrated by the success of the ARNG units which deployed in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.³²

There are perceived capability problems with placing too many key components of the overall Army capability in the lap of the RCs. Some leaders are afraid that at some point the AC combat units will not be able to deploy because essential RC CS and CSS units will not be ready in time.

Participants also stressed the risks associated with the current heavy reliance on Reserve NBC defense units, again as with the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS), particularly in contingencies such as DESERT SHIELD that do not have the luxury of a buildup period. This would be especially true if the adversary were to use NBC early to deter the United States from intervening by posing the prospect of high casualties.³³

RC CS and CSS units, despite some shortcomings, were thrust into the fray (Persian Gulf) and did the job. With the exception of the two ARNG field artillery brigades that were deployed, the same cannot be said for RC combat units.³⁴

Some of this increased capability is a function of the mirror jobs in the civilian sector that exist in some CS and CSS units. There is also the factor that perhaps the skills of a truck driver or mechanic are easier to master and retain than those of a tank gunner. But a more significant reason is the ease of training during the normal cycle that typifies many CS and CSS units in relation to combat units.

Although large-scale maneuver exercises are helpful in training CSS units, they are not essential; most essential CSS training can be conducted in the armory, the motor pool, or an accessible local training area. Combat units rely extensively on coordination and teamwork; comparing the training of an infantry unit to that required of a medical unit is a bit like comparing the type of practice necessary to meld a winning football team versus a winning track team. The type of training necessary to produce effective combat maneuver units requires both the time and terrain that are generally unavailable to RC units.³⁵

The results of RC involvement in the Persian Gulf War have been examined by many government agencies and interested parties. Innovative ideas continue to be presented in how best to get the most out of every training dollar allocated by the government. Congress is sure to take notice of these initiatives, and whether right or wrong, the Army must be prepared to either defend itself against debilitating restrictions and structure or effectively apply new methods of restructure that have merit.

Why not put structure in the RCs that lends itself to home station training; training not requiring extensive field maneuver? Why not look to the RCs for what they have proven they can do best: Support! Not coincidentally, this is also where the greatest acceptance and integration with the AC has been achieved. Why not assign the RC missions of full-time support for the AC? Base operations and "schoolhouse" training could be executed by the RCs. This would free some of the approximately 125,000 to 130,000 AC soldiers currently in the Table of Distribution and Allowances organizations to be transferred to Table of Organization and Equipment fighting units.³⁶

On the other hand, combat units, such as (armored) cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and complex synchronization skills at company level and higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill periods. The training of these combat units at company level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills, but those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire support, artillery, air defense, engineer, signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a whole host of others.³⁷

The pressure to downsize and simultaneously be able to project the country's wishes and interests into the far corners of the world will continue to force the US Army into restructure of all its components. Some hard and possibly unsavory choices will have to be made if the US Army is to continue to be the dominant force on the modern battlefield.

¹Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "The Future of the Citizen-Soldier," (Lexington, Kentucky, The University of Kentucky Press, 1994) 2.

²Robert L. Goldich, "The Army's Roundabout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," CRS Report for Congress, (Washington, D.C: US Government, October 22 1991), 1.

³Ibid., Jacobs, 57.

⁴US General Accounting Office, "National Guard - Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," Report to Senate Armed Service Committee, (Washington, D.C: US Government, September 24, 1991), 2-3.

⁵Ibid., Goldich, 23.

⁶Ronald E. Sorter, "Planning Reserve Mobilization: Inferences from Operation DESERT SHIELD," Report to Congress, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 1993), 17.

⁷Ibid., Goldich, 23.

⁸Robert F. Ensslin, "Time to Bite the Bullet", Armed Forces Journal, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 1996), 28.

⁹LGen Drennan Clark, and LTC David Pennington, "Turn out the Lights, Lock the Gate" Armed Forces Journal, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 1996), 35.

¹⁰US General Accounting Office, "Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved," Report to Senate Armed Services Committee, (Washington, DC: US Government, May 12, 1993), 7.

¹¹US General Accounting Office, "Army Reserve Components: Cost, Readiness and Personnel Implications of Restructuring Agreement," Report to Congress, (Washington, DC: US Government, March 7, 1995), 4.

¹²Ibid., 7.

¹³Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "The National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States," Report to Congress, (Washington, DC: US Government, April 1993), iii.

¹⁴Ibid., iii.

¹⁵General George A. Joulwan, "Reserve Component Campaign Plan," Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, (Washington DC: Reserves Officers Association, October 1996), 23-26.

¹⁶Colonel John R. Brinkenhoff, "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power," Parameters, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Autumn 1996), 5.

¹⁷Ibid., Sorter, Lippiatt, Polich, J. Michael, 35.

¹⁸Bruce R. Orvis, Harbert J. Shukiar, Laurie L. McDonald, Michael G. Mattock, Rebecca M. Kilburn, Michael G. Shanley, "Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components," Report to Congress (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 1996), iii.

¹⁹US General Accounting Office, "Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades," Report to Congress, (Washington, DC: US Government, November 4, 1992), 2-3.

²⁰Ibid., "National Guard - Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," 3.

²¹Army National Guard Bureau, "After Action Report Operation DESERT STORM/Operation DESERT SHIELD," (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 June 1991), 7.

²²Ibid., "National Guard - Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," 14.

²³Charles E. Heller, "The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components" Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, US Army War College, December 7, 1991), 30.

²⁴John D. Winkler, "Assessing the Performance of the Army Reserve Components School System," Report to Congress, (Santa Monica California, Rand Corporation, 1996), 69.

²⁵Ibid., Goldich, 31.

²⁶Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) Headquarters (Canada), LFAA Reserve Restructure Proposal, (Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, Canadian Government, 12 August 1996),.

²⁷Ibid., Heller, 21.

²⁸Ibid., Jacobs, 71.

²⁹Ibid., Heller, 22.

³⁰Ibid., Jacobs, 90.

³¹Ibid., "After Action Report Operation DESERT STORM/Operatrion DESERT SHIELD," 23.

³²Ibid., 25.

³³Robert G. Joseph, "The Impact of NBC Proliferation on Doctrine and Operations," Joint Defense Quartely, (Fort McNair, Washington DC: Department of Defense, Autumn 1996), 74.

³⁴Ibid., Jacobs, 101.

³⁵Ibid., 101.

³⁶Phillip A. Brehm, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force," US Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Department of Defense, 21 February 1992), 6.

³⁷Ibid., Goldich, 43.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
THE CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE RESTRUCTURE
PROCESS AS IT APPLIES TO
US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

General

In order to determine which are the specific and general principles of the Canadian Army Reserve restructure process that could have application to the US Army RCs, an in-depth yet largely subjective evaluation and logical analysis was required. Until these principles are actually physically applied to either of the US Army RC models, there can be no definitive answer with regard to which principles will work and which will not. Serious and critical evaluation of these recommendations and concepts will almost certainly be conducted by the US Army prior to their inception in any future RC restructure program.

The remainder of this chapter is therefore devoted to focusing on the discussed recommendations regarding the Canadian restructure model principles which have been evaluated as having particular relevance for the US Army RCs. Such clear-cut evaluations, however, were not always possible. In instances where it proved impossible to evaluate a particular principle for suitability against the US Army RCs, recommendations regarding further study of the principle are identified.

The ability of the US Army to restructure and reorganize their RCs is critical to the very survival and function of the Army as a whole. Without the RCs, the capability gaps in the AC

structure will continue to widen, leading to the hollow shell army that existed in the sixties and seventies. The future provision of limited budgets and resources for the three Army components will certainly hamper the ability of the Army Total Force Structure to complete all of its missions if current organizational, training, and readiness practices are not refined or altered.

Barring a future recurrence of a major threat to the US Administration such as the Persian Gulf situation in 1991, the possibility of increased funding levels for the military as a whole are assessed as minimal. This is not to imply that the US does not have the capability to reply to any threat to their interests, but will they have the time to develop the resources and capabilities necessary as they continue to downsize their strength and operational units.

In the near future, the US Army is apt to suffer disproportionate budget cutbacks in relation to the Navy and the Air Force for one simple reason. The Persian Gulf War has convinced many individuals, political, civilian, and in some cases even military, that the US Air Force, with their attack aircraft and precision-guided munitions, and the US Navy, with long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and naval aviation assets, are capable of winning any major conflict by themselves. One must only look at the 1997-1998 equipment acquisition priorities of the US military to see the importance that these high technological weapons and systems have in the US military structure. Of the top ten funded military programs, the Navy and Air Force accounted for seven of them.¹ This trend will almost certainly continue to the detriment of the Army as funds are switched for manpower and equipment to highly expensive high-technological weapon development and acquisition programs.

This simplistic version of how to win wars has in fact been voiced by many pilots and naval personnel who themselves should know better what the essential requirements are to seize and hold terrain. What they ignore, and what few civilians appreciate, is that until a pilot is willing to land his plane on enemy soil, jump into an enemy trench and neutralize the occupant, that piece of ground will continue to belong to the enemy. The Army is the only close combat force that must be maintained at

levels allowing them to achieve the missions assigned by the US Administration. They are indispensable for that reason and are the only service capable of accomplishing this difficult battlefield task in anything other than a very limited operation.

Unfortunately, it appears that recent statements in Congress demonstrate that many current Congressional leaders are influenced by the power of CNN and other news networks. This is especially obvious, and in some ways expected, when they are subjected to repeated television documentaries which show the glamour (and seemingly unfailingly accurate) high-technological wizardry of US Air Force and Navy weapons. They fail to correctly show that for all the gadgets and technology, a soldier with a weapon must still invade the enemy's territory in order to accomplish the victory that the Government desires in any conflict. All services are part of an integral team, each contributing significantly to final victory, but the Army will continue to need the manpower and resources to conduct the critical task of closing with and destroying that enemy. Without this basic capability, the US military will be unable to complete the missions assigned to it by the NCA.

The danger to the Army is that these same Congressmen control the budgetary purse strings for military manpower and equipment acquisition. No politician would prefer a bloody, resource and life expensive ground war over one fought by air and naval power and involving minimal risk. For that matter, no military planner would either, but the reality is that without a capable, trained, and well-equipped Army, the US will be impotent to stop actions such as the Iraqi invasion in 1991. In the face of the massive and completely dominant air campaign launched on them by coalition air and naval forces, and despite the number of cruise missiles that obliterated essential targets, the Iraqi Army made no step backward from Kuwait until directly threatened by the coalition Army, mainly the US Army. It is therefore in the best interests of the Army to mount an active campaign to ensure that continued cutbacks to Army budgets do not cripple them in terms of manpower, readiness, and equipment.

The restructuring of the US Army will continue as long as the people of the nation and the US Administration continue to search for ways to incorporate budgetary restraint in a time of perceived peace. The fact that the US population has a historical mistrust of a large-standing active army compounds the problem. This inherent mistrust makes it more likely that military, and therefore Army, downsizing will continue well into the next century. Barring a long-term global conflict or an incident similar to Pearl Harbor which will inflame the people to mobilize and strike back, the Army is faced with an increasingly complex problem in preparing to achieve and protect the country's national security interests when called upon while cuts continue to the resources necessary to do so.

The key to making the new military strategy work is full implementation of the Total Force Policy envisioned by General Creighton Adams. Budgetary constraints may be severe by the decade's end. AC strength will probably continue to decline and will eventually be followed by RC cuts. The only way for the Army to adhere to the strategy may be to, as General Sultan stated, integrate the three components into one effective force. This process must begin now so that the RC, with the support and assistance of the AC, can take advantage of its strengths and address its weaknesses. The Total Army concept can work, but only if the barriers between the components are eliminated by visionary, intellectually open, and decisive AC and RC senior leadership.²

Since research has determined that the restructuring process of the US Army RCs is an unavoidable dilemma, the analysis will now be completed by recommending the Canadian Army Reserve restructure principles that should be considered for inclusion in that process. No attempt will be made to measure the impact or benefit the application of a particular facet of the Canadian program would have on the US Army RCs. Instead, it will focus on the factors that were successful in Canada and that would likely experience the same success in the US Army.

Specific Principles of the Canadian Reserve Restructure Process

Involvement of Currently Serving and Retired RC Personnel in the Restructure Process

It is recommended that these personnel be included in the planning and execution process of any RC restructure proposals. Failure to do so will, as a minimum, seriously impede the process and

quite possibly derail it. These individuals and groups have proven to wield tremendous influence in the political, business, and community arenas. Without their involvement and support from the outset, the process becomes far more difficult if not impossible. Delays and inconsistencies in the restructuring process will only cause hard feelings and morale problems among RC personnel, not to mention lower readiness levels as uncertainty concerning the program takes effect. A proactive media campaign should be incorporated from the outset which stresses the concept that all three components and the former and current RC members involved are working to incorporate a solution that is in the best interest of the Total Force Structure.

Individual RC units should focus their yearly training cycles at the squad, platoon, and company level.

It is recommended that the US Army implement steps to verify that unit commanders are ensuring all RC personnel achieve and maintain the basic skills required of them by the applicable readiness standards. Although in some instances battalion level training may be beneficial after these standards have been achieved, brigade or higher level training should be conducted only during summer training concentrations, NTC exercises, or as a result of increased training opportunities due to activation.

It is also recommended that this program be provided with some sort of incentive to reward those units that achieve the required personnel training standards over a consistent period. Conversely, those units that do not consistently achieve these readiness standards should be considered for either reduced funding levels and readiness expectations, or in serious cases for deactivation.

Assignment of RC units in the schedule of unit activation to coincide with the nearly two MRCs strategy as assigned by the NCA.

The time required to complete the activation process for the RC units is the critical step toward ensuring the Army is fully capable of achieving success in the majority of their assigned missions. The

RCs however, are not allocated sufficient training time in their normal cycle to permit readiness for all possible contingencies. They must be given a specific focus to train to, else they attempt to be all things for all situations and end up being poorly trained for most if not all of them.

In order to allow the RCs this essential training focus within their available training time, it is recommended that the RC units be assigned specific roles and wartrace missions (which replaces the old CAPSTONE alignment) in accordance with the existing NCA strategy that will be followed during periods of mobilization. This allows prior training focus to meet assigned readiness levels, and should provide specific timetables for activation within the current five mobilization steps designated by the NCA. Units not initially activated should then be able to more closely focus their training efforts to the mission at hand as higher priority units are activated and deployed.

Formulation and precise adherence to an accepted set of viability criteria
when determining unit deactivations

It is recommended that future US Army restructure initiatives involving the deactivation of RC units be done in accordance with a specific and clearly identifiable set of criteria. These criteria should then be strictly followed unless specifically ordered by the Army Chief of Staff. Failure to do so paves the way for accusations of political meddling, mismanagement, geographic favoritism, and parochial pork barreling between the USAR, the ARNG, and the AC. This will have serious consequences on the success of any restructuring program.

The list of eight evaluation factors used by the US Army and mentioned in the GAO report of 1993 are included in chapter 4. It is recommended that of this list, the following be retained as criteria for further RC restructure initiatives: (1) Historical readiness, especially personnel readiness; (2) Access and proximity to training areas; (3) Projected ability of the area to support recruitment; (4) Owned versus leased facilities; and (5) Historical significance.

It is further recommended that the emphasis on geographical balance be applied judiciously and only after a decision has been reached concerning the number of RCs to be kept in the Total Force Army structure. This also impacts on the selection factor of state missions. State requirements must be considered in any decisions regarding the deactivation of ARNG units.

The evaluation criterion of participation in Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM should be modified to indicate participation in recent or current operational deployments.

There are several criteria of the Canadian Army RC restructure process that are already identified as valuable criteria for US RC restructure initiatives. Of the remainder from the Canadian model, it is recommended that any future US Army RC initiatives include the following as criteria: (1) The examination of historical success of the unit with regard to recruiting, training, and retaining soldiers; (2) Historical evaluation of consistently high readiness levels. The focus should be aimed at the skills required by the individual soldiers of the various MOSs, and on platoon and company sized formations, not on brigade and divisions operations; (3) A thorough historical review of the RC unit's effectiveness in managing its budgets for training, personnel, operations and maintenance, and other associated funding; and (4) A complete and in-depth review of the associated costs of infrastructure support to the RC units, particularly the number of armories required to permit cost effective training. Savings generated as a result of this process, or at least a large portion thereof, should be rolled back into the RC system to supplement their existing training, recruiting, or equipment acquisition funding.

Several of the general principles from the Canadian model are recommended for US Army RC restructure: (1) A specific scheduling of RC unit activations as they apply to a graduated national response and with regard to the nearly two simultaneous MRCs as outlined by the NCA. Only through this method can the existing AC capability gap or the lack of depth nationally in some capabilities be addressed; (2) Utilization of a system similar to the Total Army Establishment model in which success in recruiting, training, and retaining personnel is rewarded by increased funding to effect larger units.

This must be applied from the bottom up; (3) Increased use of full-time support to RC units, particularly the assignment of a larger proportion of AC officers and soldiers to RC units for periods ranging from two to four years. The reverse of this also is necessary, with more RC soldiers deployed as individuals to augment capability gaps in AC units on a regular basis; and (4) No task should be given to and RC units for which the associated funds are not allocated.

General Principles and Intent of the Canadian Army Reserve Restructure Process

The general guidelines of the Canadian model were formulated to provide further clarification and direction for those tasked to implement the specific principles of restructure. They played an important role in the restructuring of Canada's Army Reserve and are likely to have the same effect on the US Army RCs. Recommendations for the application of these guidelines into future US Army RC restructure processes follow.

Organizing the US RCs correctly to attain the missions assigned in the most efficient and cost effective manner.

It is recommended that the US Army take steps with regard to restructure of the RCs to achieve the following: (1) Identification and assignment of realistic readiness levels resulting in practical capabilities and yet decreased activation time for RC units from mobilization to operational readiness; (2) Initiatives should be undertaken to eliminate the mid-level discipline and leadership problems that detracted from the ability of some of the roundout brigades to achieve required readiness levels during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM activation. Specifically, the leadership and discipline problems mentioned within the roundout brigades by the GAO need to be addressed on a national basis; (3) The Total Army School System (TASS) be fully implemented and redundancies eliminated in the Total Army structure. Budgetary and manpower savings should be

returned to the Army for application in other areas; and (4) More, if not all, individual states should enter into mutual aid agreements to ensure that if the RC units of a particular state are deployed away on active duty, that troops are available for domestic emergencies should the need arise.

It is further recommended that additional study be conducted to determine the suitability of the following guidelines in relation to RC restructure, or that further consideration be given to implementing the following factors within the current structure of the Total Force Army during future restructure initiatives: (1) The US Army should examine initiatives in which to employ the ARNG and USAR as solely CS and CSS units, except in cases where the resulting realignment of AC forces to warfighter roles leaves serious capability gaps in the AC early deployment capability; (2) The existing duration of active duty assignment as specified by the current mobilization criteria be redesigned to allow authorization for longer periods of deployment at earlier stages in the process. This should be coupled with initiatives to make the system more flexible, particularly with regard to extensions to activation periods. This should be designed with a view to eliminating the requirement to re-deploy troops in theater to CONUS if an operation exceeds expected time frames; (3) The existing two RC components of the Total Force Army structure should be realigned to amalgamate the USAR and ARNG units into one single command structure. This should generate budgetary and manpower savings in the elimination of redundant command and control, personnel, and infrastructure, and make the application of future RC restructure initiatives more straight forward. Savings generated in this manner should be rolled back into the RC units. Detailed examination will be required to ensure that the individual state governments have troops at their disposal for domestic emergencies should the need arise; and (4) Steps be taken to ensure, as long as the two RC components exist in the US Army system, that they work more closely to better coordinate the difficult task of restructuring and downsizing their components so that AC, regional, and national interests are addressed.

Ensuring that the current role of the US Army RCs properly fits into the concept of a Total Force Army for the US.

It is recommended that the following RC restructure initiative be implemented within the US Army system: (1) Increased AC assignment and contact with RCs to break down existing negative barriers of perception between the various components; and (2) Specific missions be assigned to RC units and formations and that on mobilization those plans be more fully implemented.

Are US RCs capable of achieving the readiness levels expected of them?

In order to ensure that US RCs are capable of attaining these readiness levels it is recommended that: (1) More AC personnel be assigned to RC units; (2) That the AC be better educated in realistic expectations of their RC counterparts during activation; and (3) RC units train under as realistic conditions as resources and time will allow.

Are US Army RCs providing a cost effective return to the structure of the Army?

In order to improve the return for the investment in training dollars, the following are recommended: (1) The Total Army School System should be more fully implemented into the total US Army training system to reduce existing redundancies in personnel, infrastructure, and costs; (2) More RC personnel should be routinely employed on active duty with AC units to gain experience. This should be done as a matter of course and not only for operational deployments; (3) RC Officers and Sr NCOs should be given much more training and exposure to the essential skills of leadership, disciple, and battle staff duties; (4) More RC courses should be taught at AC schools or TASS installations. These facilities should be manned by both AC and RC personnel on a year-round basis.

into the 21st century, it is a virtual certainty that the current AC capability gaps will continue to expand, and more and more functions the US Army needs to conduct war will rest solely with the RCs. It has become critical that steps be taken now to ensure that the RCs are provided the necessary resources to accomplish these tasks and capabilities in the time available for yearly training. Without them, the AC is doomed to difficult if not impossible operations in all situations.

Of equal importance will be the US Army's ability to change the mind set of the AC with regard to the RCs. The existing situation where many AC personnel look down on their RC counterparts will only continue to encumber the process of preparing and training the RCs for war. The AC needs to realize that their own ability to engage in protracted combat rests increasingly on the shoulders of the RCs. Army leadership also must be cognizant of the increasing requirement to improve the training of the RC units and personnel through the increased use of full-time support, especially the improved use of AC personnel directly within RC units. This will prove a very difficult challenge but one that is viewed as critical to the continued success of the RC's contribution to the overall Total Force Army Structure and capability.

There can be no doubt that the current US strategic and operational capabilities, coupled with the technological character of the US Army today, makes them the most powerful combat force in the world. Their ability to project power to any region of the world and to win the nation's wars quickly and decisively has been aptly demonstrated in the past decade. However, if they are to maintain these abilities into the next century, they must begin now to eliminate or correct the serious problems that do plague their ability to accomplish these tasks as quickly as they would like or as could be necessary against a future enemy. The fixes are relatively simple. It remains to be seen if the political and military leadership has the nerve to ignore petty and parochial turf protection and do what is right and necessary for the army that guards the country. As the world's democratic leader, the US not only has

the capability but the obligation to ensure that they are able to defend freedom whenever and wherever required.

¹ Participant Observation.

² Heller, Charles E. "The New Military Strategy and its Impact on the Reserve Components," Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Department of Defense, December, 1991), p 33.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles and Papers

- Adams, Gary L. and Crowson, Dwain L. "The Army National Guard in a Changing Strategic Environment." Military Review, 71, (October 1991): 35-44,
- Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. "The National Guard: Defending the Nation and the States." (April 1993).
- Association of the US Army. "The Active and RCs: Partners in the Total Force Army." Army Reserve Association. Washinton, DC., 1989.
- Belzile, Charles. "Report of the Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves." Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, October 1995.
- Binken, Martin and Kaufmann, William W. "US Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks." Studies in Defense Policy, The Brookings Institution, 1989.
- Brinkenhoff, John R. "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power." Parameters, Autumn 1996.
- Brinkenhoff, John R. "War, Guidance and Guard Divisions." Strategic Review, 24, 1995.
- Brown, Roger Allen and others. "Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard." Rand Corp, 1995.
- Combined Arms and Services Staff School. "Reserve Component/Mobilization." Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995.
- Cooper, Jerry M. "The Militia and the National Guard in America Since Colonial Time: A Research Guide." Greenwood Press, Spring 1993.
- Davis, Richard A. (Richard Allen). "Army Force Structure: Attention Needed to Ensure an Ample Supply of Ready Support Forces." A Speech to the US Congressional Committee on Armed Services, 20 April 1993.
- Goldich, Robert L. "Army Reserve Components: Current Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service, 14 March, 1996.

- Gray, Colin S. "Global Security and Economic Well-Being: A Strategic Perspective." Political Studies. Washington, DC., March 1994.
- Grissmer, David W., Kirby, Sheila Nataraj. "Attrition and Retention in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard: An Empirical Analysis." The US Army Manpower Economics Conference, 5-7 December 1984.
- Kitfield, James. "Total Force: The First Wartime Use of the All-Volunteer Force Raises Questions About the Role of the National Guard and Reserve Units in Combat, The Disproportionate Burden Borne by Minority Enlisted, and Combat for Women." Government Executive, Volume 23, 10-11, March 1991.
- Malone, Jean T. Armor in Military Operations Other than War. (Thesis) Fort Leavenworth, Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995/96.
- Military Review. "The Reserve Components: Tensions between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army, Reserves contribution to the "total forces policy" and the role of civil affairs units in relief operations." April 1993.
- Nifong, LTC Michael R. "The Key to Information Dominance." The US Army Military Review, 13, June 1996.
- Morrison, David C. "The Part Time Military." National Journal, 21 March 1989.
- Shaver, David E. "Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and RC Harmony." Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 11 February 1992.
- Sheehan, General John J. "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration." Joint Forces Quarterly, Fort McNair, Autumn 1996.
- Shuster, Carol R and Bonanno, Charles J. "Reserves and Readiness: Appraising the Total Force Policy: Relying on the Reserves Makes Good Sense, but the Army Has Yet to Bring Practice in Line With Principles." Militray Review, June 1996.
- Strafer, Ken. "A Commentary on the Army RC." Military Review, 69, May 1989, 65-77.
- Sorter, Ronald E., "Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies." Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1995.
- Sorter, Ronal E. and Lippiatt, Thomas F. "Planning Reserve Mobilization: Inferences from Operation DESERT SHIELD." Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1993.
- Towell, Pat. "Defense Authorization: Surprises Are Unlikely as Hill Tackles Defense Budget: Controversial Weapons Programs: Gay Ban Likely to Resurface in Debate." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 51, pp 2232-2237, August 14, 1993.
- Towell, Pat. "Cheney Proposes Breaking Up 830 Guard, Reserve Units." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 28 March 1992.

Books

- Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. Indiana University Press. Bloomington, Illinois, 1984.
- Berberian, LTC Archie J. Return of the Strategic Minuteman. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, December 1989.
- Binken, Martin. Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC., 1993.
- Binken, Martin. US Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC., 1974.
- Binken, Martin, and Kaufmann, William. US Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities and Risks. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC., 1989.
- Brehm, Philip A. Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, February 21, 1992.
- Cooper, Jerry M. The Militia and the National Guard in America Since Colonial Times - A Research Guide. Research Guides in Military Studies, Westport, Connecticut, 1993.
- Deegan, Michael. RC Brigades and US Ground Forces in NATO. Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 1993.
- Donnelly, Thomas and Roth, Margaret, and Baker, Caleb. Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama. Lexington Books, The Fress Press. New York, New York. 1991.
- Goldich, Robert L. The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, US Congress. Washington, DC., October 22, 1991.
- Grissmer, David W., Buddin, Richard, Kirby, Sheila Nataraj. Improving Reserve Compensation: A Review of Current Compensation and Related Personnel and Training Readiness Issues. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, September 1989.
- Heller, Charles E. The New Military Strategy and its Impact on the RCs. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 7, 1991.
- Heller, Charles E.. Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, December 7, 1994.
- Hoffman, F.G. Decisive Force: The New American Way of War. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1996.
- Jacobs, Jeffrey A. The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington Kentucky, 1994.

- Neustadt, Richard E., and May, Ernest R. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. The Free Press, New York, New York, 1988.
- Orvis, Bruce R., Shukiar, Herbert J., McDonald, Laurie L., Mattock, Michael G., Kilburn, M. Rebecca, Shanley, Michael G. Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1996.
- Paret, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy: from Maciavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press. Princeton New Jersey, 1986.
- Patterson, R.F. New Webster's Dictionary (U.S.). PSI Associates, Miami, Florida, 1992.
- Rottman, Gordon L. and Volstad, Ron. Inside the US Army Today. London, 1988.
- Sarkesian, Sam C., and Connor, Robert E. America's Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities. Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, 1993.
- Smith, Perry M. How CNN Fought the War: A View From the Inside. Carol Publishing Group, New York, New York, 1991.
- Smyrl, Marc E. Conflict or Codetermination: Congress, The President, and the Power to Make War. Ballinger Publishing Company, New York, New York, 1988.
- Snow, Donald M., and Brown, Eugene. Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990's. St. Martin's Press, New York, New York, 1994.
- Sorter, Ronald E. Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies. United States Army, Santa Monica, California, 1995.
- Sorter, Ronald E., Lippiatt, Thomas F., Polich, J. Michael. Planning Reserve Mobilization: Inferences from Operation DESERT SHIELD. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1993.
- Spiller, Roger J. Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939. United States Army Command and General Staff College Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992.
- Stanton, Shelby I. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. Novato, CA. Presidio Press, 1985.
- Taylor, Robert L., and Rosenbach, William E. Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, 1992.
- Wiggley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1973.
- Wilson, Bennie J. III. The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC., May 1985.

Winkler, John D. Assessing the Performance of the Army Reserve Components School System. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica California, 1996.

Government Publications

Baca, LGen Edward D. Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year 1995. Washington, DC: Spring 1996.

Canadian Army. Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) Reserve Restructure Proposal (including associated presentation package) (Draft). Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, April, 1996.

Canadian Army. Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA) Submission to the Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves. Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, April 1995.

Canadian Army. Land Forces Command (LFC) Reserve Restructure Directive (Draft). St. Hubert, Quebec, Canada, July 1996.

Canadian Army. Land Forces Command (LFC) Presentation to the SCRR. St. Hubert, Quebec, Canada, 19 May 1995.

Canadian Government. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defense and Veterans Affairs (SCNDVA) (Canadian). Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, February, 1996.

Collenette, The Honorable David, Minister of National Defense. 1994 Defense White Paper. Government of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1994.

House Committee on Armed Services. Restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve. United States Congress. Washington, DC: hearing March 8, 1994.

Hylton-Greene, Renee, and Wright, Captain Robert K. A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard. US Department of the Army, Washington, DC: July 1986.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces. US Department of Defense. Washington, DC: June 1996.

Office of US Army, Chief of Army Reserves. US Army Reserve Long Range Plan 1993-2023. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., Summer, 1993.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Reserve Component Programs. US Department of Defense. Washington, DC., March, 1996.

US Army Publication. American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War. US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Monroe, Virginia and the Center of Military History for the US Army. US Department of the Army. Washington DC. 1997.

- US Army Publication FM 22-100. Military Leadership. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., July 1990.
- US Army Publication FM 25-100. Training the Force. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., November, 1988.
- US Army Publication FM 25-101. Training the Force: Battle Focused Training. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., September 1990.
- US Army Publication FM 63-4. Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., September 1984.
- US Army Publication FM 100-1. The Army. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., June 1994.
- US Army Publication FM 100-5. Operations. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., February, 1993.
- US Army Publication FM 100-7. Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., 31 May 1995.
- US Army Publication FM 100-17. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., 28 October 1992.
- US Army Publication FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., May 1995.
- US Army Publication FM 100-23. Peace Operations. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., December 1994.
- US Army National Guard Bureau. After Action Report Operation DESERT STORM/Operation DESERT SHIELD. US Army National Guard Bureau, US Department of the Army. Washington DC., 28 June 1991.
- US Army National Guard Bureau. Army National Guard as a Strategic Force. US Army National Guard Bureau, US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., 28 June 1991.
- US Army National Guard Bureau. Posture Statement Fiscal Year 1997, US Army National Guard Bureau., US Department of the Army. Washington DC., 1996.
- US Army Reserve Special Report. Twice the Citizen. Office of the Chief of Army Reserves. US Department of the Army. Washington, DC., 1992.
- US General Accounting Office. Army Reserve Components: Accurate and Complete Data Is Needed to Monitor Full-Time Support Program. Report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Washington, DC., December 30, 1991.

- US General Accounting Office. Army RCs: Cost, Readiness and Personnel Implications of Restructuring Agreement. Report to the Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC., 1995.
- US General Accounting Office. Efficiency of Reserve and Guard Training Has Improved Since 1974, But More Can Be Done. Report to US Congress, Washington, DC., 1979.
- US General Accounting Office. Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped By New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC., 1992.
- US General Accounting Office. National Guard Peacetime Training did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for the Gulf War. Report to the Secretary of the Army. Washington, DC., 1991.
- US General Accounting Office. National Guard: Using the Army's Supply System Will Reduce the Guard's Inventory Investment. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC., 1992.
- US General Accounting Office. Disaster Assistance: Department of Defense' Support for Hurricane Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC., June 18 1993.
- US General Accounting Office. Army Reserve Forces: Process for Identifying Units for Inactivation Could be Improved. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC., May 12, 1993.
- US House Committee on Armed Services. The Impact of the Persian Gulf War and the Decline of the Soviet Union on How the United States Does its Defense Business: Hearings. US Congress. Washington, DC., February 27-June 12, 1991.
- US House Committee on Armed Services. Military Forces and Personnel Sub Components. Restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve. US Congress. Washington, DC., hearing, March 8, 1994.
- US Office of the Secretary of Defense. Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1995. Washington, DC., 1996.
- US White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC., 1996.

Interviews

Interviews conducted with USAR and ARNG Majors Attending The US Army Command and General Staff College 1996-1997.

Surveys

Survey conducted with the USAR and ARNG Majors attending the US Army Command and General Staff College 1996-1997.

Survey conducted with selected senior leadership of the 35th Infantry Division (ARNG) located in Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Nebraska and Colorado.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
3. Canadian Defense Liaison Staff
(Washington)
501 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington D.C.
USA 20001
4. LTC Marvin Chandler
DJCO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-135
5. Dr. John T. Fishel
DJCO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
6. LTC S. Shutte
ARNG Representative
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
7. LCol J. Wermenlinger
DJCO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

8. MAJ Kevin T. McEnery
CTAC
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
9. LTC P. Kramers
Canadian Liaison Officer
Combibed Armes Center
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 06 June 1997
2. Thesis Author: Major J.P.G. MacIntyre, Canada
3. Thesis Title: U.S. Army Reserve Component Restructure: Does the Canadian Model Have Application to U.S. Army Reserve Components?

4. Thesis Committee Members

Signatures:

James Chandler
J.P.G. MacIntyre
[Signature]

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

S	-----SAMPLE-----	SAMPLE	-----SAMPLE-----	SAMPLE	-----SAMPLE-----	S
A	Limitation Justification Statement /	Chapter/Section	/	Page(s)		A
M						M
P	Direct Military Support (10)	/ Chapter 3	/	12		P
L	Critical Technology (3)	/ Sect. 4	/	31		L
E	Administrative Operational Use (7)	/ Chapter 2	/	13-32		E
	-----SAMPLE-----	SAMPLE	-----SAMPLE-----	SAMPLE	-----SAMPLE-----	

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	<u>Pages(s)</u>

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:

J.P.G. MacIntyre MAJOR

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).